#10
US Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow
U.S.-Russia Relations: Opportunities and Challenges in 2003
Moscow School of Political Studies Seminar
Perm, Russia - February 27, 2003
http://www.usembassy.ru

Thank you very much for that kind introduction, and thanks to Lena Nemirovskaya for inviting me to speak here today. I've spoken to seminars of the Moscow School of Political Studies in the past, but doing so in Perm is a first for me. It's a special honor to participate in connection with the tenth anniversary of this wonderful school.

The last time I spoke to an MSPS seminar, in June of last year, I talked about the new challenges that all countries in the world, including yours and mine, must face in the 21st century. In the course of doing this, I also spoke about U.S.-Russia relations and how they had changed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2003. Today, I'd like to update my thoughts about the new world that has been evolving over the past couple of years, and of our bilateral relationship and its important place in that world - and, of course, leave plenty of time for discussion afterward.

We are all still trying to understand and adjust to the new security environment that has emerged for all of us in a world increasingly characterized by a plague of terrorist attacks.

One of the reasons that Russia and the United States have grown closer to one another over the past couple of years is that our two countries have been among the first really to grasp, in the most concrete terms, how the world has changed since the end of the Cold War. Presidents Putin and Bush have both been leaders, especially, in understanding how the nature of the threat to civilized countries everywhere has changed.

Our countries understand that Russian, American and European security today is endangered far less by fleets, armies and missiles from other great powers than by biological, chemical and nuclear weapons in the hands of a failing state, a dictatorship, or a band of embittered terrorists. And no one country can deal with these threats alone, because terrorist ideas, terrorist money, terrorist weapons and terrorists themselves travel across borders. Today more than ever, national security depends on how well we help protect one another, not how well we protect ourselves.

International Cooperation in Response to 9/11 September 11, 2001 was a ghastly day in U.S. and world history, but perhaps some good can come out of those terrible events. We can use this opportunity to create new international partnerships and to strengthen existing alliances - not just to win the war against terrorism, but also to meet other transnational challenges that imperil global security. Every responsible nation in the world stands to benefit from greater attention to defending the rule of law, recognized standards for human dignity and the international system of nation-states.

America's global network of allies and partners quickly adapted to the crisis demands of the post-9/11 security environment. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, NATO for the first time invoked its self-defense mechanisms. In fact, NATO forces drawn from European nations flew patrols over American skies in the days and months after the attack. The G-8 nations, including Russia, moved to secure global networks of commerce and communication, including the stationing of customs inspectors in each other's ports.

Just as important, however, was the development of new partnerships in the war against terror and the deepening of old ones. President Putin's brave and instantaneous response to 9/11 accelerated an already existing trend of U.S.-Russia cooperation in several fields, not just security.

Partnership is a fundamental principle of President Bush's National Security Strategy released last September. On nearly every page the document underscores - as I wish to emphasize it again here - the necessity of cooperating with other nations, institutions and organizations. International cooperation is an indispensable ingredient in our view of national security, whether the goal is fighting terrorism, promoting regional stability, expanding trade or dealing with transnational challenges such as weapons of mass destruction, infectious disease, and international crime.

A basic responsibility for any government - whether it be American, Russian, French or German - is to protect its people. The top strategic priority of the United States, therefore, is to shield the American populace from the threat of terrorism. As recent horrific incidents - at a nightclub in Bali, a hotel in Kenya, a theater in Moscow and a government building in Grozny - have demonstrated, terrorism continues to be a grim reality around the world. And, as I stressed earlier, we must remember that terrorists do not respect international borders.

Our response, therefore, must be global. While the United States will always reserve the right to act alone if needed to protect the lives of Americans, our security is enhanced when other countries choose to play a constructive, pro-active role in responding to international terrorism and other global threats.

The current coalition against terrorism is unprecedented in scale and scope. The United States and Russia have joined with dozens of other nations to counter the threat of terrorism using all the tools available to us - intelligence, financial institutions, law enforcement and military operations. A mix of ad hoc arrangements and more formal alliances has led to a sustained campaign against Al Qaeda and other terrorists in Afghanistan, and around the world, over the past 17 months. This is not to mention the collapse of the Taliban regime, which had supported a network of terror.

And, as a result, the security of all, not just of the United States, has increased. Russia has profited from the collapse of a well-organized and aggressive threat to its south. The same is true for the Central Asian republics. We have a good way to go before we can say that the terrorist threat to Russia's south is truly dead, but think about how sharply it has diminished, and at how little cost to Russia itself. The Afghanistan campaign has truly been a win-win situation.

