#8
Izvestia
April 22, 2003
MILITARY REFORMS: THE SABOTAGE CONTINUES
Russia is capable of carrying out military reforms immediately
Author: Boris Nemtsov, Union of Right Forces party leader
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

THE NEXT CABINET MEETING WILL DISCUSS THE DRAFT OF A FEDERAL TARGETTED PROGRAM FOR CONVERTING THE ARMED FORCES TO VOLUTARY RECRUITMENT. BUT THE GOVERNMENT'S GREATEST MISTAKE HAS BEEN TO PLACE THE GENERALS IN CHARGE OF MILITARY REFORMS, WHILE CIVILIAN VOICES REMAIN UNHEARD.

Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov's dramatic announcements about the forthcoming transition of the Armed Forces from conscription to contract service are obviously calculated to have a public effect. It's very important for the minister to demonstrate how right he is - in the lead-up to the next Cabinet meeting, which will discuss the draft of a federal targetted program for converting the Armed Forces to volutary recruitment.

Even if everything Ivanov has announced is implemented, only the permanent-readiness parts of the Armed Forces will be using contract service by 2007: the Ground Forces, the Airborne Troops, and the marines. The reforms will not affect the high-brainpower sectors of the Armed Forces. Even under the most favorable circumstances, only 15% of military personnel will be serving under contract.

For several years now, the Union of Right Forces has consistently advocated transition of the Armed Forces to contract service.

Sergei Borisovich Ivanov is an intelligence officer by profession, not a military man. When he was appointed as defense minister, some hope arose that he would finally be able to get the reforms moving. Alas... Ivanov has been defense minister for two years now, but the reforms are still dead in the water.

Let's try to work out the essence of the problem. Based on a proposal from Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov, a special government commission was set up last year, which was meant to prepare a military reform program. This commission has 30 members; most of them are from the Defense Ministry and other military agencies. The commission includes virtually no civilians, no one who could represent and uphold the interests of the citizenry - the people for whose sake these reforms are being carried out; their voice plays no role in this commission. The military officials who are members of the commission will obviously be focused on the narrow interests of their specific agencies; they will be unable to rise to the level of tackling major state objectives in the public interest.

What has been the government's greatest error? Placing the generals in charge of the military reforms. I firmly believe that as long as this harmful practice continues, Russia will not have a strong military.

The working group headed by generals Vladimir Isakov and Vladislav Putilin has done a fair amount of work to determine the funding required for a transition from conscription to contract service.

Two of this working group's conclusions are undoubtedly true, and are not disputed by the Union of Right Forces. For the past two years, we have insisted that in order to make military service attractive, a contractor's salary should be 10-20% above the national average wage - it should be 5,500 to 6,000 rubles a month, or 15,000 a month for service in conflict zones. Fortunately, the generals have been in agreement with our proposals. Some may object that no one would want to serve in the Armed Forces for the equivalent of $200 a month. That is not the case. Perhaps such a salary would not appeal to young people in Moscow, but it's entirely in line with wage levels in the regions.

The commission's second correct conclusion is that the barracks in divisions where contractors will serve need to be refurbished into "hostels".

But the military officials aren't stopping there. Apparently, the generals have decided to bundle solutions to all their problems under the heading of "reforms". Thus, priority funding categories now include housing construction, repairs and maintenance to military hardware, modernization of testing grounds, and much more. Of course hardware needs to be repaired, and testing grounds need to be modernized; but this ought to be done outside the framework of the military reforms - or else the whole project becomes massively more expensive and impossible to implement.

What has essentially happened here is a straightforward substitution: rather than setting about reforming recruitment, the generals have decided to aim for a defense spending increase within the debate over military reforms. The Union of Right Forces is categorically opposed to such methods. We consider that the main reform priorities are to radically reduce the duration of service, and to phase out conscription step-by-step, until compulsory military service is abolished altogether. In order to achieve this, it is essential to focus all political, financial, and administrative resources on one thing: making the Armed Forces competitive on the labor market. This means the salaries of low-ranking military personnel should be above the national average wage, and the salaries of officers should be well above that level.

So here is what the Union of Right Forces proposes. It is essential to place military salaries and refurbishment of barracks among the financial priorities in the 2004 federal budget; to offer all conscript soldiers and sergeants, as well as any other interested persons, the opportunity to sign contracts for military service; to permit young people from other CIS nations to take up contract service in the Russian Armed Forces (offering them the prospect of Russian citizenship); and not to limit the participation of women in the formation of a contract-based military. In order to attract people into the military, the government needs to make some decisions about raising the salaries being offered to contractors; in ordre to motivate officers to carry out reforms, it should be announced that salaries in divisions which make the transition to having 100% contract personnel will be raised by at least 2,000 to 2,500 rubles a month. We believe these measures will make it possible to form a contract-based military of 400,000 soldiers and sergeants by as soon as 2006-07. After that, the two-year period of military service could finally be abolished, with a transition to six-month training periods for reservists at specialized training centers.

How much will all this cost? Military leaders insist that the transition to a contract-based military will require unbelievable amounts of money - which Russia cannot afford at present. The generals are doing all they can to convince the president that this is true.

But in fact, Russia has the capacity to carry out these reforms right now. And the state does have the money - for the first stage of the reforms, at least. Our specialists have calculated that the first task (raising military salaries to the level of the national average wage, while reducing personnel numbers at the same time) will require 30-40 billion rubles. This is the sum on which funding calculations for Armed Forces recruitment reforms are based. The conclusion: we need to exclude the very expensive projects and focus primarily on salaries for contract personnel and officers, as well as solving the problem of modernizing barracks. This will require only 10% of the current annual budget of the Armed Forces.

Moreover, we consider it an extreme form of social injustice that young men from poor families are essentially required to pay an extra tax, which the rich can simply bribe their way out of. That tax is service in the Armed Forces.

In improving this situation, a great deal will depend on the president's political will. It is essential for the president to personally supervise the progress of preparing for military reforms. He needs to formulate the objective not as an abstract transition to a contract-based military over many decades, but as a socially significant priority which primarily entails reducing the duration of military service and subsequently abolishing conscription.

To achieve this, it is essential for the institutions of civil society to be involved in the process - not only nominally, but as an integral part of it.

(Translated by Gregory Malutin)

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