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#6 - RW 271
Izvestia
August 28, 2003
BABEL IN BEIJING
Russia's position at talks on North Korea
Author: Vasily Golovnin, reporter for ITAR-TASS, specially for Izvestia
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
RUSSIA IS BELIEVED TO HAVE A CHANCE TO DEMONSTRATE ITS DIPLOMATIC TALENTS AT
TALKS ON NORTH KOREA: IT HAS PRACTICALLY NO TRUMP CARDS, BUT ALSO NOTHING TO
LOSE. WITH THE OTHER SIDES HAVING THEIR OWN SPECIFIC PROBLEMS, THIS CAN PROVE A
FAVORABLE POSITION.
Diplomats in Tokyo say Russia so far seems to be in the most comfortable
position at the meeting in Beijing. At first, they did not want to admit Moscow
to negotiations at all though; Washington was sulking because of its
stubbornness during the Iraq crisis and together with Tokyo it was afraid the
Russians would be playing in favor of another "axis of evil" state
this time as well. After all, everyone remembers the passionate welcome once
extended in Russia to the "Dear Leader," Kim Jong-Il.
Yet the Russian Foreign Ministry, more precisely Alexander Losiukov, deputy
foreign minister responsible for Asia, was playing on his own: the diplomat once
very significantly uttered Russia would certainly take part in negotiations,
since "some will support this, while the others won't mind."
Moscow's involvement was eventually resolutely backed by Pyongyang, seeking
at least any sort of allies. Seoul also extended support: it believes Russia's
presence will make it possible to smooth the atmosphere at the meeting. Finally,
the Americans agreed, too. As a result, arriving in Beijing Losiukov turned out
to be the focus of media attention - many believe Russia can play the role of
peacemaker or even go-between there.
In spite of all talks about "the Kremlin's proximity to North
Korea," Moscow is actually actively working on how to urge Kim Jong-Il to
drastic concessions as soon as possible. This is the only way to assess the
frightening statements by the same Losiukov and other Russian figures about the
threat of nuclear war in the Far East. To be sure, it's always useful to check
the bomb shelters and civil defense system in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk. Yet
the meaning of the signals was still different: it was made clear to Kim Jong-Il
that irritated Washington, in Russia's view, could still give a box to the
stubborn Pyongyang communists with all its might, given another exacerbation.
The proposals the Russian delegation has brought to Beijing are also
basically acceptable for the Americans - North Korea rejects its nuclear program
and returns to the non-proliferation regime, while the US guarantees its
security in turn. Which, if need be, can be formally guaranteed by Russia and
China.
So far, Pyongyang is declining this formula though - it doesn't want any
unclear guarantees, but a legally binding Pact of Non- aggression with the US,
as well as diplomatic relations with Washington and economic aid.
The Bush administration doesn't want to hear a word about any pact of
non-aggression, saying the Senate would never ratify it. The US doesn't yet want
to openly look into providing economic aid to North Korea either, although hints
are made via the press that some material remuneration for the right behavior is
possible for Pyongyang. The Americans are confident: time is working for them,
since economic crisis in North Korea is acquiring disastrous traits, which is
limiting Kim Jong-Il's chances more and more. Washington also counts on support
on Beijing's part: if Pyongyang persists for too long, China can cut it off
oxygen slightly, limiting economic aid.
Beijing, no doubt, does not want nuclear armament in North Korea. Its dream
is to lift the current crisis; remove the conflict threat in the region;
preserve Kim Jong-Il's regime; and gradually attain reforms in North Korea
according to China's model. However, in the present stage, China is most afraid
that this meeting will be a failure, with no distinct prospects for a second
round.
S. Korea has a similar position; so far, it conducts itself as modestly as it
can, afraid of both irritating its northern brethren and cooling relations with
its American allies. It is hard to expect special initiatives from Japan: on the
threshold of the possible parliamentary election this year, its government is
chiefly concerned with its specific problems in relations with North Korea. This
is primarily the issue of the Japanese once kidnapped by North Korea's
intelligence. Against this background, they believe Russia has a chance in
Beijing to demonstrate its diplomatic talents: the delegation practically has no
trump cards, but it also has nothing in particular to lose.
(Translated by P. Pikhnovsky)
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