#13
Izvestia
No. 3-M
January 2003
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
RUSSIAN EXPERTS MAKE A FORECAST OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN
POLICY
Izvestia's readers can now familiarize themselves with an abridged version of
a forecast of Russian foreign policy made by the Foundation for Long-Term
Research and Initiatives jointly with the Institute of the World Economy and
International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences on the basis of the
analytical forecasting experience accumulated in this institute. The Foundation
is a non-governmental, non-profit research organization created in 2002 by
Russian scientists and representatives of political and business circles.
The authors tried to analyze how Russia's relations with individual countries
could develop and gave recommendations on developing these relations and
upgrading the national and international mechanisms of controlling
foreign-policy processes.
There Are No Traditional Threats, But Just New
Ones...
The international position of Russia can be called stable and, on the whole,
favourable for solving the priority tasks of national revival.
There are practically no direct external threats to security in the
traditional sense of the word. Russia is not involved in interstate conflicts
fraught with war, but maintains correct, non-inimical relations with all
countries. Indirect threats to security are also insignificant.
Although, there are still risks of destabilization between some CIS countries
and a possibility of conflict. As practically any crisis in the CIS may be
detrimental to Russian interests, Russia's involvement in the settlement of such
a crisis seems virtually inevitable.
Against the background of a reduction in traditional threats to security in
2001-2002, new threats have markedly grown. The main one of them is, beyond
doubt, international terrorism. Rapidly expanding its zone of action and using
various sources of financing, it is turning into an industry with its methods of
extracting profit and posing a real threat to world civilization.
Chechnya has become a stronghold of international terrorism in Russia. A
serious threat to Russia lies in the fact that, as a result of the symbiosis of
Chechen separatism and international terrorism, the whole territory of the
country may find itself in the zone of the latter's active operations.
At the same time, the international community is more and more often
considering the Chechen problem in the context of the struggle against
international terrorism. That is, the situation in Chechnya stops being a factor
seriously complicating Russian foreign policy. However, in order to strengthen
this positive shift, we should achieve a marked progress in ensuring legality,
observing civil rights and especially solving humanitarian problems in Chechnya,
and resume the search for an acceptable formula of political settlement.
Positive Changes Must Be Made Irreversible
On the whole, the vision of Russia by the international community has become
much more even and calm. While wariness partially persists, it is practically
free from inflated expectations, and restrained optimism seems to prevail. This
result has been achieved largely thanks to the Russian political leaders, who
made a strategic choice in favour of integration into the community of
democratic states. In September 2001, when Russia firmly sided with the
anti-terrorist coalition led by the US, a new stage of Russian foreign policy
began.
However, this policy has been outlined at the most general level with only
vague reference-points. The are also other problems:
- well-considered decisions adequate to new strategic guidelines are made, as
a rule, in priority directions. Meanwhile in less important directions work
often goes as if by inertia, in the spirit of traditional approaches;
- a wide use of old propaganda cliches prevents the Russian leaders from
making the forming new foreign policy understandable and popular to society;
- the dominating model of internal political development brings to the camp
of the Russian president's supporters mainly those who are not inclined to back
the foreign policy course proclaimed by him.
In this way, neither the new foreign policy nor the stability of the
country's international position determined by it have yet become irreversible.
Making positive changes sustainable and self-reproducing is Russia's main
foreign policy task for 2003 and the next four to five years.
Any Terrorism is Evil But Far From Any Evil is
Terrorism
In recent years, Russia, due to objective circumstances and its own mistakes,
has acquired a tragically rich experience, both positive and negative, in
combating terrorism. This makes Russia one of the most active and energetic
participants in the global anti-terrorist campaign.
However, one can fight international terrorism efficiently only if one
clearly realizes what one must fight, and how. There are two dangers in this
respect. On one hand, giving terrorism a simplified broad interpretation, and on
the other hand, reducing the struggle against it to military and police
operations. A restrained and critical reaction of the international community to
the anti-terrorist actions of Russia, the USA and Israel shows that the policy
of these countries is not free from these "distortions".
This is why the criteria to define terrorists and their accomplices, as well
as the forms and methods of cutting their activity short and encouraging one to
reject it needs to be worked out. It is worthwhile thinking about the creation
of an international fund of the social-economic rehabilitation of the countries
and territories that refused to be accomplices to terrorism.
Persuading Without Recognizing
Yet another problem of the 21st century is the growth of the number of
self-governed territories claiming the status of states but not recognized in
this capacity by the international community. These territories are becoming
criminal from within, acquiring not quite legal external ties and becoming a
catalyst for regional differences and conflicts. Until recently, the list of
unrecognized states was limited to Taiwan and North Cyprus. Today, it includes
Abkhazia, Transdnestria and Nagorno-Karabakh; tomorrow, Kosovo, South Ossetia,
Iraqi Kurdistan and the "Tamil state" may join it; and the day after
tomorrow, who knows, also the Basque Country, Gorny Badakhshan and Xinjiang.
