#12
Moscow News
May 7-13, 2003
New Danger: Hyperpower on the Loose
The victory over Hussein has changed the United States' position in the world. What is the danger of this?
By Lilia Shevtsova
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)

Today the United States has assumed the role of a hyperpower with no checks or balances. The lack of any restraints opens before it a way to fulfilling the most boundless of ambitions. But at the same time the price of being the sole superpower is suspicion and even hostility from the rest of the world that is afraid of the U.S. behemoth. In short, omnipotence leads to vulnerability: We know this axiom only too well. The war in Iraq has demonstrated a dramatic paradox, formulated by Brzezinski as follows: The United States has for the first time found itself at the height of its military might and at the bottom of its political popularity. Obsolete Rules

With its military campaign in Iraq the United States has turned round the world chessboard, effectively saying: The current rules of the game on the international stage do not guarantee U.S. security, so we will ensure this security with the means we consider necessary. True, it should be noted in all fairness that the decisive strike against the world order that had emerged after World War II came from the breakup of the Soviet Union. It has since become clear that there is a pressing need to review the UN role, the NATO mission, the EU security policy, and international law principles, in particular the perception of international threats, the rationale behind the use of force, and the attitude to sovereignty. The question now is how to build a new world order - based on consensus, which is favored by Europe but is so difficult to achieve, or on U.S. hegemony. Thus far however it is far from certain whether the United States itself is ready to take on additional international obligations: Its current course is not necessarily a long-term strategy as many observers as well as U.S. foreign policy architects themselves would like to portray it. Paradoxically enough, it is not at all a foregone conclusion that Russia will be more comfortable within a consensus-based world order, not within the framework of a U.S. unipolarity that could well envision a special status of relations with Russia.

Going It Alone

So far it is clear that the United States is emerging from the Iraq war as a divided nation. Nearly one-third of Americans are still wondering why the Iraq campaign was necessary in the first place. American patriotism failed to consolidate the establishment. No sooner had Baghdad fallen than debate arose over what to do next. Stop in Iraq? Move on to Syria, Iran, and further down the "axis of evil"? Set out to reform the entire Arab world or limit itself to the threat of force, given that the world has now seen that America means business? Or maybe it is time to withdraw into its own internal problems?

The "battle of giants" - State Secretary Powell and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld - has once again come into the open, gaining new momentum. The former is seeking to reconcile the United States with Europe and bring the United States back into the Security Council. The latter is trying to legitimize the "Bush Doctrine" - the U.S. right to preemptive strikes and an unlimited use of military power. You might get the impression that Rumsfeld in effect received carte blanche from Bush and that Washington is moving toward a tough, forceful policy line.

We should not, however, jump to conclusions: Neo-conservatives are not the sole force in Washington. There are also moderate elements that are increasingly vociferous in saying: Don't let us go overboard. Heavyweight Sen. Biden argues, with good reason: In Iraq, we should act together with the international community. The Washington Post points out sarcastically that the White House deliberately caused widespread damage in Iraq to enable friendly corporations to cash in on the reconstruction program. In other words, the Americans are still capable of taking a critical view of their administration.

As for Bush himself, he does not behave at all like a triumpher. The reason is clear. Bush needs, first, to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and second, he needs success with "regime change" in Iraq. Only in this event will the war be justified.

Chances are that the Americans will indeed find weapons of mass destruction - or traces thereof - in Iraq. Democracy building however could be more of a problem. Over the past century the United States has made 16 attempts to change regimes in other countries, only two of them successful: namely, democratization of post-war Germany and Japan. But these attempts were legitimized by the international community and were accompanied not only by huge financial inputs (the Marshall Plan was worth about one-third of the U.S. national budget) but also by U.S. military presence in both countries. All other attempts at "regime change" are known to have failed. Afghanistan, where formation of a democratic state has been marking time, is yet another argument showing that the "Bush Doctrine" should be treated with caution.

Furthermore, Bush has yet to translate the military success into support for his domestic policy while all is not so simple here. In his time, Bush Sr., having won the first Iraq war in 1991, lost the election. Meanwhile, after the war, Bush Sr. had a 89 percent popularity rating, as compared to his son's 66 percent now. This, given that approximately 60 percent of Americans disagree with his tax policy. In this context, the White House could succumb to the temptation to score new military victories as a means of mobilizing the nation and winning elections.

Messianism with a Problem

The United States today remains the only Messianically minded country. All other democracies prefer calm to revolutionary upheavals. America's idealism, backed up by its vast resources, makes it by far the most dynamic society, capable of systemic shifts on the geopolitical field. Furthermore, the U.S. might dictates a tough and uncompromising line of conduct on the international arena. As one commentator put it, when you've got a hammer in your hand, all problems begin to look like nails. The sheer possibility of waging virtually stand-off wars with minimum casualties begets an aspiration to deal with world problems by striking a hammer. There is no getting away from the fact that the impotence of international institutions, the helplessness of Europe in military affairs and its obsession with its internal problems of integration do little to encourage the United States to display collectivist instincts.

Gravitation by the U.S. elite toward forceful policy produces a vicious circle: The use of force is rejected by the rest of the world, making America more vulnerable, which in its turn leads to further use of force. As a result, the United States risks ending up as a destabilizing factor in the world.

Meanwhile, the future of a new world order today is in the hands of the United States which can turn it either way. This puts to the test American society's ability to realistically assess both international threats and its own limitations, but most importantly, its ability to apply democratic principles in the foreign policy sphere. Nonetheless, this also is a moment of truth for the rest of the world which should understand that there are threats - above all the danger of proliferation of mass destruction weapons and international terrorism - that require an immediate and tough response. So there is a need to think about putting in place a legal groundwork with appropriate new institutions to ensure such a response. This will make it possible to avoid situations where the United States could once again find itself in isolation, which is dangerous both for itself and for the international community.

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