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#9 - RW 274
Moscow Times
September 18, 2003
How to Manage Chechnya
By Pavel Felgenhauer
Over the past few years, the Kremlin has been extremely successful in
creating a system of "managed democracy" throughout Russia. Now the
same tactic is being applied to Chechnya in an attempt to stabilize the rebel
republic where federal forces have been fighting an unsuccessful anti-guerrilla
campaign.
After assuming supreme power in 2000, President Vladimir Putin recreated a
Soviet-style "executive vertical," although elections were not
abandoned. In the Soviet Union, there were also regular "elections" in
which the candidates, chosen by the Communist Party, were elected with 99 to 100
percent majorities.
Now we have a multiparty system, but since 2000 seriously contested elections
have become extremely rare. By and large, Kremlin-selected favorites get
elected. Candidates who threaten this corrupt election process are either
"persuaded" to leave the race or simply get disqualified.
Kremlin-controlled television is the main source of information for the
majority of citizens and is used to promote favored candidates and parties.
Shameless propaganda and brainwashing has replaced journalistic news reporting,
comment and analysis.
A typical Russian television news program begins with several reports on
Putin, the great leader, meeting dignitaries, bureaucrats or the working masses
and uttering some words of eternal wisdom.
The present Kremlin is divided between two clans (the chekists and siloviki
vs. the Yeltsin Family) that are clinched in a bitter power struggle. But the
populace of the country is not involved and is not very interested in it. The
termination of the democratic experiment in post-Soviet Russia has been more or
less accepted by the entire nation.
The authoritarian and corrupt "vertical of power" has stabilized
Russian politics. Kremlin insiders like to state that the dullness of the
political scene is a sign that Russia is maturing into a "normal
country." Only Chechnya stands out. The rebels, supported by the
population, continue to fight with complete disregard for television propaganda
and the results of rigged elections.
In the spring, the Kremlin organized a referendum in Chechnya in which some
95 percent of the population voted for a Kremlin-written constitution in what
the authorities claimed was a popular rejection of separatist aspirations. Next
month, the Kremlin plans to have its pet Chechen, Akhmad Kadyrov,
"elected" president. Kadyrov is extremely unpopular in Chechnya, so
other, better-liked candidates have been crudely forced out of the race.
Kadyrov has a well-equipped private army of several thousand thugs. He is the
main supplier of vodka to Russian soldiers -- known to the troops as "kadyrovka,"
it is bottled in Kadyrov's home village of Tsentoroi.
The Russian occupation force is mostly young, and many men prefer to take
heroin or amphetamines instead of, or together with, vodka. People who have
served there say the drug supply network in Chechnya is well established.
To pay for drugs and vodka, Russian soldiers and officers maraud, extract
bribes at checkpoints, sell arms to the rebels, and provide protection for the
trade in illicit oil products.
In some respects, the situation in Chechnya is indeed stable. Various armies
and groups receive their cut of misappropriated reconstruction funds from the
budget or in other rackets. The rebels also play an important role: If they
weren't killing federal soldiers, the number of checkpoints would have been
reduced, the occupation force cut in size and the corrupt status quo have become
unbalanced.
If the rebels were more pragmatic, allowing Russian soldiers high on drugs
and vodka to kill their own in friendly fire incidents, Chechnya could
eventually turn into just another Russian region, where the police pretend to
fight "bandits," while in fact all benefit from the status quo. But
instead of appreciating Putin's political stability and corrupt "managed
democracy," the rebels employ truck bombs, shoot down helicopters and kill
people -- including generals, colonels and FSB officers.
It's clear that after the upcoming "election" of Kadyrov the
population will give the rebels even more support and more innocent blood will
be spilled. More bombs will go off and there will be more Russian reprisals.
Maybe the Kremlin should spend a fraction of what it is already squandering in
Chechnya on providing each family with a television set and brainwashing them
along with the rest of the nation.
Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst.
CDI Russia Weekly #274 ~ Contents Next
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