#11 - RW 269
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
August 13, 2003
RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY ON TWO CHAIRS
Is Moscow capable of defending its own interests?
Author: Viktor Kremeniuk
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

IN A WORLD OF SUCCESSFUL, INTERMEDIATE, AND UNSUCCESSFUL NATIONS, RUSSIA IS NOW IN THE INTERMEDIATE GROUP. ITS ECONOMY IS SPLIT, WITH ONE PART RELYING ON NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE OTHER ON HIGH-TECH PRODUCTS BASED IN THE DEFENSE SECTOR. RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ARE INTERDEPENDENT.

The combination of the consequences of the Iraq crisis and the summit of G-8 presidents and prime ministers in Evian still requires further analysis. The main issues are contained in the following questions.

Is Russia really capable of defending its legitimate interests if another situation arises in which the actions of the United States pose a threat to those interests, as in Iraq? Should Russia have sacrificed the need to defend what belongs to it (in Iraq, a matter of $9 billion in state debts, and the interests of Russian oil companies) for the sake of maintaining good relations with the United States? Does Russia have any alternatives for action at all, given the accelerating processes of globalization, in which Russia is not playing a primary role?

These questions, and possible answers, are being studied in research centers and - let us hope - in government agencies. Considerable time will be required for the answers to become part of real-world politics; but it's impossible to avoid looking at the range of possible answers.

A NEW STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD

One of the chief consequences of globalization is said to be a certain new structure of the world, based on the criterion of "manageability" as well as traditional indicators like military and economic power. The need to include the criterion of "manageability" in the standard description of a state has arisen because in the state of affairs in individual nations and international affairs, a great deal now depends on whether systems of governance are capable of resolving problems - in a way that doesn't create further problems. This assessment has come to be valued in politics.

The combination of old and new descriptors for the status of individual nations enables them to be classified into three groups: "successful" nations (which have made evident progress in the ability to resolve their problems); "intermediate" nations (those that want to be "successful" but have failed to do so as yet, for various reasons); and "unsuccessful" nations with the most dangerous and desperate level of development: poverty, disease, government disorder, systematic human rights abuses, and so on.

It's scarcely necessary to describe in detail what "successful" nations are. This is the West and some nations close to it: countries that have created solid, reliable government institutions, based not on force, but on the will of the people; countries that are able to handle issues related to basic human needs: food, housing, transport, education, health care, employment.

It would be wrong to say that such nations have no problems; but their historical experience has enabled them to create socio-political systems capable of recognizing and resolving any problems that arise in a timely manner, not permitting them to reach crisis level, and not resolving them in the interests of some groups and to the detriment of others. These nations have their foreign policy problems as well, to do with ensuring security; but they have grown accustomed to resolving those with the help of their senior ally, the United States, which gladly undertakes to resolve those problems in exchange for the loyalty of its junior allies.

The next group of nations is "in transition", in the intermediate zone. It includes Russia, China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and a number of other large and small nations that seek to achieve the first group's level of development, and are currently at various distances from that goal. This is a fairly problematic group, primarily because there is fierce competition within it over who is carrying out reforms, and how successfully; and who will be noticed by the first group and permitted to draw closer, at least as a participant in the G-8; and who will be granted the status of ally, or rejected and declared an enemy (Iran, for example). The problematic nature of this group of nations is also determined by objective indicators: population numbers (over half of the world's population); amount of natural resources (these nations supply most of the world's raw materials); and the nuclear arsenals of Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and (perhaps, in time) Iran.

While accepting basic Western values (living standards, access to technology, private property, and so on), these nations vary in their relations with the West - ranging from friendly (Russia and India) to cool or even hostile (Iran). The main criterion for the situation within these nations and their place in the world is the success of their economic and social reforms. If they are able to overcome the burden of their own past, as well as the attitude of the developed nations (not always friendly), then they will succeed as nations. If not - then they are likely to fall apart, or be left on the sidelines of progress.

Finally, the third group: the "unsuccessful" nations. Political correctness requires the least insulting description possible, though this is hard to find. No longer can their difficulties be attributed to imperialism, colonialism, or neo-colonialism. It is now clear that the fate of these countries (most of Africa, parts of Central America, Burma, Sri Lanka, Indo-China) is the consequence of some kind of serious internal flaws. These are the countries that have become havens for terrorists, producers of drugs, and the sources of illegal migration to developed nations. This is where the most dangerous form of terrorism is found: nuclear blackmail. This is the group the rest of the world doesn't know how to deal with.

AN ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT

The global system has never been able to avoid conflict, and it cannot do so now. The relief experienced by the world following the end of the Cold War only seemed like the dawn of "an era of peace and consensus." But after two superpowers managed to overcome the madness induced by fear and ideology, the conflict's axis of force moved into other areas, primarily relations between those at the top of the system and those at the bottom: between "successful" nations and the "unsuccessful" desperate cases.

