#13 - RW 261
RIA Novosti
THE FIRST STEP TO TRUST
By Colonel-General Varfolomey KOROBUSHIN, head of the Operations Strategic
Research Center of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces (1985-91)

On June 1 fifteen years ago the Soviet Union and the USA signed the treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF treaty). It was the first practical step towards building up mutual trust. In the three subsequent years, the Soviet Union and the USA eliminated two classes of nuclear-capable missiles that threatened not only each other but also third countries. It was an even of historical dimension.

The INF treaty liquidated a nuclear arsenal with a larger aggregate yield than the yield of all nuclear weapons humankind had used since their creation. The bulk of that arsenal (though it amounted to barely 5% of the aggregate number of nuclear warheads) was deployed in Europe. The flight time of those missiles was so small that the very possibility of their use greatly destabilized the situation for Moscow and many European capitals.

Soviet missiles deployed in the European part of the country could reach the remotest parts of the continent, including Iceland and Spain. American missiles deployed in West Germany, Britain, Italy and Belgium could reach Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Gorky (Nizhni Novgorod) and Baku. No wonder that they seriously affected the Soviet and American relations with their respective neighbors and allies. The INF treaty removed that very real threat from Soviet borders and paved the way to the reduction of not only nuclear but also conventional arms.

In all, the two states liquidated nearly 2,500 ballistic and cruise missiles. The last Soviet intermediate-range missile RSD-10 was exploded at the Kapustin Yar range on May 12, 1991, and the last US Pershing-2 missile was eliminated on May 6, 1991. Moscow liquidated 1,752 missiles (including 845 that had not been deployed) and Washington eliminated 859 missiles (including 283 non-deployed ones).

The liquidated Soviet intermediate-range missiles (with the range of 1,000 to 5,500 km) included RSD-10 Pioneer (SS-20 Saber, according to Western classification), R-12 Dvina (SS-4 Sandal) and R-14 Chusovaya (SS-5 Skean) ballistic missiles and RK-55 Granat (SSC-4 Slingshot) cruise missile. The liquidated shorter-range missiles (with the range of 500 to 1,000 km) included the OTR-22 Temp-S (SS-12 Scaleboard) and OTR-23 Oka (SS-23 Spider) missiles.

The USA liquidated Pershing-2 and BGM-109G intermediate-range missiles and Pershing-1A shorter-range missiles.

The Russian military believe something strange happened in the case of the RK-55 and OTR-23 Soviet missiles. The RK-55 had been tested but was not deployed by the day when the INF treaty was signed; yet it was included in it as a special case.

The story of the OTR-23 Oka is totally incredible. It did not fit the parameters of the treaty because it had a range of only 400 km. Created by a talented designer Sergei Nepobedimy, it incorporated the latest achievements of Soviet technology. It hit targets without fail, was invisible to the potential adversary's radars because it used stealth technology, and evaded electronic warfare systems. It could float and could be easily delivered by transport aircraft. The Americans wanted us to eliminate it and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze ordered the Oka to be incorporated in the treaty contrary to the firm objections of the Soviet General Staff.

The implementation of the INF treaty cost the Soviet Union and Russia dearly. The utilization of intermediate-range missiles topped 30 million non-denominated roubles and a lot of money was spent on 250 inspections of US facilities where intermediate- and shorter-range missiles were produced and deployed. Soviet inspectors became a permanent fixture at the factory in Magna, Utah, while the Americans kept a permanent team at our factory in Votkinsk, Udmurtia in northeast Russia. Mutual inspections lasted ten years.

In my opinion, we did not squander money. Both the USA and the Soviet Union became convinced in each other's honesty and that conviction is vital for confidence, then and now. Russians and Americans drew on each other's experience, learning above all to talk, to come to agreements, to respect the partner and to work openly.

The INF treaty allowed us to exchange data about missiles, for the first time in the history of bilateral relations, and to publish it in the press. By the data I mean the tactical-technical characteristics of ballistic missiles, the factories where they were produced, their deployment sites, testing ranges, warehouses, the composition and strength of combat crews that service the missiles, and their training centers. There were 117 such facilities in Russia, including Novosibirsk, Barnaul, Postavy, Malorita and Karmelava. The Americans had 32 facilities, including in Maryland, Utah, Colorado and Alabama.

Those positive trends were developed in the CFE treaty, START-1 and START-2 treaties and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SOR treaty), signed by the presidents of Russia and the USA in May 2002 and enforced on June 1, 2003.

In the past 15 years the world has firmly moved away from confrontation to cooperation between the planet's largest countries. I am not naive or optimistic. I know that there is a long and winding road to lasting peace and cooperation. But we made the first step to it 15 years ago.

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