Post-9/11 Russian Cooperation with NATO and U.S. But victory against the Taliban could not have come so quickly in Afghanistan, nor a democratic government installed there so successfully, without the important logistical, intelligence and humanitarian assistance that Russia provided. And today our two countries continue to work together to combat the continuing threat of Al Qaeda and other terrorists in Central Asia and around the world, thereby serving the common security interests of the United States, Russia and all nations that value stability, human dignity and freedom.

The new NATO-Russia Council set up last year is another good example of how much the security environment has changed, and it underscores Russia's importance to meeting today's challenges. The NRC is off to an impressive start. Russia held a joint civil-emergency exercise with NATO Allies and Partners last fall in Noginsk and hosted a NATO-Russia seminar in Moscow two months ago on the military's role in combating terrorism. NATO and Russian military authorities in Brussels have completed joint assessments of the threat posed by Al Qaeda to our troops in the Balkans and to civil aviation, and they have begun an assessment of the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

As important as terrorism is to our cooperation in Brussels, it's not the only thing we work on together. Earlier this month, Russia and NATO signed an agreement on joint submarine search-and-rescue operations, in the hope of avoiding future submarine disasters such as the Kursk tragedy. This is the first in what we hope will be a series of military agreements between Russia and NATO that will help achieve our shared goal of a secure, stable and peaceful Europe.

U.S.-Russia Partnership Let me now turn to the bilateral U.S.-Russian relationship. At the end of last year, Foreign Minister Ivanov described Russia's growing partnership with the United States as the single most important achievement of Russian foreign policy in 2002. Let me add that our common recognition that we face a new security environment today provides our two countries with the opportunity to develop an even closer relationship. The most recent proof of this is the unanimous approval on February 5 by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of a resolution that will lead to the final ratification of the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions.

The Moscow Treaty that President Bush and President Putin signed at their summit meeting last May was a watershed in our relations. It reflects a recognition that our security no longer depends on micromanaging the numbers and types of warheads and delivery systems that each side has, but on working together against the new threats of the 21st century.

"Yes," we both said in signing the new treaty, "by all means let's cut the numbers of missiles and deployed warheads we aim at one another - who needs them all?" "But," we also said, "let's not waste years arguing over the details when we have so much other important work to do together - let's draw up our agreement on a couple of pages, sign it, then get on with our other work together."

And, in fact, the Treaty of Moscow may turn out to be less important than the second agreement signed by Presidents Bush and Putin in Moscow last May - their joint declaration on the New Strategic Relationship. That document sets forth an action plan for joint work in dealing with new security challenges. It commits us to work together against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, narcotics trafficking and organized crime. It creates a framework for transparency and cooperation on missile defense - reflecting the fact that we each face growing threats from countries that are acquiring the technology for long-range missiles that could be armed with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.

The joint declaration also calls for expanding trade, investment and people-to-people links between our countries. I believe it is possible that historians will look back on the joint declaration as the marking the start of a long-term security partnership - perhaps an alliance - between our two countries, one grounded on common interests and a shared commitment to the values of democracy, economic liberty and the rule of law.

Challenges to the Relationship in 2003 2002 was a very good year for U.S.-Russian relations, but we cannot rest on our laurels. Indeed, the year 2003 will present a whole series of challenges to the relationship that we will have to handle with care if we are to achieve the optimistic future I just described. I can hardly talk to you today about the challenges we fact without discussing Iraq. (And why do I have the feeling that some of you will have questions for me later about this subject?) This is an area where our two countries don't share the same approach; at least, not yet. Nevertheless, our goals are the same: Saddam Hussein must be made to disarm. But Russia feels that inspections should go on in order to determine whether Saddam in fact has weapons of mass destruction.

We look at the question differently. Saddam does have weapons of mass destruction. We know that he had, for example, thousands of tons of VX nerve gas and thousands of liters of deadly anthrax and other toxins when the previous UN inspectors departed in 1998. Now he claims not to have them any more. Well, what happened to them? Saddam says Iraq has destroyed them, but just didn't bother to make any record of the destruction.

Why would anybody believe this? The Iraqis generally keep quite detailed records, but they just "forgot" to note down that they destroyed large quantities of nerve gas and biological agents? Saddam has lied and deceived for years about his programs to build weapons of mass destruction - it's the UN that says this, not just the U.S. His track record of lies is clear and well documented. But somehow we're supposed to believe him now that he says that he got rid of these horrible weapons? Why?

Here's our approach: We all know that Saddam had these weapons. And, if reality, we all know that he almost certainly still has them. He must account for them - either declare that he has them so they can be destroyed, or give evidence that they've been destroyed. If he fails to do either, he must face "serious consequences." That's what UNSCR 1441 says. It gave him one last chance, after 12 years, to comply with the terms of the bargain that ended the Gulf War in 1991. And the sad but clear fact is that Saddam has already failed to comply. He has missed his last chance.