So a kind of "asymmetric conflict" took shape. It would appear that comparing the military and economic resources of both sides in the conflict is quite futile; the balance is indisputably in favor of those at the top. And yet in their war against those at the top, those at the bottom have been scoring some victories so far: they continue to put pressure on the governments and societies of developed nations, imposing their system of security priorities on them. One clear example of this is the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Intifada.

The only advice that may be given to the nations fighting "terrorism", alone or together - the United States, Britain, Russia, Spain, Turkey, and others - is as follows. Don't rely so much on military force - if only for the sake of reducing the flow of voluntary recruits into the ranks of terrorists. Make more effort to be fair in dealing with the people of problem regions: show no mercy in punishing terrorists responsible for violence and robbery, but don't spare those from your own side who are equally guilty of looting and violence. After all, the ordinary people are perfectly well aware (despite all propaganda efforts) of whether they can trust any particular individual or any policy.

In the end, the whole "war on terrorism" is essentially a sign that systems of governance are incapble of resolving the problems of certain groups of the population (religious or ethnic groups); and as a result, those who suffer rise up against injustice. In the way the battle against "terrorism" is being organized and waged now, there is more of a sense of states seeking revenge for their "honor" being violated by terrorists - rather than any clear understanding of the true scope of the challenges involved or the options for meeting them. Given such an approach, no substantial, lasting success can be expected. The leaders who are gaining fame through fighting terrorism will be gone one day, but the problem will remain.

THE INTERMEDIATE ZONE

Thus far, the intermediate zone, with all its resources, does not present any great threat to the state of the international system. Although there are some potentially dangerous hotbeds of possible conflict, or even nuclear war (India-Pakistan), the situation in this group of nations is still determined by widespread hopes for success and resolving the problems of economic, political, and social reforms. The balance between these hopes and the real state of affairs is likely to determine where the nations of this group will go, and how stable the situation in this part of the world will be.

Under the circumstances, it is worth noting the growing disparity between nations in the intermediate zone. Firstly, one group of them stands out: the nations that are resolving all or part of their problems more or less successfully. This group includes China, whose economic reforms excite general admiration, although it's still unclear which way its political development will go. This group also includes the former socialist states of Europe, now being invited to join NATO and the European Union - which will naturally help them to consolidate their achievements in building new societies. And this group includes India, with its stable democracy, finally starting to make some progress along the path of economic development.

But the intermediate zone also includes nations where the situation is alarming. Pakistan, for example. An alliance with the United States has not prevented General Musharraf's regime from making undemocratic amendments to the constitution, or creating a nuclear arsenal aimed at India, or making broad use of terrorist methods in politics and relying for support on terrorist movements in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Iran is less alarming, though many are concerned about the activities of pro-Iranian terrorist groups in the Middle East. US policy on Iran is one of the embryos of future military and political conflicts that will shake the world.

For us, the most interesting country in this group is Russia. So far, it has not recorded any spectacular achievements in constructing a democratic society and a free market economy, although reforms have been nominally underway for over a decade. On the contrary, an outside view - friendly or otherwise - reveals the following picture: the formation of a new elite, not entirely flawless from the standpoint of the law; real power being usurped by the upper layer of the bureaucracy; a stunning degree of monpolization in the national economy; widespread corruption; an unmanageable state apparatus; rising signs of xenophobia (spy mania, refusal to allow foreign investors to operate freely in Russia, "taking offense" at foreigners who report human rights abuses, and much more).

There is the impression that despite all the leadership changes at the top in recent years, Russia continues to hang in the balance between the past and the future, between a socially responsible society and social Darwinism, between prioritizing individual and social liberty or the concept of a "strong state." Given Russia's considerable quantities of nuclear weapons and natural resources, this places Russia in a unique position.

TWO WORLDS AND IN BETWEEN

The description given above can hardly be viewed as a typically Russian exaggeration of Russia's role. There is every reason to believe that the situation in Russia - which undoubtedly has a decisive influence on Russia's foreign policy - does play a significant role in shaping the contemporary world order. In line with its ancient emblem of the double-headed eagle, Russia has at least two components in economic, political, and cultural terms. This isn't simply a matter of West and East, Europe and Asia, as political scientists sometimes say. These are two different incarnations, two different faces of the nation and its society.

On one side, there is the economy based on extraction and processing of natural resources; at present, the dominant ones are oil and gas. A powerful economy, globally significant, bringing in billions of dollars each year for owners and employees, contributing the bulk of the state's revenue. Closely linked to this phenomenon are the political preferences of the owners of oil companies (and other companies): the oligarchs. All of them are drawn to the West, where their main markets lie. For this group (and its power is impressive, if we recall the role of "Yeltsin's Family" in Russian politics), only one model of Russian foreign policy is acceptable: alliance with the West. An alliance on our own terms, of course (not permitting Western capital to enter Russia); but still an alliance that would entrench Russia's raw materials orientation and enable this group of the elite to count on favorable prospects for the future.

