#5
The Center for Defense Information
www.cdi.org
The Weekly Defense Monitor
January 23, 2003
Is Russia the New Peacemaker?
Seva Gunitskiy, Research Associate, vgunitskiy@cdi.org

To a casual observer, Russian diplomacy seems to be suffering from multiple personality disorder. One day President Valdimir Putin is shaking hands with North Korean President Kim Jong Il, and a few days later he is bonding with his newfound soulmate George W. Bush. How is it possible, one might ask, for Russia to straddle the fence so effectively, playing both sides without drawing critique for its diplomatic ambivalence? Aren’t they supposed to be, after all, either with us or against us? In fact, Russia today is in a unique position in world affairs – it is the only close U.S. ally that maintains diplomatic relations with the entire "axis of evil" – Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.

A few factors may explain Russia’s ability to do so. First, unlike America, Russia is not pretending to pursue a moral agenda in its activities abroad; instead, it has propounded a policy of pragmatic, hard-nosed realpolitik. No longer constrained by Communist ideology, Russia can – and does – make friends with whomever it wants to. Second, Russia is still lingering in the gray area of post-communist transition: it is reaching out toward the West, but has not yet relinquished its historical ties to the old comrades and comrade-wannabees. And third, Putin himself has proven to be a nimble diplomat. In his utilitarian search to determine what is "good for Russia, " he transcends the traditional politician’s dichotomies of "liberal" or "conservative."

What all this means is that Russia may prove to be the indispensable U.S. ally in negotiating with hostile states. It can, in effect, act as a diplomatic buffer between countries that are resistant to American diplomacy. Perhaps the best example of this dynamic at work is the current situation with North Korea.

In dealing with North Korea so far, the best foreign policy tool Bush has been able to muster amounts to a form of bribery – the US will resume sending food and energy aid to the country if North Korea abandons its plans to develop nuclear weapons. Russia, on the other hand, has important economic and historical ties to North Korea and is one of its few allies and as such, has far more diplomatic leverage. If some sort of mutually agreeable resolution is to be achieved, Russian involvement will be necessary.

If anyone may be said to have built a rapport with North Korea’s reclusive leader, it’s Putin. The two have met for talks three times in the past three years. Kim Jong Il has visited Russia twice, the last visit involving a somewhat unusual trek across Siberia in his own armored train. And as the Financial Times (Jan. 7) notes, the North Korean government even has a special "Friendship with Russia" link on its official website, complete with video footage of the Russian Foreign Minister’s recent visit.

So it was no surprise when on Jan. 14 Russia assigned Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov, Moscow’s top expert in Asian affairs, to circulate between China, the United States and North Korea in an effort to break the impasse with a "package solution." The Interfax news agency (Jan.14-20) states that Losyukov’s proposal "calls for achieving non-nuclear status for the Korean peninsula, strict observance of the treaty on the non-proliferation on nuclear weapons, and the fulfillment of obligations under other international agreements, including the 1994 framework agreement."

Undoubtedly, Russia no longer has the economic influence on North Korea that it did in the days of the Soviet Union. Trade volume between the two countries amounted to $115 million in 2001, an 80% decrease since the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and a fraction of its all-time high of $1.5 billion during the Soviet era.

Yet Russia’s Ministry of Economy estimates that bilateral trade between the two countries is currently growing at up to 10% per year, and Pyongyang is eager to keep those numbers climbing. North Korea wants Russian rocketry and weapon technology. It also needs immediate updating of its heavy industries – oils refineries, metal factories, and nuclear reactors – which were built to Soviet specifications. Russia, meanwhile, would like to see the construction of an annex to its trans-Siberian railway that would run through the Korean peninsula, and thereby open up a profitable route for Asian exports to Europe. Such a route would also produce positive externalities for Russia’s far eastern regions, whose shrinking population is a concern to the Putin Administration, given the burgeoning Chinese population nearby.

Even beyond economics or demographics, Russia may be a better negotiating partner simply because it has more experience dealing with North Korea and, presumably, enjoys a greater degree of trust among North Korean leadership than the United States does.

That is not to say Russia’s path is completely clear-cut – its diplomatic multipolarity can be a hindrance as well as a virtue. Putin does not want to be seen as a lackey of American foreign policy interests. Perhaps that’s why Russia was initially hesitant to engage in anything but behind-the-scenes discussions with the North Korean leader. Even now, after Losyukov has been dispatched to find "a political and diplomatic solution to the situation," Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov emphasized that this solution must be achieved "by political means, without issuing diktats and ultimatums." Losyukov echoed the sentiment several days later, stating that "in this situation, you cannot speak in the language of ultimatums and strict demands. You need to approach the situation in a more delicate manner."

Inside Russia, feelings are mixed at best. Various political leaders and news agencies express concerns that a) North Korea demonstrated "the limits and paradoxes of American might" by playing the nuclear card and getting a different treatment than Iraq; b) this is only the first stage of "nuclear blackmail" that could result in a chain reaction of similar threats by rogue states and c) the United States is pushing Russia into a corner by shoving diplomatic priorities down its throat. The undercurrent of meaning is similar: the United States is to blame. Not everyone can be as coolly pragmatic as Putin, and there is a hint of emotion, a trace of defensiveness in these concerns, however valid they may be. Putin will need to keep that in mind. As a proponent of moral relativism, Putin may be the first post-modern political leader, but he can’t afford to race ahead without waiting for modernity to catch up.

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