So we - the international community, but especially the members of the Security Council - are fast approaching the moment of truth. We understand that Russia wishes to avoid military action and to keep the issue firmly within the UN Security Council. But Russia, I believe, also shares our interest in demanding that Saddam fulfill his obligations to disarm.

We understand that the authority of the Security Council is important to Russia, as a permanent member of that council. But what kind of authority will the Council have if it can be defied by every dictator with enough nerve?

And we all have to keep firmly in mind that the Security Council is not some shining ideal bestowed on the world by heaven. It is a practical device created by nations for the purpose of solving real-world security problems. If it turns its face from these problems because they are too hard to solve, or because the solutions make us uncomfortable, then the Council won't maintain its authority, it will lose it. Russia and others have rightly called on the United States and Great Britain to allow the Security Council to resolve the Iraq crisis. We readily agreed to do so. Now we, in our turn, are calling on the Security Council to accept its responsibility and insist on Iraqi compliance, and not just talk about it. I hope the Council makes the right decision, for its own sake and for that of all our countries.

Well, difficult diplomacy lies ahead. But whatever happens, I don't think the bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia will be strained to the breaking point. As I stated earlier, whatever the differences in our approach to the problem of Iraq, we have the same underlying goal.

We also understand that Russia has important interests in Iraq, including economic interests, and we will take them into account. But more important, both our countries realize that our bilateral partnership in the war against terrorism is too important for us to jeopardize. Usama bin Laden drew us closer together; surely Saddam Hussein cannot drive us apart.

Iraq dominates the news these days, but let's step back from today's headlines to look at some of the other major challenges that Russia and the United States have to face together:

Russia continues to export nuclear technology to Iran. We believe this is dangerous to Russia's own long-term interests. It's clear that Russia intends to complete the reactor at Bushehr. But Russia needs to fully contain the proliferation risks from that reactor. Insisting that Iran return spent fuel to Russia is a start, but it's not enough. Iran is making no secret of the fact that it is seeking control over the entire nuclear-fuel cycle. Why? If it just wants to generate electricity, why does it need the ability to reprocess spent nuclear fuel? What does it intend to do with the main product of reprocessing, plutonium, except make bombs?

We would also like to see Russia crack down more effectively on other transfers to Iran of technology and expertise for WMD and ballistic missiles. If the situation doesn't get better, it will get worse. On the other hand, serious change for the better could unlock profitable cooperation in the nuclear and aerospace fields, including work on space projects that are now blocked by the Iran Non-proliferation Act passed by the U.S. Congress three years ago.

North Korea is an area where Russia could play a major, positive role in bringing Pyongyang to its senses. The question, however, is whether Moscow (and Beijing) will put maximum pressure on the North Koreans before it's too late. Pyongyang is defying not just the United States, but all signatories of the NPT and all members of the IAEA, including Russia. What's more, a nuclear-armed North Korea would increase tension on Russia's own eastern border, and could easily set off an arms race in Northeastern Asia.

Such instability and tension could only damage Russia's interests. Suffice it to say that the North Korean nuclear program is far from simply a bilateral U.S.-North Korean matter. It simply isn't enough to say "well, you Americans caused the problem and you have to sit down with the North Koreans and fix it." This kind of approach doesn't fit the facts and it doesn't fit Russia's role as a power in Asia.

In 2003, we should expand our bilateral security relationship. This will be a challenge. The Russian military has historically been reluctant to engage with the United States in serious military- to-military cooperation. And yet, how can we face together the common threats of the 21st century if our militaries can't cooperate effectively?

Our dialogue on missile defense cooperation remains handicapped by Russian military concerns that we seek to steal technology rather than collaborate against real threats. Both our sides need to overcome inhibitions to substantial MD cooperation, including in the areas of joint early warning, and even joint development of MD architecture and systems.

Missile defense cooperation and enhanced military-to-military cooperation should be among the top priorities for strengthening the NATO-Russia relationship as well'.

How Russia handles its relations with its neighbors will also affect the bilateral U.S.-Russia relationship. We hope to see continued Russian efforts to normalize its ties with Georgia and promote settlements to decade-old disputes like Abkhazia and Transnistria. We also need to work together to support democratization in Belarus and other former Soviet republics.

Those were some of the challenges facing us in the political and security spheres. I also see several challenges on the economic and trade side:

Talks on Russian accession to the WTO have accelerated in recent months and Russia is continuing to move essential legislation through the Duma. Russia has also launched along-overdue crackdown on Intellectual Property Rights violations, especially rampant CD/DVD piracy.

