#11 - RW 266
RIA Novosti
July 23, 2003
CASPIAN: A SEA OF CO-OPERATION OR AN APPLE OF DISCORD?
Valery ASRIYAN, RIA Novosti analyst

Will the Caspian Sea, which has become an apple of discord between five coastal states (Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Iran) after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, become a sea of their fruitful co-operation? There is no answer to this question so far. But the 10th session of special presidential representatives of the Caspian member states on the legal status of the sea held in Moscow showed that their positions are becoming closer, giving ground to a hope for the long desired consensus.

It should be said that the search for a legal status of the Caspian Sea that would be acceptable to all five states is taking too long. As of now, the sea holds the status stipulated in the 1921 treaty between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and Iran and the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1940. They interpret the Caspian as "the Soviet and Iranian sea," i.e. an object of communal use for the two coastal states.

The unofficial and conventional Soviet-Iranian marine border was established between Astara and Gasan-Kuli, the southernmost points of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, in the mid-1930s. At that time, they were Soviet republics located on the Western and Eastern shores of the sea, respectively. In accordance with this gentleman's demarcation, over 86% of the sea was Soviet and less than 14%, Iranian. Since the sea is not naturally connected with the rest of the world's oceans and is in fact a landlocked water body (lake), it has never been covered by the norms of international sea law, in particular those regarding territorial seas, exclusive economic zones and continental shelves.

The issue of the new status of the sea would not have been put or taken such an acute and drawn-out form when four independent countries appeared on its shores instead of one (the Soviet Union), if it had not been for the Caspian's considerable hydrocarbon resources. These estimated resources amount to 15-18 billion tons of conventional fuel (10-11 billion tons of oil). It is not the Persian Gulf, of course, yet the amount is comparable to the substantial resources of the North Sea or Western Siberia.

Accordingly, the newly free Caspian states want to start digging for oil and gas as soon as possible in a bid to improve their economic situation and attract foreign investments. They have refused to use these resources as a common fund and demanded that the sea be divided between them. They are fighting over the ownership of fields, the location of division lines, and the maintenance of the natural preserve in the northern part of the sea, where only fishing and water transport were allowed to develop in the past.

Two different views became prominent from the very beginning. One group believes that the Caspian is a common sea and should be used jointly, while the other group demanded its division into sectors. In fact, this was done back in Soviet times, when the Oil Ministry divided the seabed into sectors in 1970 to facilitate the calculation of prospective hydrocarbon resources in each union republic. This is why the so-called median line was drawn on the seabed. It became an issue again immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. In 1993 Turkmenistan adopted a law on the state border, which announced the creation of inland waters, territorial sea and an exclusive economic zone. An article was added to the Azerbaijani Constitution in 1995, which claimed that the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea was part of the republic.

Russia and Iran initially protested this partitioning. But later, when trying to find a way out of the deadlock, Russia suggested a compromise. Let's divide the seabed with its resources with due consideration for the modified median line and keep the water body in common use, Russia suggested. Kazakhstan was the first to support the idea and Azerbaijan soon followed suit. The three countries have reached an agreement on the division of the Caspian seabed by this principle and Turkmenistan is holding consultations on the demarcation of the seabed with neighbouring Kazakhstan.

Iran is energetically negotiating with its neighbours, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. For a long time Teheran advocated the preservation of the 1921 and 1940 treaties, according to which the seabed and the water body should remain in common use of the coastal states or be divided equally between them (20% each). This Iranian stand is logical, as it would get the smallest "piece" - 13.8%, or approximately as much as it had in Soviet times - under the Russian scheme supported by Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Russia would get 18.7% of the seabed, Azerbaijan 19.5%, Turkmenistan 18.7%, and Kazakhstan would get the largest share, 29.6%. This does not look advantageous for Russia and Iran, but simple arithmetic does not work in politics (and the division of the Caspian Sea is mostly a political issue). Accordingly, Moscow believes that Iran's idea of joint use of the sea or its equal division between the coastal states will not resolve but will only aggravate the problem.

Like Iran, Russia can be formally regarded as an offended party if its idea is accepted. But after all, it is not figures that matter, Moscow believes. By refusing to fight for a bigger piece of the pie and accepting reasonable compromises instead, Russia will earn considerable political capital in the form of the trust of its Caspian partners. It will also facilitate the establishment of the new political, economic and moral foundations of neighbourliness. This capital would be no smaller and possibly even larger than that which Russia would gain by pumping several thousand more tonnes of Caspian oil.

Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Kalyuzhny, special representative of the Russian president for the Caspian problem, believes that "the division of the Caspian seabed from the modified median line would be the fairest method," which the five coastal states should accept. The other day he commended Iran for energetically searching for a solution to the status problem. However, there are no signs pointing to the possibility of Iran accepting Russia's scheme soon. Mehdi Safari, special representative of the Iranian president on the Caspian status, confirmed at the Moscow session that his country advocated a technical formula for the division of the Caspian, according to which Iran would get 19.9% to 20.3%. The Iranian delegate said that any unilateral action or bilateral or multilateral agreement would be valid only with the approval of all of the five coastal states.

In short , it would be premature to speak about consensus, although Kalyuzhny stressed that a considerable part of the draft convention had been co-ordinated and the situation in the region was favourable. Maybe the next summit of the Caspian leaders will finally clarify the matter. Last year's summit in Ashkhabad became one of the major political event of the year that boosted the sides' movement towards a solution of the status problem, said Russia's Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. He suggested holding a meeting of the sides' foreign ministers, arguing that it would reinforce the spirit of regional co-operation, help resolve remaining problems and facilitate preparations for the summit.

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