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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
www.ceip.org
Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project
Act Now to Save G-8 Summit
Proliferation Brief, Volume 6, Number 8
May 22, 2003

On May 14, 2003 project deputy director, Jon Wolfsthal testified before the House International Relations subcommittees on Europe and Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights on the issue of threat reduction in Russia and the upcoming G-8 summit. This Issue Brief excerpts his testimony, a complete version of which can be found at www.proliferationnews.org.

In a field filled with overstatements, exaggerations and superlatives, it is impossible to overstate the dangers posed by the continued lack of security over the weapons complex of the former Soviet Union. Each day hundreds of tons of materials and an unknown number of nuclear weapons - capable of killing millions of American citizens - are at risk of theft or diversion.

Let me be even more direct. These weapons, materials and know how remain at risk - ten years after the problem was diagnosed and first addressed - because the international community, including most prominently the United States, has lacked the will to make the political and financial investments required to solve these problems quickly enough. Americans live in imminent danger of nuclear terror because we simply have not done enough to address this threat.

As grim as the assessment is, things could have been much worse. Only through the foresight of the United States Congress and the combined leadership of Republican and Democratic administrations has the security situation in the Former Soviet Union improved. The wise expenditure of over 5 billion dollars has paid dividends in spades.

Yet despite our progress to date, much remains to be done. A recent Harvard University study, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, reports that only "37% of the potentially vulnerable nuclear materials in Russia was protected by initial 'rapid' upgrades, and less than one-sixth of Russia's stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) has been destroyed."

That more money, personnel or political support is needed is hardly news. The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board report chaired by Ambassador Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler recommended in 2001 that we spend $3 billion a year for the next decade on DOE's nuclear security efforts alone. The executive summary of the report stated "[t]he most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation-states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home."

What was true before the terror attacks of September 11 is even more so today, and yet we see the DOE program budget stands at roughly the same level that existed before 9/11 and before the Baker/Cutler report was issued. Let me offer a contrast. The risk that Saddam Hussein might develop one nuclear weapon was enough of a threat to risk US troops and expend at least $80 billion. Over the past ten years, we have spent one-tenth that amount to secure thousands of nuclear weapons we know exist and that could more easily end up in the hands of terror groups.

This testimony is not meant to imply that success or failure of these programs is only a matter of money spent. It is not. We have learned over a decade of threat reduction efforts that to make progress, the administration must invest political as well as financial capitol. The relationship between Presidents Bush and Putin offers both countries an opportunity to make great strides in threat reduction and nuclear security. Unfortunately, by our words and our deeds, the United States has failed to make these issues a top priority in our relationship with Russia. We must communicate at every level, including the very top, that securing Russian weapons and eliminating Russia's potential as a terrorist source for weapons is our top mission.

The G-8 Global Partnership is a major step toward ensuring that the United States and the rest of the world shares in the burden of dealing with the cold war's overhang in the former Soviet Union. Moreover, it is a critical path forward for ensuring that Russia can move from the position of a pure recipient of assistance to a broader force for nuclear security and non-proliferation around the world. The G-8 initiative is the first step in a process for Russia to resume its traditional role in non-proliferation efforts.

But these efforts are in serious danger of faltering. The Evian summit is less than one month away. The stated target of pledges has not been met, new programs are not in place and allies are still harboring grudges over the positions taken prior to the war with Iraq. The outlook is grim. The President himself can and must change the tone and the outlook for the summit.

Personal relationships matter, and for the sake of the Global Partnership and for the security for all Americans that this initiative's successful implementation would bring, President Bush should reach out to his French and German counterparts. He should make clear that their contribution in this area will go a long way to repairing the rift that has opened between the long-time allies. This effort will not in itself repair the overall alliance, but taken as part of a broader reengagement, the G-8 program could make a valuable contribution. The three leaders can take a personal role in ensuring that financial targets met, and that every G-8 partner sees the success of this initiatives in his or her direct responsibility. To raise the bar on these efforts, the President should challenge his G-8 partners to invest more money more quickly, and do so by pledging to invest three dollars for every one invested by the other states. President Bush should go even farther with Russia and pledge to spend five new dollars for every new dollar spent by Russia itself. In doing so, the President should also make the personal commitment in prestige and time to work directly with these countries and these programs to ensure they receive sustained high level attention.

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