#7
French Commentary Views Impact of Iraq Crisis on Russian Diplomatic Trends
Le Monde
March 12, 2003
Commentary by Natalie Nougayrede:
"Pro-Americans Versus Anti-Westerners in Russia"

Has Vladimir Putin turned a corner? Is the "strategic partnership" between Moscow and Washington -- cited following 11 September 2001, and subsequently confirmed during George W. Bush's visit to Moscow in May 2002 -- about to collapse? The new insistence with which Russia, at the United Nations, is siding with France's viewpoints, expressing, via its foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, a categorical rejection of any second resolution opening the way to a military intervention in Iraq, is having a sharp impact on US leaders, who nevertheless are careful not to express this loud and clear.

They still hope that Vladimir Putin will "adjust his aim" at the last minute, as he has done in the past, and grant his approval, or at least passive consent, to actions previously vigorously condemned by his subordinates. This happened in connection with the deployment of US troops in Central Asia in 2001 (described as impossible by Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov) and even before that the arrival of US special forces in Georgia in spring 2002, which angered many members of the Russian military, but which the Kremlin leader did not consider at all a "tragedy."

There is in US leaders' statements no aggressive condemnation of the position adopted by Moscow over the Iraqi question. This is a long way from the volley of criticisms suffered by France and the "Old Europe." At his 6 March press conference, George W. Bush, when asked about the "Franco-German-Russian" rejection front, definitely avoided including Moscow in his remarks. Nevertheless, there is a mood of disappointment.

For some people, such as Russian analyst Andrey Pyontkovskiy, who has recently returned from Washington, Vladimir Putin has already gone too far to avoid compromising the "confidence" and "friendship" that George W. Bush has said he feels toward him.

In Moscow, a US diplomatic source is now issuing repeated veiled warnings: Russian economic interests (accession to the WTO, Moscow's involvement in post-Saddam Husayn oil arrangements in Iraq) "will be significantly affected by the degree to which Russia supports, or does not obstruct, the solution of the crisis" in Iraq.

A "very negative Russian attitude will have an impact on the support of the US Administration and public for the Russian-US partnership," this source said. So much for the risks.

Russia's opposition to the US war in Iraq is based on several factors -- the attachment, which has been proclaimed for several years (consider the war in Kosovo,) to a UN international order in which Moscow would retain that crucial element of a great power that is the right of veto; a strong aversion to the notion of interference; the desire to prevent absolute US domination in international affairs, and consequently to promote a multipolar the world, like France and China.

Domestic factors are also very significant: the fear that a collapse of oil prices following the arrival of Iraqi oil on the world markets could seriously undermine Russia's budgetary revenue and jeopardize the economic improvements that Vladimir Putin has been able to boast during the past three years; the desire to preserve the position acquired over the years by Russia's major oil groups in Iraq; and also anxiety about the rise of radical Islam that would be sparked by a war in Iraq, in view of the fact that one Russian in seven is a Muslim and the northern Caucasus region, where the Chechen war is dragging on, is one of the points of penetration of Wahhabism in Russia.

Mr Putin's Change of Course

But in Moscow, democrats favorable to a rapprochement with the West are now worried about the consequences of a stiffening of Russia's policy with regard to US plans.

In their opinion, Vladimir Putin has turned a corner. He has supposedly yielded to the appeals of powerful bodies (the secret services and the military) on which part of his power depends, and which have in fact never accepted the new post-11 September Russian-US situation.

They regard Russia's loss of ground in Central Asia and the Caucasus, its assent to NATO's enlargement to embrace the Baltic countries, and the dismantling of Russia's radar in Cuba and of a military base in Vietnam as so many concessions, poorly repaid.

They say that the time has come to adopt a patriotic, nationalistic tone in foreign policy, to reassert a specific Russian line that is already reflected in the ties that exist with Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.

"Until recently, Vladimir Putin performed very well diplomatically, adopting a middle stance between the United States and the prewar Europeans," according to Andrey Pyonkovskiy. But by threatening to use its veto by ostensibly supporting France's line, Moscow has, he said, gone beyond the point of no return.

"People in Washington, among those who were more favorable toward a long-term "strategic alliance" between Russia and the United States, believe that Moscow made a serious mistake.

The fact that part of the Russian establishment (diplomatic and military) have reservations about the pro-US line adopted by the Kremlin since 2001 is nothing new. What is new is the fact that their opinions seem to be dictating Russia's official conduct, in connection with the Iraq question.

"These circles had been silent for some time," according to Mr Pyontkovskiy, "but they have found a golden opportunity to speak out by siding with the position adopted by France and Germany. Putin tried to resist. He spoke (in a speech in Kiev) about 'stricter measures' against Iraq, but he warned his public against 'anti-Americanism.'" But he ultimately gave way, caught in pincer between on the one hand the pressures from the Russian establishment and on the other hand those brought to bear on him by Paris and Berlin."

According to this analyst, "it would be a mistake to believe, as some people in France and Germany do, that those Russia who oppose the US line on Iraq are essentially "the Europeans' friends." In fact they are chiefly anti-Western circles."

Russia's domestic political context seems to be influencing the course of events. Part of the Kremlin administration, within Mr Putin's close entourage, seems favorable to the adoption of a highly patriotic, "grassroots," line of argument with anti-Western connotations, as the December 2003 general elections approach, in order to guarantee the ruling party a constitutional majority in the Duma.

The same of Russia as an independent great power is apparently thus returning to the prominence, with Vladimir Putin keen to demonstrate that he will not yield to US demands on anything.

Has this point been reached? One immediate aspect, which some consider crucial, could cause the pendulum to swing the other way. Moscow needs external support for its plans for "elections" in Chechnya, which have been portrayed to Russian voters and the international community as the foundation of a normalization.

The Chechnya problem has for the past year and a half been a crucial factor in Vladimir Putin's adherence to the US position in the war against international terrorism. The criticisms of the Russian military's misdeeds have virtually ceased.

While some in Europe call for the establishment of an ad hoc international tribunal on Chechnya, Moscow is now waiting for Washington to issue a pronouncements on the legitimacy of the "referendum" scheduled for 23 March in a republic at war.

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