#8 - RW 268
Moscow News
August 6-12, 2003
U.S. Know-How Doesn't Work in Chechnya Why Russian security services are unable to subdue Chechen warlords
By Sanobar Shermatova

This past spring, Chechen leader Akhmad Kadyrov announced the establishment of a fund to pay bounty for the heads of Ichkerian resistance figures. According to sources among Moscow-based Chechens, the fund is estimated at $ 400 million. Originally, there were 12 names on the wanted list, but now it has grown to 30. The trick that was successfully used by the U.S. military in Iraq, however, does not seem to work in Chechnya. In the wake of the terrorist attack in Mozdok, politicians started accusing of inaction security and intelligence services designed to neutralize the organizers of terrorist acts. Indeed, after each terrorist attack law enforcement agencies cite Aslan Maskhadov and Shamil Basaev as the masterminds behind it. It would be logical to expect a follow-up in the form of a special operation to catch them.

Is there a political order to neutralize Ichkeria leaders in the first place? This is a far from idle question as during the first military campaign, according to then-Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov, there was no such directive from the Kremlin. According to sources in Moscow's Chechen community, after Djokhar Dudaev's death, in the spring of 1996, a certain accord was reached between Moscow and the Dudaev followers to guarantee personal security to top officials on either side. The agreement was still in effect in the summer of 1999 when Chechen and Dagestani bands invaded Dagestan's Botlikh district from Chechnya: Later, Shamil Basaev and his group retreated back to Chechnya without any losses.

Ditto for Aslan Maskhadov and Vakha Arsanov, former vice president of Chechnya. As Moscow accused Maskhadov of masterminding the terrorist attack at Dubrovka, he was reportedly safe in one of the North Caucasus republics while Vakha Arsanov was staying in Nazran, in a house opposite the Assa hotel from where he occasionally volunteered to mediate negotiations with the hostage-takers.

Informed sources say that Shamil Basaev never leaves his native Vedeno district where he trains and instructs future terrorists. To the naive question why he cannot be caught there, there are at least three possible answers.

First, security services do not have their covert agents in the Basaev inner circle. He skillfully hides in mountain caves while no one wants to expose themselves and risk their lives.

Second, security services are vying with each other, blocking each other's efforts.

Third, top military brass is not interested in seeing the key resistance figures leave the stage. Should Basaev and Maskhadov go, how would the military, security, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies justify their presence in Chechnya which has turned into a feeding trough for them as well as a springboard for rapid career advancement?

The present situation, however, cannot go on forever. With presidential elections pending in Russia the head of state should demonstrate positive results in Chechnya. The ruling authorities do not have much choice: Either wipe out the resistance leaders or negotiate with them. As long as KamAZ trucks packed with explosives roam the North Caucasus unhindered, there is simply no question of the effectiveness of police or military action. The latest terrorist attack in Mozdok is a case in point.

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