#13
Moscow Times
May 15, 2003
Bloody Internecine Conflict
By Pavel Felgenhauer
As the war in Iraq was developing, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, the Kremlin's chief
spokesman on Chechnya, told journalists that Moscow's staunch support of the
Iraqi regime could help solve the Chechen problem by "consolidating the
people" of the rebellious republic. Yastrzhembsky, it seems, was implying
that if Osama bin Laden and other Muslim extremists were supporting Saddam
Hussein in his fight with the United States, Chechen rebels (who are known to
have connections with al-Qaida) would appreciate Russia's pro-Hussein stand,
cease resistance and join the pro-Moscow forces.
Of course, this was just daydreaming. Some factions in the Chechen resistance
may accept aid and use volunteer Muslim extremist fighters from abroad, but the
main source of Chechen resistance is internal. And primarily it is a product of
the constant (and unpunished) attacks by death squads run by Russian
intelligence services, which allegedly kidnap and kill Chechens who are
suspected of helping the resistance. It is exacerbated by the marauding of
undisciplined federal soldiers.
The Chechen resistance is not and never was an al-Qaida import -- a fact the
Kremlin has failed to acknowledge. Actually, the official Chechen rebel leader,
President Aslan Maskhadov, announced last March that he fully supported the
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.
The official propaganda machine, steered by Yastrzhembsky, has year after
year been pushing the idea that the Chechen people love Russia and that foreign
mercenaries are running the insurgency. As is often the case, the creators of
this propaganda narrative have started to believe their own hyperbole.
Last March, Moscow organized a referendum in Chechnya to approve a new
constitution for the republic within the framework of the Russian Federation. It
produced a staggering Soviet-style result: 96 percent in favor. If the
plebiscite's results in any way reflected reality, there would be no support
base for serious, organized resistance in Chechnya. But the vote has not stopped
rebel attacks.
This week, in a suicide attack in Znamenskoye, northern Chechnya, a truck
laden with explosives blew up outside a government compound. At least 55 people
were killed, including six children under the age of 12, by a blast that had the
force of at least 1.3 tons of TNT. The attack destroyed a regional pro-Moscow
administration building in Znamenskoye and severely damaged the local office of
the FSB, which is in overall charge of the campaign in Chechnya. Several private
houses nearby were also ruined by the blast. The victims were pro-Moscow
government employees, Russian FSB operatives and local residents.
Znamenskoye is the center of Chechnya's Nadterechny region. Since 1991, this
region has opposed the separatist leaders in Grozny and openly stated its
allegiance to Moscow. OSCE representatives and human rights organizations
allowed into Chechnya by the federal authorities were in recent years based in
Znamenskoye as it was considered the safest place in the wartorn republic.
It would seem from the brutality of the rebel truck-bombing in Znamenskoye,
which was performed with very little concern for innocent, civilian Chechen
lives, that it was planned not only as an attack on the FSB, but also as
collective punishment for the pro-Moscow Chechens. As the conflict continues,
the bitter divisions within Chechnya grow (as Wednesday's suicide bombing in
Ilaskhan-Yurt further demonstrates). The rebels target pro-Moscow Chechens with
the same ferocity as Russian soldiers, increasingly using such indiscriminate
weapons as truck-bombs.
But still a sizable share of the Chechen population continues to support the
rebels. A Russian occupying force of more than 80,000, backed by more than
10,000 pro-Moscow Chechen militia men, is unable to break the rebel
organization. The rebels still manage to perform well-rehearsed attacks, like
the one in Znamenskoye. It would seem that Russian informers have not managed to
penetrate deep into their ranks.
The rebel organization has an efficient staff that plans attacks and gathers
intelligence information. And they have devoted hit squads to perform attacks,
including suicide assaults.
The organization also seems to be increasingly militant, and Russian support
for Hussein did not amuse the rebels at all. If the rebels do not care much
about killing Chechens en masse, including innocent civilians, what in the
future will prevent similar devastating truck-bomb attacks inside Russia -- even
inside Moscow?
Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst.
BACK TO THE TOP  #257 CONTENTS NEXT ARTICLE
|
