#11
Asia Times
April 30, 2003
Putin: The incredibly shrinking president
By Peter Lavelle

Is President Vladimir Putin slowly but surely losing his Teflon veneer, or is the true nature of Russia's political economy simply becoming more apparent? Events over the past few months would seem to attest that both propositions are correct. Putin's Teflon relies heavily on public relations and an acute tenacity in avoiding policy debate in public. In domestic affairs, Putin almost always sides with the predetermined winner. In foreign policy, his turn to the West has clearly irritated members of the state bureaucracy, but, then again, the most powerful domestic business concerns support this policy reorientation.

Thus, a very impolite question is in need of an answer: Does Vladimir Putin really matter? In early May, during his annual address to the federal assembly, he will have to explain why he is losing his struggle to fundamentally change Russia, as well as defend the importance of the office of president of the Russian Federation.

Over the past few months, the limits of what public relations can do for the Kremlin have been put to the test, and results have been mediocre. The Kremlin's expectations that America's war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq would end in a catastrophe have given Putin a black eye. The political assassination of Duma Deputy Sergei Yushenkov - a prominent liberal and perpetual thorn in the side of the political forces Putin has supported and even reluctantly protected - has hurt him further, as no one expects the culprit(s) of this act to be found as long as the security forces are in charge of the investigation. To add insult to injury, Putin is sporting a broken lip with the rise of YukosSibneft, an oil corporate heavyweight that will cast a long and powerful shadow across Russian politics. The Kremlin's usual backpedaling on economic reform as late tops off Putin's travails.

There is no doubt that Putin has found himself on the defensive over the past few months. Just about everything, be it domestic economic reform or foreign policy initiatives, has gone off course or stalled for the president. And Putin is virtually nowhere to be found as Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov's cabinet squabbles itself into a standstill. Putin has no meaningful public stance when it comes to tax policy and the recent legislative battle over military reform. The most important cabinet official supporting creative reform, Minister of Economic Development and Trade German Gref, is in the process of being hounded out of office due to a combination of Kasyanov's ineptness and Putin's unwillingness to stomp his foot in favor of Gref's agenda - an agenda that is supposed to reflect Putin's publicly expressed hope of transforming the economy.

The saving grace that keeps Russia's political elite afloat and the country's business leaders from starting an all-out assault on one other is the extraordinary influx of ruble liquidity, creating a sense of increasing affluence for the oligarchs and what is called Russia's "middle class". This limits the imperative for conflict with the state. At present, Putin the politician can take credit for stabilizing and enriching Russia for the lucky few. The super-rich have no real and pressing grievances at the moment as well - they are the ones who are being fabulously enriched as over a third of the population lives in abject poverty. During a time when those most interested in politics are making money hand over fist, the call to battle appears to be unnecessary. Or this seemed to be the case before the American war against Iraq, the murder of a high-profile member of the political opposition and, most importantly, the rise of the mega-oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky - signaling that the pecking order of Russia's business world has finally been secured. This makes the state appear less and less relevant in the areas in which it has a mandate: foreign policy, public order and regulation of the market.

Putin is a net loser in all three areas and, at the very least, this tells us something about his political role and the nature of Russia's presidency in general. Putin clearly was given some bum advice on America's chances of effecting "regime change" in Iraq. The "coalition of the unwilling" with the French and Germans, while noble, was a foreign policy initiative that bordered on naivety and stubbornness. And, in the face of all logic, the Ministry of Defense's plans for military reform will come to pass - the same military that forecast defeat of American forces in Iraq and cannot achieve victory in chaotic Chechnya. Putin's virtual silence on this issue is a reflection either of a low learning curve or that his hands are tied.

The murder of Sergei Yushenkov is telling as to Russia's current political culture. The death appears to be much more than a random act of violence or revenge. It was most probably a political murder ordered by someone in authority - someone untouchable. Even for those not overtly interested in politics, Putin's proclamation of a vision of "dictatorship of law" must ring very hollow right now: No major politically related crime has been solved for years, and nothing in the present political order appears to be moving to reverse this trend. Looking back over the past few years - the Putin presidency - it appears obvious that the "dictatorship of law" applies to those who cannot protect themselves or who have been rejected by those who control the levers of power.

The Yukos-Sibneft merger is the most glaring reason to wonder about just what the value of Putin and the Russian presidency in the country's political environment really is. From the start of Putin's term, there was a Kremlin attempt to keep the oligarchs equally distant form the corridors of power as well as prevent them from joining forces against the Kremlin. The merger of Yukos and Sibneft is a complete refutation of Putin's original "divide and rule" approach to those who wish to make the state irrelevant or, at most, a paid employee. The new YukosSibneft may help protect Russia's international petroleum interests, but it is hard to see how it can promote reform at home.

To date, Putin's "quiet revolution" has reined in the country's regional governors, installed numerous security officials in high government positions and, for all intends and purposes, resurrected the KGB. This has affected everyone in Russia except those who can afford to pay off the state. It would appear that the essence of Putin and his presidency is to keep the little folks under control while others live above and beyond the law of the land. It seems Russia does not need a president; it just needs a public relations-driven facilitator to keep the masses in line.

When Putin addresses the Federal Assembly next month, it will not be important which Russian oil company's insignia will be found proudly emblazoned on his chest. What will be of interest is if anyone will be able to see Russia's incredibly shrinking president on the chamber's podium.

Peter Lavelle is a Moscow-based analyst and author of the weekly e-newsletter Untimely Thoughts.

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