#14 - RW 266
Russia in Global Affairs
http://eng.globalisation.ru/
Lesson from Iraq: Foreign Policy Must Be Unpopular
By Fyodor Lukyanov
Editor-in-Chief, Russia in Global Affairs.

The Gulf war entered its final phase -- the construction of a new Iraq by American standards -- so rapidly that the dumbfounded global community barely realized what had happened. Even before a comprehensive analysis of the Iraqi campaign is completed, the Russian leadership must draw, without delay, this very important conclusion: Russia's foreign policy must be consistently unpopular. Only then will it be able to meet the actual interests of the state.

The Iraq war has demonstrated that an overwhelming majority of the Russian population, as well as a large part of the Russian elite, react to international events emotionally rather than objectively. From a psychological point of view this is understandable; Washington's unceremonious conduct infuriates at least half of the free world. However, Russia's foreign policy must become more pragmatic, as President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov repeatedly and rightly say. This means that political developments in the world must be calmly analyzed without any biased positions. Occasionally, this would mean taking decisions irrespective of how public opinion in Russia will respond.

What are the forces which help to determine public opinion in contemporary Russia? Public opinion is a product which is derived from the interaction of a large number of factors, each dangerous per se and actual dynamite when combined. These include, first of all, the "phantom pain" of a lost "superpower" status for Russia. Second, public opinion derives from an inadequate perception of the world and the place Russia is actually occupying in it. Finally, it is affected through domestic "political technologies," which serve to modify statements on international issues with a view towards boosting the popularity rating of a policymaker (especially on the eve of elections).

The Iraq conflict effectively demonstrated the mechanism for molding public opinion. President Putin's harsh public statement, delivered on the first day of the war, set the tone for the subsequent coverage of the military operations by the nation's leading mass media. Television and newspaper commentaries added fuel to the already strong anti-American sentiments in the country. The wave of anti-Americanism backfired on the government, however, leading its members to assume more radical positions while providing the hawks with more arguments for a harsh policy toward the U.S. Nevertheless, the head of state should be given his due: ignoring public opinion, he denied that Russia wanted to see the U.S. defeated in that war, and thus halted the wave of anti-Americanism from intensifying, which would otherwise have had serious consequences for Russia's foreign policy. Yet, the second statement came only after two weeks of fierce informational warfare.

Public opinion, molded in such a manner, makes for a bad adviser when responsible political decisions are required. For example, the anti-war rally, organized by the United Russia party on the day Baghdad fell and the Saddam Hussein regime collapsed, demonstrated how inadequate public opinion may be. In mid-February, when it was still possible to prevent war, millions of people around the world took to the streets to protest against U.S. war preparations. By contrast, Russian anti-war demonstrations involved only several hundred people; the rest of the population proved to be indifferent to events in Iraq (this was the people's actual attitude, which was not at all influenced by the current political situation).

Two European leaders, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, took opposite approaches to the public opinion of their respective countries during the Iraqi campaign. Blair, who fully supported the tough Bush-Rumsfeld line, quickly found himself in a difficult situation in his own country. Hundreds of thousands of pacifists staged protests on the streets of London, a revolt erupted within his own party and several of his Cabinet members turned in their resignations. These were ominous signs that Blair might very well have been the next one to go. Now, however, he is a hero of a victorious democracy.

The German chancellor chose a strong anti-war position which coincided with the public sentiments in his country. Moreover, he himself had roused these sentiments during the autumn 2002 election campaign. Schroder had no solid arguments to rebuff attacks from the rightwing opposition which lashed out at his Cabinet for a soaring unemployment and economic decline; the Iraq issue arose at the right moment as a straw to clutch to assure his political survival: the chancellor accused his rival from the Christian Democratic and Christian Social Unions (CDU/CSU) of wishing to involve Germany in a war. Schroder won the election by a slim margin. Now, however, the positions of the German Cabinet are endangered as economic growth has slowed and unemployment is on the rise again. The aggravation of relations with the U.S., Germany's main trading partner and investor, has angered big business in Germany. Now Berlin finds itself in the position where it must beseech the "militarist" Blair for his assistance in mending these ties.

Europe can afford a "small rebellion" against America -- whatever happens, their mutual trade and investment, totaling U.S. $2 trillion, will prevent the trans-Atlantic bridge from trembling, let alone collapsing. But Russia's relations with the world's only remaining superpower, on which much in the world now depends, rests on a rather unstable foundation. Actually, it seems to rest primarily on the personal relationship established between Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush.

It seems that the best example for Russia to follow in pursuing its foreign policy is the one provided by China. Beijing unequivocally opposed the war plans of the U.S. Anti-American sentiments prevail in Chinese society; it could not be suspected of entertaining any sympathy with Washington's striving for world domination. Beijing is highly sensitive about the violation of any nations' sovereignty, as it regards this act as a direct threat to itself; these feelings are probably more pronounced since the U.S. conservatives &mdash who are now molding sentiments in the White House &mdash have traditionally been rather ambivalent towards the Communist "Celestial Empire." Yet, China never declared that it would use its veto power at the UN Security Council, thus leaving it for Russia and France to clash with America.

Keeping itself above both the military and anti-war campaigns, Beijing preferred to concentrate on what really concerns it, that is, North Korea and the possible transfer of Washington's attention to the Korean Peninsula. As a result, China took over the initiative in Korea and Beijing was chosen as the venue for Pyongyang-Washington negotiations on the settlement of the nuclear crisis. Washington is now very interested in a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue. But will anyone dare accuse China of playing up to the U.S., or ignoring its own national interests?

The above does not suggest that one must necessarily love America or welcome the methods it now implements in order to build a new and safer world for itself. In a situation when Russia is objectively weak, our best interests will seldom coincide with our sympathies. If the Russian leadership now decides to pursue a policy that would enjoy wide support throughout the Russian population, it would do everything it can to prevent the Americans from rebuilding Iraq, since a majority of Russians would be only be too happy to see them bogged down in a post-Saddam chaos. But such a situation would not correspond with the real interests of Russia. It is difficult to say when the Russian people will come to realize this. The Russian elite must realize it right now.

This article was first published at the web site of the Vedomosti newspaper.

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