
#7
Izvestia
No. 24
February 2003
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
VLADIMIR PUTIN BETWEEN IRAQ, THE OLD WORLD AND THE NEW
WORLD
Vladimir Putin went on a three-day official visit to France and found himself in
the epicentre of a planetary scandal. The USA is vexed by the attitude of its
NATO allies, who refuse to support its plans of a war on Iraq. In this situation
Putin's task is not to gain dividends but try not to quarrel with everyone.
By Georgy BOVT
Thrown into the epicentre of a flaming scandal between the USA and those whom
the Americans contemptuously call "the old Europe," Vladimir Putin is
trying to play actively on this diplomatic field, upholding the importance of
Russia's role. But this is a veritable mine field, where the consequences of
such activity depend on the delicacy and sophistication of "diplomatic
tricks." In principle, the role of an active intermediary who maintains
relations with all members of this multilateral conflict can bring substantial
dividends, but only hypothetically so.
Of all G8 members Russia has the best relations with Baghdad and could
encourage it to become more pliant. But it has not been successful so far.
Instead, Saddam Hussein has broadened the split in the ranks of his opponents.
Russia has nearly allied relations with the USA, cemented by the personal
friendship of their presidents. It also has pragmatic relations with the EU,
which are seemingly progressing towards economic integration, as seen by the
favourable talks about potential humanitarian integration and the simplification
of the visa regime. How can one use this incredible diplomatic wealth? The
trouble is that any step taken towards either side in the conflict may be
regarded by the other side as treachery. What prize can be worth risking one's
prestige in this multilevel game?
The history of diplomacy knows of many examples of successful manoeuvring by
a not very strong country between very strong players. (It is a fact that Russia
is not in its best form now.) For example, during the NATO-Warsaw Pact
confrontation, the communist China played the role of the Wise Monkey who
watched the battle of two Tigers - the USA and the Soviet Union - from a nearby
hill. And today China, which has become much stronger, is not playing an active
part in the Iraqi settlement. It has opted for a more passive stand than those
of Moscow and Paris, though Beijing supports their views on the issue. China is
not eager to jangle the nerves of the USA, who is rearing for a crucial battle
with Iraq, with peaceful statements. Why bother? Isn't it clear that the fate of
Iraq has long been decided, unless France, Russia and Germany decide to dispatch
a joint military group there for erecting a live barrier on the way of "the
American aggression"? And they will not do this.
What is the main goal of Russian diplomacy on the issue of Iraq? A goal that
would justify the diplomatic activity of Moscow at the top level, which entails
the involvement of Russia in the internal NATO scandal where the sides have
become personal. Is it the struggle for peace and against war? Very noble. But
few people believe in mindless altruism today, the more so that the struggle
against terrorism in Chechnya does not bespeak of any love for such regimes and
terrorists in principle.
Or is the goal resistance to "US hegemony seeking policies"? Sounds
good, too, but what dividends can it bring and what subsequent steps can be
taken? Or does Russia still hope that Iraq will repay its 7-billion dollar
debts? If so, who will repay them? The current regime or the new one? Different
variants presuppose different tactics. So far, it appears that Hussein has taken
offence and will not repay a cent of these debts or confirm the oil contracts
with Russia. LUKoil was officially denied the right to develop the West Kurna
oil field yesterday. As for the potential new masters of Iraq, their attitude to
Russia is unknown.
A few words about the involvement of Russia in the scandal between the Old
World and the New World. Who can guarantee that France will close its eyes to
the war in Chechnya if Russia supports its dissenting opinion on Iraq? Until
recently France has held a very tough stand on this issue. And will Germany,
acting jointly with France, advocate a softer EU attitude on the main issues of
contention with Russia, such as the deadlocked negotiations on Russia's
accession to the WTO (fierce debates on the "proper" domestic prices
of Russian energy resources)? Or will it help soften the EU anti-dumping
policies with regard to Russia, facilitate a new visa policy in general and the
issue of transit to and from the Kaliningrad Region in particular?
It should be said that by pursuing an anti-American policy on the issue of
Iraq, France and Germany are acting in their own pragmatic interests. To
Schroeder, the anti-Bush policy (the two leaders hardly talk with each other
now) is an attempt to keep up his rating, which is crumbling under the weight of
economic problems. And France, with its "special stand" in NATO, hopes
to satisfy its oil interests in Iraq in any situation.
It can be assumed that by inciting Russia to fight the USA over peace in
Iraq, "the old Europe" will try to turn it into the main anti-American
force. There are no reasons to assume that France would dare to vote against the
USA in the UN if Russia and China choose not to do so.
And what can Russia gain from siding with the USA? Will the USA abolish the
discriminatory Jackson-Vanik Amendment? Or lobby for the admission of Russia to
the WTO (just like it forcefully lobbied in support of the Turkish request for
EU membership)? Or will it help the Russian Aerospace Agency with money and
technology in view of the recent Columbia catastrophe? Or guarantee Russia's oil
interests in Iraq under a new government? Or do something else?
The traditional argument against the above is well known: Plain bargaining is
not a method of big-time diplomacy. This is certainly true. But first, even the
noblest of principles should bear practical fruit. Second, friendly relations
cannot rest only on commitment to common ideals but should take into account
mutual pragmatic interests. And third, the greatest disappointment comes when
the fruits of the superhuman efforts of one player are appropriated by other,
stronger players (this is inevitable when the players are of different weight
categories).
So, it is sometimes better to quit the fight before the other fighters,
dissatisfied with the standards of your mediation, start clobbering you.
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