#10
Russian Naval Show of Strength Not Seen as Bluff
Trud
February 13, 2003
Sergey Ishchenko report:
"Crossing Three Seas: the Russian Navy Is Preparing an Indian Ocean Deployment Unprecedented Since Soviet Times"

The Admiral Panteleyev and Marshal Shaposhnikov large ASW vessels are under steam in the Far East. In Sevastopol, the guided-missile cruiser Moskva, the Pytlivyy and Smetlivyy patrol vessels, and a large landing ship with a company of naval infantry on board and also several support ships.

A Russian squadron of comparable power led by the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov last set out in a state of operational readiness in 1996. But the assignments then were somewhat more modest-those maneuvers were of almost a festive nature and were devoted to the tricentenary of the Russian Navy. And the area of deployment-the Mediterranean-was somewhat closer.

The actual date of the present departure for the India Ocean of the Pacific and Black Sea detachments of ships has not yet been determined, it will depend on a political decision of the RF leadership. This was stated by a spokesman for the Pacific Fleet headquarters. He hereupon contradicted RF Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov. According to the head of the defense department, who is more well-versed in diplomacy, the timeframe of the start of the deployment to the Indian Ocean "will depend exclusively on technical readiness." Well, should Sergey Ivanov not, in fact, be acknowledging that he will give the command to raise anchor depending on what kind of speed the American-British war machine in the Persian Gulf picks up in the coming days?

That the actions of Russia's sailors will, in actual fact, be dictated by these circumstances is not to be doubted.

First, a deployment of an exceptional scale for the present times would undoubtedly have been planned a year ahead, at a minimum. The staffs and crews would have had to be prepared, the ships to have been overhauled and drydocked, thousands of tons of fuel, oil, and so forth to have been gradually collected, and so forth in good time. And to raise the fighting spirit of the dejected berthed sailors the maneuvers would probably have been announced ahead of time. There has been none of this.

Second, were it in reality on this occasion a question of customary combat training, ships of the Black Sea Fleet would hardly have been sent to the Indian Ocean. The area of responsibility of the Black Sea sailors is the Mediterranean, and in order to practice the search for a submarine or the attack of an aircraft carrier, there would be no point them setting out for the ends of the earth.

What aims, then, could the Russian ships have been set in the Indian Ocean? It is no secret that in the decades of the cold war our navy accumulated experience of confrontation with its American counterparts on all ocean latitudes: reconnaissance, tracking the actions of the "likely adversary," and demonstrating its own battle readiness. But neither we nor they lifted the protective covers off the guns. Times have changed considerably, of course, but, judging by the actions of our transatlantic partners, "gunboat diplomacy" in the world has yet to be abolished.

When, several years ago, US aircraft bombed Yugoslavia, incidentally, many military experts were agreed that the Americans would have had to have been more restrained had our ships been in the area of combat operations. Alas, Russia was able at that time to fit out for Balkan shores only the reconnaissance ship Liman. Yet the command of the Black Sea Fleet nonetheless sounded out how the Americans would have viewed the appearance near their aircraft carriers of our cruisers. A demonstrative loading of other ships of the fleet with fuel and ammunition began for this on the eve of the dispatch of the Liman from Sevastopol. Then Admiral Vladimir Komoyedov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet at that time, who had seen off the Liman, in the view of dozens of television cameras, unexpectedly for the reporters, remained on board the Liman, which headed for the Mediterranean. This could in principle have meant only one thing-other ships would be weighing anchor immediately after it.

The reporters did not see that immediately beyond the harbor gate Komoyedov transferred to a patrol boat that had come alongside and returned to his headquarters. And the sensational news that Russia was resolved upon a "show of strength" off the coast of Yugoslavia flew around many press agencies.

At that time this was a bluff. Now it would not appear to be a bluff.

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