#5
Moscow News
March 12-18, 2003
Russia Trusted by All Involved in Iraq Conflict
By Vladimir Lukin
[DJ: member of Parliament and former Russian ambassador to the US}

In politics there are situations when a straight yes or no is out of place. One such situation is the confrontation at the UN Security Council. The United States wants that body to pass a resolution that would empower it to mount an immediate attack on Iraq should it fail to disarm by March 17. It is true that France, China and Russia can exercise their right of veto on such a resolution. But I can't figure out why Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov declared in public that Russia - and Russia alone - could use its power of veto. Why burn our bridges by frustrating an already exasperated United States? It is for such situations that so-called private diplomacy exists. Ivanov could have warned his American counterpart Colin Powell in a private meeting that Russia might indeed resort to its power of veto. But we seem to have walked into an old trap: When Europe is dissatisfied with America, it lets Russia rush headlong on a collision course with America; meanwhile, Europe sits back and amicably resolves its problems with America on the quiet.

Russia should avoid a serious clash with both Europe and America. Our foreign policy should pursue our principal goal of securing favorable external conditions on a long-term basis for the modernization of our country.

What are Russia's aims regarding Iraq? Its primary aim is to see an Iraq devoid of mass destruction weapons. All its other interests - oil and geopolitical - are secondary. As for oil, we have to sort out first who needs Iraqi concessions, the Russian state or certain individuals in Russia? Won't we gain more by developing our own oil fields? Incidentally, some experts say it is precisely cheap oil that is holding back Russia's modernization, compelling it to take the path of extensive, not intensive economic development.

Mass destruction weapons pose an obvious and direct threat to Russian modernization. The threat is both physical and economic. We only need to recall that at one time we helped our eastern neighbor build nuclear weapons. We did so for purely ideological reasons, and in the 1960s our chickens came home to roost. We had to spend billions on strengthening our eastern borders.

President Putin made a correct move by joining the antiterrorist coalition in 2001 and by joining the United States in fighting against the proliferation of mass destruction weapons. But of course we would not like that coalition to follow the United States blindly. We want it to be controlled by international institutions, not unilaterally by the sole superpower. In other words, we don't want the antiterrorist coalition to be in the private hands of any power. But the fact that a coalition like that exists is very much in our interests too.

For many years now, U.S. foreign policy has been propelled alternately by two concepts. The first is a conservative one; it asserts: "We Americans are the strongest of all, and therefore we are always right." The second is liberal democratic; its motto is slightly different: "We are the strongest of all because we are the most just and law-abiding." The first concept has prevailed in the United States for the moment, but it will not be so forever.

How could we work on America in a way that would be advantageous to both of us? Building up blocs and coalitions against the U.S., as the Soviet Union used to do, is useless and expensive. Yet this is exactly what our well-wishers among the Arab nations are encouraging us to do, apparently viewing Russia as a truncated USSR.

As matters stand, we have a unique chance to act as an intermediary who has the confidence of all nations involved in the Iraq conflict. France and Germany have had a "top level" quarrel with the United States, and it is extremely difficult for them to continue their dialogue with Washington. Britain is perceived in Europe as a foreign-policy arm of the United States. We happen to be in a unique position, being able to hold an antiwar position like Europe, while retaining the possibility of conducting a dialogue with both America and Europe. Our aim in maintaining such a dialogue is not to set Europe against America; nor is it to overstress that Russia is an alternative pole in a multipolar world. Our objective is to create an acceptable system of decision-making within the Euro-Atlantic community. And consequently to attain peace on our frontiers. It is precisely peace that will let Russia have 20 to 30 years of security, which is indispensable for its modernization.

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