#14 - RW 278
Imperial America: An Interview with John Newhouse
Washington Profile News Agency
October 13, 2003
www.washprofile.org

From 1998 to 2001, Mr. Newhouse served as senior policy advisor on European Affairs to Strobe Talbott, U.S. deputy secretary of state. From 1980 to 1998, he was a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution, and served as a staff writer for the New Yorker magazine from 1980 to 1994. He is currently a Senior Fellow at the Center for Defense Information in Washington DC. He recently published "Imperial America: The Bush Assault on the World Order", a book on America's foreign policy since September 11.

Q: You write in your book that Bush made the wrong foreign policy choices after 9/11. Was his policy toward Russia one of those wrong choices?

John Newhouse: No. I think he was right to meet Putin half way, and to establish rapport with Putin. I do think that the strength of the relationship remains at the personal level - I don't think Bush cares much about American policy toward Russia as long as he has Putin's ear. He doesn't really have a Russia policy, he has a Putin policy. He likes talking to him. Besides Tony Blair, he doesn't have close relations. When Bush had a problem with Tony Blair over Iraq in September 2002, he was extremely angry and confused, and he called Putin to discuss it with him. It's very unusual for the President of the United States to call the President of Russia to discuss problems he's having with the leader of the UK.

Q: What, in your opinion, were the other foreign policy mis-steps made by the administration following September 11?

JN: In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Bush had huge opportunities to begin the stabilization of the greatest sources of instability in the world. Specifically, he could have driven Israel and Palestine to direct negotiations. He could have rebuilt bridges to the reformist governments in Iran, because Iran was reaching out to America after 9/11, and even the hard-line clerics who run the place renounced the attacks. Iran was offering assistance to the US in various forms. Instead, Iran got the axis of evil speech, along with North Korea. Secretary of State Powell wanted to restart negotiations with North Korea to complete the agreement that Clinton had advanced to a considerable degree, but he was turned down. And after 9/11 there was a sense of urgency to do something about the sources of instability around the world, but nothing was done.

North Korea was ignored, Iran was ignored, the Middle East peace process was ignored. Pakistan became an ally because President Musharaff was seen as having helped us fight the Taliban. That was true, but he wasn't doing much about stabilizing the country or providing some sort of political coherence. He lost the support of moderates, and he never had the support of the extremists. All he has now is the army. Granted, that's an important institution, but it's a bit shaky too, and its allegiance can change. So Musharaff, in my opinion, has not played his cards right, and the US has not encouraged him to play his cards right, and Pakistan is the largest single source of instability and the greatest fomenter of terrorism in the world.

Q: Many people in Russia feel that Bush didn't give enough back to Russia after Putin pledged unconditional support for America and allowed American bases in Central Asia. Do you agree?

JN: I do completely. I'd imagine that this puts Putin in an awkward position, because he's done all the running in terms of making this relationship a real thing. And I think there's a great deal in it for him, or else he wouldn't have done it. He wants to rebuild the Russian economy, and in order to do that he needs help form the West in general, and from American in particular.

America should do more reaching out to Russia. There's a lot of business to be done on the counter-terrorism front. Many problems associated with terrorism originate in Central and Southwest Asia. The biggest problem in the world is Pakistan, and they could work jointly on that. Musharaff isn't really in full control - on some issues, the Pakistani secret services have more control. But there are also other problems in Southwest Asia and Central Asia.

Q: Are you surprised that President Bush has mostly ignored domestic Russian issues, such as freedom of the press and the war in Chechnya?

JN: I'm not surprised at all. America doesn't want to be interfered with domestically, and it doesn't want to interfere with a government that in principle supports them. The original trade-off after September 11 was that Putin would authorize an American presence in parts of Central Asia, where there was still a lot of Russian influence, in return for which America would not interfere with the war in Chechnya.

Q: Do you expect to see any Russian presence in Iraq, either a military or a business one?

JN: Not for some time. First of all, there has to be a constitution in Iraq, and after that elections, and then a government. And if a stable government does evolve, and the security situation improves, and if the US then withdraws its heavy military presence in Iraq - and that's a lot of "ifs" - well, at that point, Russia would be free to compete for business in Iraq, and oil would certainly be one of them.

Q: Do you foresee Russia being a long-term strategic partner in any security arrangements?

JN: Well, Russia gaining access to NATO was a very encouraging step, and I hope it can be built on. You could have a small group of NATO members plus Russia managing all of Western security arrangements. To me, that would be an ideal situation.