There is also Tibet and a large group of autonomous entities within Russia.
This is why the drafting in the near future of a universal criteria of the
international recognition of new states would be in the interests of Russia and
its partners. None of the self-proclaimed entities meets the most obvious of
these criteria -- viability, non-infliction of damage on the security of the
donor-state; the availability of borders with third countries or access to sea;
consent of the overwhelming majority of the population to secession. This is why
the task at hand is to convince, and if necessary, force them to drop the claims
to the creation of a state of their own and find an acceptable form of
association with their "old" states.
International Security Institutes Must Be Reformed
Who can handle such tasks? In the past decade, the system of controlling
international relations has hardly changed - it is still moderately efficient in
solving routine issues and does not meet requirements for high efficiency in
crisis situations at all.
The functions of its formally main universal institutes (the UN, OSCE ) are
gradually going over to the mechanisms that have a less official character (the
Eight, "no-ties meetings"). They function rather at the regional level
(the EU, ASEAN) and are orientated to the solution of not so much general
political as special tasks (NATO). There are opportunities for developing
Russia-NATO partnership. Cooperation along this line should be concentrated on
more substantive and long-term directions (air defence, joint development and
production of arms, ensuring the compatibility of the systems of control,
communications and intelligence). As to the "universal" institutes of
control, Russia should be more active in the process of reforming them, first of
all the UN, acting in the following directions:
- extension of the powers of the UN Security Council and a new regulation of
the right of veto enjoyed by its permanent members;
- revision of the issue of the functions and composition of UN troops;
- re-adjustment of the existing and creation of new specialized international
organizations designed to prevent the proliferation of mass destruction weapons,
international terrorism, drug trafficking and other global threats.
Direction of the Main Strike
Last year, Russian foreign policy achieved its main successes in the
direction that is traditionally considered to be the key and decisive one in
many respects - in the field of relations with the USA. With the least effort
and outlay, the basis for brand new cooperation between the two countries was
laid down. For Russia, the anti-terrorist coalition with the USA is a chance to
speed up the process of integration into the community of democratic states with
highly developed economies, a chance to join it as a great power. This is why in
2003 the task of forming a new agenda of Russian-US relations will be a priority
one, and from the viewpoint of strategic perspective - a key one. Among the
items on the agenda are new joint initiatives on the non-proliferation of mass
destruction weapons, work in the field of arms control, reduction of the role of
mutual nuclear deterrence and a stage-by-stage rejection of it, and purposeful
efforts to curb anti-American propaganda in Russia.
Pragmatic "Europeisation"
The priority of the European direction is determined by mutual economic
interest. The EU is Russia's largest trade partner (it accounts for about 40% of
Russian imports and approximately 30% of Russian exports). Deliveries from
Russia meet 15% of the EU's requirements for the imports of energy resources.
Rapprochement with Europe is simultaneously going through the invigoration of
bilateral relations and development of partnership with the European Union.
Practice shows that Russia often compensates for, or solves, the problems
arising with the latter with the help from individual European powers. There is
also a potential for their cooperation in the field of security.
As applied to European realities, Russia's strategic choice could be
specified as orientation towards joining "a single Europe", even if in
the very distant future. The process of rapprochement with Europe should be made
more smooth. For this, it is important that a certain painless political-
psychological re-adjustment be effected: for example, realize that Russia will
not secure for its citizens the softening, and the more so, abolition of the
visa regime of entry to the states of the Schengen zone unless it establishes
order on the borders with the CIS countries. Or take for granted the fact that
as distinct from Russia, the USA and Israel, the European countries are less
concerned about combating international terrorism and worry more about the
humanitarian and legal problems arising in the process of this struggle.
Asia-APR Is a Delicate Issue
Russia is still lacking an integral concept of the hierarchy of its interests
and, correspondingly, political priorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (APR). In
the late 1990s, the ideas of rapprochement with China, India establishing
"special" relations with North Korea to spite the West were being
cultivated as part of the search for "Russia's special way". However,
Russia should by no means position its policy in the APR only with regard to the
West, no matter whether this policy is positive or negative. In conducting this
policy, Russia should be guided by the logic of its own interests both in the
region and the rest of the world.
Relations with China is a key issue for the Russian policy in the APR. Russia
has no reasonable alternative to the development of good-neighbourly relations
with it as an unconditional priority of its policy in the APR. Obviously,
priority should be given to building a mechanism of strategic cooperation in the
Russia-China-USA triangle on the basis of common responsibility for uprooting
international terrorism and ensuring regional and global security. For Russia,
it is important that its rapprochement with China be a controllable process,
which does not complicate the western vector of its foreign policy.
