#4
Vremya MN
No. 73
May 2003
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
RUSSIA-US DIFFERENCES CAN BE SETTLED
Vladimir FROLOV, deputy head of staff of the State Duma international affairs committee

Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Moscow at a critical moment in Russia-US relations. The Iraqi crisis showed that acute problems in bilateral relations stem from differences (sometimes big ones) in the evaluation of the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the so-called problem states and their connection with international terrorism, as well as different views on the relatively effective and legitimate ways of fighting these threats, especially as regards the unilateral proactive use of military force.

Unless the two countries harmonise their attitudes on these issues (as they did on the issue of fighting international terrorism in the autumn of 2001), Russia-US collaboration in ensuring global security will remain skin-deep and uneven, with outbursts of mutual mistrust. The way out is not in the radical reform of the UN, G8, NATO or international non-proliferation regimes, though some changes are overdue. What we must do in this situation is form a new common view of Russia and the USA on the new nature of threats to international security and the range of international legal instruments that can be used jointly to resist these threats.

There are three acute international problems where readiness for such cooperation can be tested.

The first is Iraq. The draft resolution on lifting Iraqi sanctions submitted to the UN Security Council by the USA, Britain and Spain includes certain concessions of the USA and Britain and provides a good basis for the resumption of constructive collaboration in the council. It should be improved, in particular by specifying the powers of the future special UN coordinator and increasing his role in creating a new legitimate government in Iraq.

But the main problem is Washington's unwillingness to stipulate, in view of current changes in the situation, a new role for the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors who should establish the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and ensure their liquidation. Since the coalition forces have not scored spectacular success in the search for these weapons, the issue of legitimising the result of this work is acquiring special significance.

The second international problem concerns Iran's nuclear programme. The USA is campaigning for Moscow's support designed to ensure that the June session of the IAEA board blames Iran for violating the provision of the non-proliferation treaty according to which it may not create nuclear weapons. The Americans believe that the relevant IAEA decision can be made because the IAEA found a major uranium enrichment facility in Natanza in February this year. The scale of the facility points to its predominantly military nature.

Such IAEA decision could be used as the legal basis for raising in the UN Security Council the issue of sanctions against Iran and seriously complicate the implementation of the Russian project at the Bushehr nuclear power station. Washington plans to use the forthcoming summit in St. Petersburg and the G8 summit in Evian to encourage the participating countries to take a harsh stand on Iran.

Undersecretary of State John Bolton held consultations on this issue in Moscow last week. The sides failed to harmonise their stands because Russia does not see any proof of the creation of nuclear weapons in Iran. Russia is prepared only to join the pressure on Iran in order to put the Natanza facility under IAEA control and force Iran to join the additional protocol on broader guarantees.

So far, there is no visible way out of the Iranian crisis and this problem can soon become the main irritant in Russia-US relations. On the other hand, it can encourage the sides to take a fresh look at the non-proliferation problems and find new ways of cooperation to neutralise them.

This calls for changing Russia's attitude to nuclear cooperation with Iran without putting in question its goals and Russia's contractual obligations. The secret creation of the uranium enrichment facility in Natanza (predominantly on the basis of Pakistani technology) and a heavy water factory in Arak seriously undermined Russo-Iranian cooperation in nuclear engineering. Moscow was deliberately misled concerning Teheran's ultimate goal in Bushehr. In other words, Moscow can condition nuclear engineering cooperation with Iran and its potential development on Iran's pledge not to create its own nuclear fuel cycle and to dismantle Natanza and Arak facilities under IAEA control. The USA should be prepared to back such an agreement.

The third problem is the nuclear programme of North Korea. Like in the case of Iran, the USA is trying to win Russia's support for a combination of symbolic negotiations to test Pyongyang's intentions with growing international pressure on the North Korean regime, including the possibility of arresting North Korean ships in order to block the export of ballistic missiles and weapons-grade nuclear materials. Moscow is not ready yet to support such harsh measures and calls for more energetic negotiations.

On the other hand, North Korea's negotiating tactic and its admission of the presence of nuclear weapons make one think about taking harsher international measures. Russia has mentioned the possibility of supporting harsher measures against North Korea in the UN Security Council if it creates nuclear weapons and exports nuclear materials. Russia and the USA also agree that North Korea must not have the nuclear status. In other words, differences concerning the choice of effective measures designed to prevent this can be settled.

(Translated by P. Pikhnovsky)

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