The positions of this group are frequently confused with the position of Russian liberals, the "Westernizers", although these are different groups. The pro-West attitudes of the oligarchs and associated political circles (the Union of Right Forces, for example) represent an aim to gain a strong ally in the outside world, not a strong rival within Russia; the wish to make Russia their own "preserve", the base for their international power, not ruling out the possibility of an authoritarian system in Russia. But the "Westernizer" liberals uphold Western values: individual liberty, free enterprise, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly. In their social position they are less close to the oligarchs than they are to medium- sized and small business; they believe that unless Western capital is allowed to enter Russia, political and economic power will continue to be monopolized in Russia - a situation that threatens not only basic liberties, but the entire future of reforms. These two groups - the oligarchs and the liberals - are not in conflict with each other, but neither have they established a political dialogue.

On the other side there is an entirely different economy. This is the defense sector and everything connected with it: the space industry, nuclear energy, arms production, aviation, missile-building, and other high-technology sectors. Having failed to convert military industries to civilian production, and narrowly escaped the madness of "privatization", this part of Russia's economy is having great difficulties. The state and the government cannot ensure the kind of stable demand for its products that could enable it to survive tough times (meanwhile, mad sums of money are spent on various anniversaries and other celebrations, as well as the pointless war in Chechnya). This part of the economy is forced to seek access to foreign markets; selling products there at least enables enterprises to avoid shutting down. After all, millions of jobs are at stake here.

The West has closed off access to its markets for this sector of the Russian economy. What's more, the West has unceremoniously pushed it out of East-Central Europe. The American war in Iraq has resulted in this part of the Russian economy completely losing the Iraq market. Some nations are still friendly to Russia's defense-related sectors: China, India, Iran, Vietnam, and more recently Malaysia. The key problem in these markets is not a matter of billions of dollars in revenue for oligarchs, but a matter of basic survival; although if there is to be any serious dicusssion of Russia's prospects as a great power, such prospects can only be realized if Russia retains its scientific resources (some of which have been irretrievably lost already by the oligarchs' regime) and the industry based on that.

Russia's objective need to preserve and develop this part of its economy is pushing its foreign policy to the East, toward the markets for its high-tech products. This is the basis for the duality in Russia's foreign policy, and what might sometimes appear to be senseless vacillation between East and West. If we recall how strongly the US intervened in the cryogenic engines deal between Russia and India in 1993 - and how the US actively pushed us out of Iraq, a potential major customer for our high-tech products - and how the US is now laying siege to our scientific and technological contacts with Iran - then the direction of American policy becomes extremely clear. As a potentially dangerous rival in high-tech markets, Russia is having its "oxygen supply" deliberately cut off. Incidentally, this is also the reason behind conflicts between the US and France, and the US and Germany; France and Germany would prefer to keep Russia as an important participant in scientific and technological progress, capable of challenging the US itself in a number of leading sectors.

As a consequence, whether we want this or not, Russia's foreign policy (even leaving out anybody's personal preferences or ambitions) will continue to sit on two chairs: on the one hand, seeming to establish close contacts with those at the top of the international system as a supplier of raw materials; on the other hand, establishing close contacts with the intermediate group as a supplier of high-tech products. It's an unenviable position (since the "Bush question" will always be there: With whom do you stand?) - but it also offers the room for maneuver required to ensure that Russia is not a hostage to only one available option. The algorithm for a conclusive solution to this problem will determine the course of economic and social reform within Russia.

If Russia continues to evolve in the direction of being the West's raw materials appendage and quasi-ally, the foundations of an oligarchic political regime (somewhat like Pakistan) will be entrenched in Russia; a regime advantageous for the United States and not posing any danger to Washington's global plans, despite Russia's nuclear arsenals. But if pressure from the class of industrial enterprise directors and the headquarters of medium-sized business leads to Russia's economic reforms taking a different direction, one that enables Russia to retain its scientific and industrial resources, the evolution will be different. Then Russia's alliance with France and Germany, as well as its close contacts with the East, would become more understandable, despite Washington's displeasure. One way or another, as long as Russia remains a nation occupying one-seventh of the world's land surface, it will have to cooperate with the United States. There's no avoiding that. The question is how, and on what basis.

As globalization intensifies, the roles of individual nations may change and acquire new parameters. What we are seeing now - the US as a superpower with a world of dependents, a world of enemies, and a world of half-allies, half-rivals - will not last forever. China's turn is approaching; it is becoming the world's leading economy in terms of GDP; it has an interest in globalization, and in resolving the Taiwan issue on its own terms. India's role is growing stronger; and for India, close relations between the US and Pakistan are not only an unacceptable option, but a form of threat. The outcome of the America-Iran crisis is unknown. At the other end of the spectrum is the "revolt" of France and Germany due to Washinton's policies in Iraq. For Russia, this chain of events opens up new international prospect; but the big question is whether Russia will be able to take advantage of them in the interests of its own development.

(Translated by Kirill Frolov)

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