#8
Izvestia
May 8, 2003
ON THE SCALES OF IRAQ
The war in Iraq has some lessons for Russian military reformers
Author: Andrei Lebedev
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

RUSSIAN MILITARY REFORMERS OUGHT TO LEARN SOME LESSONS FROM THE WAR ON IRAQ. THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES ARE INEFFICIENT AND SHOULD BE REFORMED AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. THERE SHOULD BE A FOCUS ON A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY, MOBILE RAPID RESPONSE FORCES, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND JOINT COMMAND.

Lessons from the war on Iraq are closely related to Russian military reform - moreover, they can exert a significant influence on Russian military structuring and planning that are being reformed. This conclusion was made in the course of the speeches of Vladimir Dvorkin, an expert of the Center for Policy Studies (PIR-Center), and Yuri Fedotov, deputy director of the Institute for Applied International Research, delivered to a meeting of the Ambassadorial Club of the Foundation for Prospective Studies and Initiatives.

The war on Iraq, one of the most successful major theater wars, had the following distinctive features.

Counter to the expectations of many military experts, the surface operation was launched practically at the same time as aircraft preparation. Confirmation was given to the conclusion that the so- called no-contact wars make a particular case of major theater wars and that wars of this type in the future will seemingly combine both no-contact and land force operations.

The war on Iraq demonstrated the convincing prevalence of armed forces built and equipped in accordance with 21st century requirements over armed forces built by schemes of the 1960-70s even if they are strong and numerous. For according to the assessments of most military experts, not only Russian ones, the Iraqi army was strong enough, despite the defeat in the war of 1991.

Fundamentally important is a very low level of casualties: about 150 people for the Anglo-American coalition and probably an order more for Iraq's armed forces; figures of civilian casualties are alike. This is significantly lower than in preceding wars and incomparably lower than the casualties in the two Chechen campaigns.

There is another important question to which no answer was given in Iraq: about the possibility of pre-emptive small-capacity nuclear strikes on the state rousing concerns if this state possesses nuclear arms as well. The scheme applied in Iraq suggested that the enemy did not possess nuclear arms. Saddam Hussein did not take large-scale military efforts, but that does not mean that any future enemy of coalitions like the Anglo-American one will behave the same way. This scheme is hardly applicable to the Korean Peninsula.

Active top officials made no predictions concerning the operation in Iraq. However, there were quite a few statements from military analysts and former army chiefs in the media. The military establishment drew the conclusion that the war would be lengthy.

What caused errors in forecasts?

Russian military analysts make their predictions based on trends: the first war in the Gulf employed 10-15% of high-precision weapons; there was more in Yugoslavia and 85% in the second war in the Gulf. So they assumed that the second war in the Gulf would have no ground operation, or that it would be minimal.

Errors in Russian forecasts about the operation in Iraq lead to the conclusion that the top brass ought to pay special attention to multi-scenario planning combining strategic and tactical thinking, and decision-making support with special hardware, software, and computer systems. Information systems used by the Russian military must be improved.

The war on Iraq gave arguments to both supporters and opponents of a radical military reform. Opponents now say that it is time for Russia to increase its military budget, cancel conscription deferrals, create a powerful army, and reinforce its nuclear potential, as a similar operation against Russia in a certain while cannot be ruled out. Conclusions have been made in the paradigm of logics developed as far back as during the NATO operation in Yugoslavia. Another point of view consists in that it is time for Russia to seriously tackle its military reform.

So the next important question is why conduct military reform. There are two basic approaches to this question.

According to the conservative-traditional approach, the main military threat to Russia proceeds from the West, the US in the first place. The theoretic basis for this approach is different from the ideological Soviet one; it proceeds from a series of geopolitical theories of the early 20th (not 21st) century; however, this does not change its substance. Recpectively, the structure and tasks of the armed forces are viewed as resembling those the Soviet Armed Forces faced.

The armed forces in the Soviet period were meant to wage major wars, wars of greater dimensions than a major theater war, three- theater wars - in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region against the US and Japan, and in the Far East and Siberia against China. None of such wars is urgent to Russia in the foreseeable future.