But it is still not clear whether Russia is prepared to make the compromises necessary on market access to meet the U.S. and EU halfway - especially in key areas such as financial services, telecommunications and civil aviation. Meeting the WTO standard in these areas will threaten some powerful interests - a tough challenge for the Duma and for President Putin in an election year. But the benefits for Russia of joining the WTO would be enormous: greater access for exports to other markets; increased foreign investment in Russia, and the protection that comes from participation in a rules-based international trading system.

Russia also needs to take steps at home to improve the climate for U.S. and other foreign investment. Even in the most promising area, energy, Russia has yet to complete the Production-Sharing Agreement legislation that is the sine qua non for the multi-billion dollar investments it needs to develop its remote offshore and Arctic reserves. And looking beyond the energy sector, Russia still has to do more to protect investor rights and uphold the sanctity of contracts. Although some major corporations have made investments over the past year (Ford, GM, Pepsico), doubts about the rule of law and rampant bureaucratic red tape continue to deter many small and medium-sized American companies from investing in the Russian market.

And there's the ever-present danger of another chicken war! The recent announcement of import quotas into Russia was not helpful, and further manipulation of veterinary standards to restrict poultry trade would be even worse.

The United States has to deliver some things, too. For example, we need to graduate Russia once and for all from the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The Administration is working energetically with the Congress to make this happen.

But perhaps the biggest challenges to the relationship will come from how Russia handles some major domestic challenges. The durability of the U.S.-Russian partnership will turn on whether Russia remains on the path of democratization - or, put another way, whether Americans see Russia as a country committed to the same values as themselves.

The endless war in Chechnya is not only causing a horrific human toll, but it corrodes Russian democracy. Of course, terrorists must be dealt with firmly. The United States has just designated three groups involved in the attack on the Dubrovka Theater as foreign terrorist organizations in order to help cut off external support for terrorism in Chechnya. But not all Chechens are terrorists. Continued human rights violations by Russian forces against the civilian population will not only set back chances for a political solution, but also weaken the foundation for U.S.-Russian cooperation. (They also undermine the prestige and effectiveness of the Russian military itself.)

We're glad that President Putin has launched a political process to resolve the Chechen crisis. We hope that the March 23 referendum on a new Chechen constitution turns out to be a step forward in that process. But we are apprehensive, too, about whether a referendum can really be held in a region where physical security is so poor. We wonder how meaningful can be a vote on a new constitution when so few people have access to information about what they'll be voting on. I can't help believe that additional steps will be needed, aimed at attracting the support and participation of the civilian population while marginalizing those unwilling to renounce violence and terror.

What other internal factors do I see as affecting our partnership'? The conduct of the upcoming federal elections, the fate of the independent media, the treatment of the Catholic Church and other religious groups, measures to rein in skinheads and other extremists - all these will be bellwethers of the future of Russian democracy and factors affecting the U.S.-Russian relationship.

The future health of Russian civil society will also hinge on whether Russia faces up to the emerging HIV/AIDS crisis and growing problems of human trafficking. On this latter issue, I'm glad to see that an anti-trafficking law has just been introduced into the State Duma.

In conclusion, I think that the pace and direction of economic reform and the strategic direction of Russia's external policy demonstrate a strong commitment on President Putin's part to make Russia a stronger and more stable international partner for the United States and other countries - to its own benefit and to that of the rest of the world as well. U.S.-Russian relations are increasingly guided by common interests, and the scope of our cooperation is expanding in ways that would have been inconceivable ten years ago. Even on difficult issues like Iraq, our differences are more over tactics than over fundamental goals.

Common interests represent one pillar of the new U.S.-Russian relationship, but it is a commitment to the same values that will give our new partnership the quality of a long-lasting strategic alliance - the kind of ties that we have with our partners in NATO, the EU, Japan and Australia. In this respect, the trends in Russia's internal, democratic development are favorable, but the overall picture is still mixed. The institutions of civil society are taking shape, but the roots are sometimes still shallow, and the habits and practices of decades under communism still lie too close to the surface.

Institutions like the Moscow School of Political Studies, however, make me very optimistic about the future. Seminars like this one are important "schools of democracy" that strengthen the pillar of common values on which the U.S.-Russia partnership also rests. It is people like you who will shape Russia's future and the ones who will guarantee that U.S.-Russian relations achieve their full potential.

The road ahead may be a bumpy and uncertain one. But I'm confident that we are moving forward and that the journey is well worth the effort.

Thank you.

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