#7
Itogi
No. 7
February 2003
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
RUSSIA BETWEEN EUROPE AND USA
By Andrei KAMAKIN and Konstantin LEZHANDR

Historical associations are a questionable thing. But the Franco-German-Russian unity on the Iraqi problem provoked an apparent association with big-time politics of the late 19th century, when France and Russia formed a union that largely determined the course of the 20th century. Later Britain joined the union (mostly to spite Germany), which became known as the Entente. The USA became a member, too, and in 1918 the Western allies turned their guns against Soviet Russia.

Times have changed greatly since then, but does this mean that historical justice has been done? Rather, historical logic has been restored. The world in which one power - the USA - dominated while the other countries kept silent, is resuming the time tested practice of creating blocs and strategic unions, thus destroying the established views on international stability.

This situation prompts one more analogy. The Entente was created to counter the hegemony-seeking policies of Germanto fit the world into its pattern. The creation of blocs resulted in three world wars, two "hot" and one "cold." The current Franco-German-Russian declaration was the three countries' reaction to the unbridled ambitions of the Americans. However, history never repeats to the last dot.

Today one can imagine a war between Europe and America only in a nightmare, as the international community is more civilised now than it was in the preceding 100 years. But this does not mean there will be no bloc confrontation. It is interesting that like 100 years ago, the current confrontation was provoked by military preparations of one superpower against a small third country. Iraq of 2003 is like Serbia of 1914.

In this nascent conflict between the "European" and "Atlantic" civilisations (the names are relative, as you surely understand), Iraq is but a pretext and other pretexts could be found if there were no Iraq. North Korea could be a good pretext.

Indeed, members of the potential anti-war coalition are not eager to protect the current Iraqi regime. Russian and French companies are fighting each other for a piece of the Iraqi oil pie and German firms would like to join the melee. But this has not stopped Putin and Chirac from coming to an agreement, because nobody will get their share if the Americans occupy Iraq.

It is not by chance that European politicians have started speaking about the principle of the matter. It is not Iraq that matters but the unwillingness of principle on the part of Paris, Berlin and (partly) Moscow to accept the role assigned to them in the world globalised by the US script.

On the other hand, each member of the "new Entente" has more down to earth reasons. What are Russia's interests in the matter?

It has been seen as one of the closest US allies in the counter-terror coalition and so it most probably thought very hard before supporting the Franco-German initiative. Proof of this is the long pause during which Moscow avoided giving a clear-cut answer to questions about its attitude to the US plan of a military settlement of the Iraqi crisis. Its evasive phrases showed that while booking a ticket to the European express train, Russia nevertheless maintained the right to change for the US train any time.

Claiming the role of a major player on the world scene, Russia could not keep aloof of the world's hottest problem; it was morally obliged to at least specify its stand. Joining the Franco-German initiative was a nearly fail-safe form of self-identification, as the declaration is not overtly anti-American. It just calls for carrying on the inspections in Iraq.

The question is, will Moscow go the whole way? It can play an independent role on the world scene and the union with France and Germany was a tactical, rather than a strategic decision.

Openly playing with Americans would mean shouldering a substantial part of responsibility for the unpredictable consequences of the Iraqi war. Russia is not Estonia or Georgia, which risked almost nothing when they expressed support for the USA. You cannot expect political "midgets" to do what political "giants" do. And the possible Russian dividends in case of playing on the US side are questionable.

The Americans promised Moscow (1) to respect its economic interests in the "liberated" Iraq, (2) not to protest against Russia's possible strikes at terrorist bases beyond its territory, and (3) to put the most notorious Chechen "guerrillas" on the US black list of terrorist organisations. But the Americans do not and cannot give any guarantees on the first issue; at the best, Russian firms will have to compete on equal grounds with other potential investors in the Iraqi oil sector.

As for the second and third promises, we are certainly pleased but the al-Qaeda connections of Basayev & Co have long been proved, unlike bin Laden's alleged contacts with Baghdad. And second, Russia needs European understanding of its Chechen problem much more. And it cannot win this understanding by unconditionally supporting the USA.

Relations with Europe are important to Russia in all other respects. Suffice it to say that the largest European countries account for over a half of Russia's foreign trade and the bulk of its foreign debt. Germany is the basic consumer of Russia's energy resources. So, there are very good reasons to be friends with Europe.

But France and Germany, which welcomed Putin's visit with a sigh of relief, had other reasons for their anti-American stand.

It was a chance to save face in a losing game. The irreconcilable stand on the issue of military escalation around Iraq threatened France and Germany with political vacuum. Belgium was the only country in Europe to dare support them. It was clear that the bulk of the EU and East European countries would toe the US line.

The logical question is, What made these two European powers to raise the pacifist banner? The tune was clearly set by Paris, which has pursued an independent international policy ever since Charles de Gaulle launched it nearly 50 years ago. Besides, the population of France (many of them Moslems and newcomers from the East) fear that the Iraqi war would provoke a new stage of terrorism and violence, whose destructive consequences the citizens of the Fifth Republic have felt long before the Americans had their first taste.

Besides, France has economic interests in the Middle East and hence must do its best to keep up its positions in Baghdad, even though they have been greatly undermined by the UN embargo. The more so that the Fifth Republic (just like Russia) has been trying not to endanger its relations with the Arab world in the past few decades.

Germany has its own reasons. The widespread rumour that Gerhard Schroeder is fighting for peace because the bulk of Germans are set against the war is hardly justified. Germans worry about economic problems more than about Saddam Hussein's future. At least pacifism did not help Social Democrats and greens at the recent local elections, which the ruling coalition lost.

After WW2, the European economic superpower hardly ever expressed foreign policy ambitions, which does not mean that it has none. At first it did not have the possibility and later the chance to realise these ambitions. Its current involvement in the "anti-war alliance" is a marvellous chance to make a stand as an independent player on the world scene.

So, next on the agenda are big diplomatic manoeuvres. The big-time politics of the good old 19th century is coming back.

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