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#12 - RW 274
Rossiiskaya Gazeta
September 18, 2003
BETWEEN THE CIS AND THE US
Is where the key to the success of Russia's foreign policy is hidden Russia is
unlikely to send its peacekeepers to Iraq
Author: Vitaly Tretiakov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE SUCCESS OF RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY, ESPECIALLY IN RELATIONS WITH THE
UNITED STATES, DEPENDS TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT ON THE SUCCESSES OF ITS POLICY
IN THE CIS. WHAT DOES THE UNITED STATES NEED FROM RUSSIA NOWADAYS? ACTUALLY, NOT
VERY MUCH.
A CIS summit takes place in Yalta tomorrow. President Vladimir Putin will
meet with George W. Bush in the United States next week. George H.W. Bush
himself visited Putin recently. This visit by the father to a leader scheduled
to meet with the son is hardly a coincidence. The father must have come on a
fact-finding mission.
What does the United States need from Russia nowadays? Actually, not very
much. What it needs is the help of the United Nations (and Russia is a permanent
member of the UN Security Council) to shift responsibility for the ill-fated
occupation of Iraq from the Americans and their allies to all of the
international community.
Russia is unlikely to send its peacekeepers to Iraq, either in the capacity
of troops or police. Deterioration of relations with the Arab world, the threat
of terrorism expanding on Russian territory, and the prospect of having hundreds
of officers and soldiers killed (in addition to the casualties in Chechnya) -
all these are sufficient and sound reasons not to help George W. Bush extricate
himself from the blind alley of his own making. As for support of the new
resolution of the US Security Council, legalizing the presence of occupiers in
Iraq - Russia's support should be sold profitably. It should be sold for what
Russia needs: Washington's withdrawal from its positions in the CIS.
The Iraqi trap the Americans set up and walked into, despite numerous
warnings (from Moscow as well), provides a perfect opportunity to try to explain
to Washington that the burden of responsibility for global stability is
something beyond the strength of any single world power. And that Russia (in
cooperation with the United States and the European Union) can ensure this
stability on post-Soviet territory. Of course, it wouldn't hurt to back up these
assurances with examples of effective stabilization, and a display in which the
majority of post-Soviet countries would demonstrate their willingness to see
Russia playing this role in the CIS.
From this point of view, the importance of the upcoming CIS summit cannot be
overestimated. Its success or failure - especially the success or failure of the
plans for a united economic zone of Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus -
will decide whether Putin has another ace to play in his talks with George W.
Bush.
In fact, Russia's role in the CIS - or rather, how this role is perceived by
Washington - is the major issue in Russian-American relations, the foremost
criterion of how Washington perceives Moscow: as a tactical ally to be summoned
every now and then, or a serious partner in implementing Washington's plans for
establishing a liberal world order. The CIS is the region where Russia can and
should demonstrate the validity of its claims. But the experiment must be pure.
The Americans will not agree to it just to please Moscow; especially if Moscow
itself demonstrates to them its failures in the CIS.
In short, the success of Russia's foreign policy (its American sector,
actually) is 90% dependent on the successes of Russian diplomacy in the CIS.
CDI Russia Weekly #274 ~ Contents Next
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