Russian WMD Materials, Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction

While America’s attention has been riveted on Iraq and the war on terrorism, the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction agenda has, with little fanfare, protected the nation against major nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons threats. Nunn-Lugar and related programs have been a critical defense against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by reducing many of the dangers posed by the old Soviet Union’s massive Cold War arsenals.

During its 12-year span, threat reduction has posted some remarkable achievements. These concrete accomplishments are all the more significant because they have been achieved under often difficult circumstances through cooperation with Russian ministries and institutes that for more than 40 years were America’s enemy.

Beyond the measurable rewards, these cooperative programs also have created equally important but less tangible benefits, including an improved Russian appreciation of nonproliferation; heightened levels of trust between U.S. and Russian officials, military officers, and scientists; and new political linkages and relationships not thought possible during the Cold War. These intangible benefits are hard to quantify in official reports, but they are a unique result of this work.

Last year’s Group of Eight (G-8) pledge to provide up to $20 billion over the next decade under the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction has provided an opportunity to further catalyze and accelerate progress on this nonproliferation agenda and to bring in new allies to share the threat reduction burden....

Many of threat reduction’s enduring problems can be solved if decisive steps are taken in the near term to reform some key programs, create new ones, and make determined efforts to solve major obstacles. This will require focused attention and effort from the United States, Russia, and the other G-8 partners. In the United States, there is a reform role for both the administration and Congress. A congressional threat reduction reform agenda, however, should not focus on additional expenditure restrictions and more onerous reporting requirements as a means of assuring accountability. Fiscal prudence is necessary, but these methods have produced limited results to date, and reliance upon them places risk aversion over threat elimination.

Supporting the amendment of current law to give permanent authority to the president to waive the annual certifications required for CTR programs and Freedom Support Act nonproliferation programs. The president requested this action in the fiscal year 2004 budget request to Congress. Expanding and refocusing efforts designed to employ excess weapons scientists and specialists peacefully and eliminate WMD complex infrastructure irreversibly. Excess weapons scientists and workers are a major root cause of the proliferation threat given their expertise and access to weapons and materials. These efforts need more funding, greater flexibility, and new strategies in order to provide the career-changing opportunities that can further reduce, if not eliminate, the threat these scientists and their facilities pose. Supporting robust funding for key programs. The Baker-Cutler task force report, A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia, recommended that $30 billion be spent on nuclear security alone in Russia and other former Soviet states. To date, the United States has spent a total of about $7 billion on all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons threat reduction activities. Critical threat reduction programs were cut in the fiscal year 2002 budget submission. Without congressional action, those cuts would not have been reversed, and additional funding to accelerate the security of WMD materials in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks would not have been provided. The fiscal year 2004 budget request again cuts some essential nuclear material security programs, although they are designed to pay for new and important initiatives. Although some of the programs targeted for reduction have funding backlogs, if implementation problems are resolved, those backlogged funds could be spent rapidly. Creating a new global initiative that would eliminate weapons-grade uranium from vulnerable facilities worldwide (similar to projects conducted in Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Serbia). The authority to undertake this effort needs to be clarified and the funding for it provided.

The Bush administration also should make changes in the way it approaches threat reduction by: Integrating cooperative threat reduction activities into the concept of homeland defense and the war on terrorism. These programs are a first line of defense against WMD threats to the United States and its allies, and they should be considered a high national security priority, not foreign aid. This could also provide a basis for the expansion of threat reduction beyond Russia and other former Soviet states.

Creating a senior U.S. coordinator or focused coordination team that can prioritize, oversee, and expedite threat reduction activities. Currently the multiple threat reduction programs are run without a well-developed or coordinated strategy. This person or group must be more powerful than current interagency working groups and must have unfettered access to the president and his senior advisors.

Proposing the creation of bi-annual, performance-focused meetings between high-level U.S. and Russian political officials to evaluate threat reduction progress comprehensively, receive reports from program managers on advances and impediments in each program, and negotiate solutions to implementation obstacles. There is no substitute for having both sides in the same room reporting to senior political officials on programmatic progress and problems. In addition to the steps taken by the United States, it is vital for Russia to improve the environment for threat reduction activities by accounting for past WMD program activities, providing access to facilities where security improvements are required, offering financial transparency, and approving the legal protections that are needed to move this agenda forward. Resolving these problems would benefit from a much more intense political dialogue between the White House and the Kremlin than currently exists. If Russia is to be an equal partner in this process, however, it must be primarily responsible for addressing these key issues.

It is also important for the other G-8 countries to meet their financial obligations under the Global Partnership initiative and to focus their funding on priority proliferation issues. Intensified efforts also should be made to encourage the further involvement of non-G-8 states and to increase the total funding commitment to higher than $20 billion.

Cooperative threat reduction is a vital effort that is essential to reducing 21st century WMD threats. It needs to be updated, reformed, and expanded. Congress and the administration need to work together along with Russia and our other G-8 partners to make this reform a reality.

The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed.…We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best.…History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.

If terrorists or hostile regimes should gain access to the world’s largest exposed WMD stockpiles because of inertia, distraction, or risk aversion on the part of our leaders, our security will suffer despite other victories in the war on terrorism, and the judgment of history may indeed be harsh.

Kenneth N. Luongo and William E. Hoehn III are Executive Director and Washington Office Director, respectively, of the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC), a private nonpartisan research organization.