Supporters of the second approach on the contrary believe that main threats do not proceed from the West, but from the South. These are threats related to local conflicts, low-intensive conflicts, borderline troubles, an entire range of the so-called untraditional threats, and international terrorism. This approach requires drastic restructuring of the armed forces.

Russia is currently placed in unique historic conditions when it has no enemy states in the closest outlook. Meanwhile, to fight terrorism Russia needs small, well-trained armed forces equipped with state-of-the-art high-precision arms. There is a need for high- precision arms and integrated systems of control, reconnaissance, and communications. Nuclear arms will probably play an important, though limited, role for Russia.

Adjustments conducted in the Armed Forces after 1992 have been distinctively chaotic and inefficient. Thus, the personnel numbers of the Armed Forces have reduced by almost 200% - from 2.8 million in 1992 to 1.2 million in 2002. However, their structure almost has not changed. In November 2000, the tope political leadership made decisions for the Armed Forces to number 800-850,000 by 2005; at the same time, the Strategic Missile Troops (RVSN) would be cut by 70-80%. However, in April 2003 the Defense Ministry leadership claimed Russia could not have Armed Forces numbering less than 1 million people, i.e. decisions made in November 2000 are being revised under the pressure of new objective circumstances, primarily economic ones.

Russia's military spending in real value, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), has grown by $10 billion or approximately 25% since 1998. Yet the structure of the military budget has even worsened. Thus, as compared with 1999, the share of spending to support personnel has risen significantly - from 30% to 40% - in 2003, whereas spending on procurement, combat training, and so on has relatively been cut. Only spending on research and design has grown slightly.

Since late 2001, special meaning has been applied to creating units of permanent alert and transiting to a professional army. The priority switching of sergeants to a professional basis is of fundamental importance to reform the Armed Forces.

The Russian army lags heavily behind in terms of its structure. The experience of the operation in Iraq has confirmed: for a long time already fight has not been conducted by combat arms and branches, but by groupings of heterogeneous forces and means. Russia's lacking joint commands prevents it from heightening the military potential of mixed armed forces capable of conducting up-to-date operations.

The first integration processes began in Russia in 1997 when RVSN were merged with the outer space and space missile defense troops. (In the US, the 20th army has been part of the space command for a long while already.) This gave very positive results.

However, a series of reorganizations beginning with good intentions encountered particularistic interests of individual combat arms and branches and ambitions of individual military chiefs. This phenomenon is typical not only for Russia. For a long time such integration could not happen in the US either - the Air Force and Navy stood their ground, claiming independence. Only after the Goldwater- Nichols Act on joint command had been passed in 1986 did the process move faster.

International experience suggests that armed forces are not always capable of substantial transformation; so only top legislative institutions or the very strong political will of a president can carry through major reforms.

The most important task in reforming the Russian army is to halt the threatening growth of the technological gap between the armed forces of the United States, the West and Russia - if not overcome it. This is a long process, requiring a lot of resources. Its realization requires choosing priorities. The priority now should be placed on high-precision weapons integrated with systems of reconnaissance, control, and communications. There are some promising high-precision weapons systems - but it will take about five years to bring them to the stage of regular production.

In the view of many military experts, the task for 2010-15 is to create a core - or, as it is called, a "hi-tech embryo" - of the future Armed Forces that can be increased subsequently. The Armed Forces are pictured to be built on principles of joint commands, their core being mobile forces of rapid response jointly acting with transport aircraft, naval, rail, and land vehicles under the control of an operative joint strategic movements command.

Such rapid response forces can be the prototype of the future army. They are also necessary for taking part in coalition operations, as there is a need for efficient armed forces and a hi-tech military - not for confrontation with the West, but to enable Russia to take part as an equal in coalition operations, including those more complicated than the war on Iraq.

However, it is hard to solve these problems while maintaining troop strength at its current level. Some experts believe that the Russian army might be cut even further.

The directions of reform in the Russian Armed Forces and defense sector are known. The war on Iraq should provide an impulse to accelerated implementation of these plans. There is some hope, and some initial signs, that the combat experience of the anti-Iraq coalition will provide momentum for real reforms in the Russian Armed Forces.

(Translated by P. Pikhnovsky )

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