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CDI Russia Weekly Home Edited by David Johnson

#11 - RW 274
RIA Novosti
September 17, 2003
COMMENTARY:
SHOULD RUSSIA SEND TROOPS TO IRAQ?

MOSCOW, September 17 (RIA Novosti military analyst Viktor Litovkin). Russia's Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov recently said in reply to this question that he was not "rejecting anything outright." Russian troops may be sent to Iraq under certain conditions. "Everything depends on the text of the resolution, the unity of opinion in the UN and the impact of this decision on the situation in Iraq," he said. "At any rate, the Security Council should make the relevant proposal to Russia and we shall consider it."

A week later Sergei Ivanov categorically refused to discuss any possibility of Russian military involvement in the peacekeeping operation in Iraq. "We have never had the intention," he said. And yet, the issue of sending Russian troops to Iraq in line with a UN Security Council decision has not been removed from the agenda.

Russia has both political and military-economic interests in that region of the Middle East. In the 1980s, Iraq was the largest buyer of Soviet-made weapons. As a result, it owed Russia 7.238 billion dollars for weapons and 586.7 million dollars for technical assistance as of December 1, 1996.

Baghdad has no reason to reject military-technical co-operation with Russia. US, British and other western firms, which today see themselves as the absolute bosses of the Iraqi arms market, will hardly be able to provide everything this specific market needs. The Iraqis do not know how to use western arms systems (as they have been trained with Russian weapons) and learning to do this will take time. However, order must be restored now. This would be better done by local troops and law enforcers loyal to the UN peacekeeping forces (provided they are deployed in line with a Security Council decision) and their command, as well as to the US administration and the interim governing council of Iraq.

If Russian peacekeepers were to take part in the operation, Moscow could easily supply the nascent armed forces of Iraq with at least small arms and other anti-terrorist weapons and provide advisers and specialists to train Iraqis with these weapons.

There are also other reasons for dispatching Russian peacekeepers to the stabilisation force in Iraq. The local population will trust Russians much more than US, British and even Polish forces or soldiers from any other country that took part in Shock and Awe. Russia is greatly respected in the Arab world and the presence of its troops in international peacekeeping forces will surely facilitate a quick restoration of order and peace and democratic elections in Iraq.

But there are as many, if not more arguments against Russia's involvement in the peacekeeping operation in Iraq. One of the main ones is that "this is not our war." France, Germany, Russia and other countries were categorically against the US and British invasion of Iraq and if Russia dispatches troops (even if in line with a UN Security Council decision) to help them stabilise the situation in the country, it will amount to retrospect approval of Shock and Awe.

Another counter argument is that nobody has guaranteed or will guarantee that the Iraqi arms market will not be closed to Russia. One might well suggest that there is no hope of receiving payment for the past weapons and hardware deliveries. The Americans will hardly allow Russia to get even a cent of their future dividends. In a word, we should not hope for any military-economic benefits in Iraq.

And then, where would the Russian peacekeeping contingent be deployed, provided the decision is taken after all? Dispatching it to Northern Iraq would threaten the good relationship with the Kurds, who have always been loyal to Russia. Its deployment in Central Iraq seems improbable, as the USA will hardly want to share responsibility for Baghdad and its environs with Russia. Accept subordination to the Polish command? This will not suit Russia's generals. And Southern Iraq on the shores of Shat el-Arab does not seem suitable either, as Russia does not need any conflict with the Shiites who dominate the area.

However, all these deliberations are secondary to the main issue: Russia does need a quick restoration of peace in Iraq. If the Security Council decides to send peacekeeping forces to Iraq under the banner and jurisdiction of the UN (it does not matter who is in command), Moscow could take part in its transportation. Its military transport aviation and civilian airlines have enough planes to carry out the operation quickly and at the highest level.

Neither can we exclude the possibility that our police officers will be dispatched to the international coalition police forces. The Russian Interior Ministry has done this before. Russian peacekeepers have been pulled out of Kosovo, but about 150 Russian police officers are successfully working there hand in hand with their counterparts from other countries.

Indeed, Russian arms producers could do their bit, too, as quite a lot of weapons systems were destroyed or damaged during the Iraqi war. Their safe scrapping calls for proper knowledge and skills to be implemented and it stands to reason that a producer country should know how to dispose of its weapons in the best possible way.

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