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CDI Russia Weekly Home Edited by David Johnson

#6 - RW 271
Izvestia
August 28, 2003
BABEL IN BEIJING
Russia's position at talks on North Korea

Author: Vasily Golovnin, reporter for ITAR-TASS, specially for Izvestia
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

RUSSIA IS BELIEVED TO HAVE A CHANCE TO DEMONSTRATE ITS DIPLOMATIC TALENTS AT TALKS ON NORTH KOREA: IT HAS PRACTICALLY NO TRUMP CARDS, BUT ALSO NOTHING TO LOSE. WITH THE OTHER SIDES HAVING THEIR OWN SPECIFIC PROBLEMS, THIS CAN PROVE A FAVORABLE POSITION.

Diplomats in Tokyo say Russia so far seems to be in the most comfortable position at the meeting in Beijing. At first, they did not want to admit Moscow to negotiations at all though; Washington was sulking because of its stubbornness during the Iraq crisis and together with Tokyo it was afraid the Russians would be playing in favor of another "axis of evil" state this time as well. After all, everyone remembers the passionate welcome once extended in Russia to the "Dear Leader," Kim Jong-Il.

Yet the Russian Foreign Ministry, more precisely Alexander Losiukov, deputy foreign minister responsible for Asia, was playing on his own: the diplomat once very significantly uttered Russia would certainly take part in negotiations, since "some will support this, while the others won't mind."

Moscow's involvement was eventually resolutely backed by Pyongyang, seeking at least any sort of allies. Seoul also extended support: it believes Russia's presence will make it possible to smooth the atmosphere at the meeting. Finally, the Americans agreed, too. As a result, arriving in Beijing Losiukov turned out to be the focus of media attention - many believe Russia can play the role of peacemaker or even go-between there.

In spite of all talks about "the Kremlin's proximity to North Korea," Moscow is actually actively working on how to urge Kim Jong-Il to drastic concessions as soon as possible. This is the only way to assess the frightening statements by the same Losiukov and other Russian figures about the threat of nuclear war in the Far East. To be sure, it's always useful to check the bomb shelters and civil defense system in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk. Yet the meaning of the signals was still different: it was made clear to Kim Jong-Il that irritated Washington, in Russia's view, could still give a box to the stubborn Pyongyang communists with all its might, given another exacerbation.

The proposals the Russian delegation has brought to Beijing are also basically acceptable for the Americans - North Korea rejects its nuclear program and returns to the non-proliferation regime, while the US guarantees its security in turn. Which, if need be, can be formally guaranteed by Russia and China.

So far, Pyongyang is declining this formula though - it doesn't want any unclear guarantees, but a legally binding Pact of Non- aggression with the US, as well as diplomatic relations with Washington and economic aid.

The Bush administration doesn't want to hear a word about any pact of non-aggression, saying the Senate would never ratify it. The US doesn't yet want to openly look into providing economic aid to North Korea either, although hints are made via the press that some material remuneration for the right behavior is possible for Pyongyang. The Americans are confident: time is working for them, since economic crisis in North Korea is acquiring disastrous traits, which is limiting Kim Jong-Il's chances more and more. Washington also counts on support on Beijing's part: if Pyongyang persists for too long, China can cut it off oxygen slightly, limiting economic aid.

Beijing, no doubt, does not want nuclear armament in North Korea. Its dream is to lift the current crisis; remove the conflict threat in the region; preserve Kim Jong-Il's regime; and gradually attain reforms in North Korea according to China's model. However, in the present stage, China is most afraid that this meeting will be a failure, with no distinct prospects for a second round.

S. Korea has a similar position; so far, it conducts itself as modestly as it can, afraid of both irritating its northern brethren and cooling relations with its American allies. It is hard to expect special initiatives from Japan: on the threshold of the possible parliamentary election this year, its government is chiefly concerned with its specific problems in relations with North Korea. This is primarily the issue of the Japanese once kidnapped by North Korea's intelligence. Against this background, they believe Russia has a chance in Beijing to demonstrate its diplomatic talents: the delegation practically has no trump cards, but it also has nothing in particular to lose.

(Translated by P. Pikhnovsky)

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