Relations with Japan have been favourable for Russia of late. Confirming its
loyalty to the Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration of 1956, Russia has taken an
irreproachable position on the problem of border delimitation. At the same time,
a qualitative breakthrough, achieved in Russia's relations with the USA and
West-European countries, is increasingly irritating Japan, evoking in it the
classical complex of the fear of lagging behind the allies. Russia is getting a
chance to remove, or at least seriously weaken, the link between the improvement
of bilateral relations and the settlement of "the territorial
problem". Russia should try to shift emphasis in relations with Japan from
economic contacts to political cooperation on the broadest range of problems.
Relations With the CIS Countries
Russia's relations with the CIS countries have been extremely sluggish for a
long time. This meets the interests of the political leaders of the majority of
Commonwealth states. It is not quite clear what aims Russia sets itself. The
actions conducted by it often look sporadic and time-serving and do not produce
the impression of a thought-out strategy. Meanwhile, authoritarian regimes of
various degrees of toughness are in power in practically all the CIS countries.
Preserving allied relations with such regimes not only discredits our country in
the eyes of the rest of the world, it affects Russia's internal popularity.
Russia's popularity in the CIS countries turns out to be directly dependent on
the popularity of the regimes existing there. The probability that a takeover in
many CIS countries may take place under anti-Russian slogans seems to be
unacceptably high.
This is why Moscow needs, while giving the CIS countries every possible
political and economic assistance, to maintain even relations with all political
and public forces in these countries. However, Russia should not be indifferent
to the destiny of former compatriots. All those born in the USSR before its
breakup must be granted the right to Russian citizenship following a simplified
procedure, as well as a realistic opportunity to move to Russia. In connection
with this, a national program needs to be drawn up to provide economic
incentives for those wishing to move to Russia to settle in Siberia and the Far
East.
Threats in 2003
2003 will pass under the sign of combating international terrorism and the
threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The international
community will focus first of all on Iraq, Iran and North Korea - these
countries are really problem ones from the viewpoint of their
military-technological potentialities, political intentions and involvement in
terrorist acts. The apprehensions existing in connection with this must be eased
as soon as possible.
The Iraq problem has two components: the attitude of the international
community to the Saddam Hussein regime and a potential US military operation
against it. It is assumed that international inspectors will fix in the long run
the absence of mass destruction weapons in Iraq or allow it to eliminate them,
which will pave the way to lifting international sanctions against Baghdad.
However, once inspections are over and sanctions lifted, Iraq will be able to
immediately resume the programs of the development of mass destruction weapons
and their delivery vehicles. Consequently, the differences between those who
advocate such inspections and those who are set on conducting a military
operation are irreconcilable. These differences may seriously aggravate Russia's
relations with the USA because, with the deduction of the anti-terrorist
subject, they are still far from what is called partnership, even less so, a
coalition.
Considering this, Russia could even now get down to drafting a UN Security
Council resolution to establish constant control over the military, economic and
scientific-technological activity of the Saddam Hussein regime by conducting
planned and unplanned inspections of any facilities in Iraq. In the event such
control cannot be established, a military operation against Iraq will evidently
become unavoidable. However, Russia's attitude towards it will be defined in
different conditions.
On the surface, the situation in Iran bears a certain similarity to the
situation in Iraq. However, the distinctive features are different and more
important. In their totality, they point to Iran's much higher viability and
stability as a state, compared to Iraq, and its considerable, judging by local
standards, ability to perceive changes. To put it bluntly, while the Baghdad
regime no longer yields to re-education, the international community can and
hence, must work with the Tehran regime. The task at hand is not to provoke Iran
into resorting to Islamic extremism but support its evolution in the opposite
direction. In this context, Russian-Iranian cooperation in nuclear power
engineering should be continued not only because it is legitimate and profitable
but also because it proves to Tehran that it enjoys the credit of confidence of
the international community. The possibility of the Iranian leaders assessing a
potential military operation against Iraq as the beginning of a campaign whose
next stage would be Iran must be prevented.
In 2003, the international community's suspicions with regard to the scale
and character of North Korea's military preparations will justifiably grow. This
country may really have nuclear weapons ready for live tests, but not combat
use. The gist of the problem, however, lies in the readiness of the North Korean
leaders to use these weapons (or declare its availability) to blackmail all
sides concerned, including Russia. Such a tactical gamble seriously undermines
the scant confidence in North Korea that has appeared in recent years largely
thanks to the efforts of Russia and especially president Vladimir Putin.
Obviously, the task of Russia is to persuade Pyongyang into unconditionally
rejecting military preparations and the blackmail tactic.
Who Directs Foreign Policy?
Just like in the Soviet era, foreign policy is being formed by many
structures, but now it is formally devoid of the highest coordinating body.
Practically all foreign policy functions have been handed over to the foreign
ministry, which often has neither the rights nor material resources to perform
them in practice. The foreign ministry is only formally responsible for the
provision of the conceptual backing of foreign policy activity - everybody
realizes that the directive for action will be the president's instructions
which will come when, and if, he has time to do this.
This is why the main task should be the delineation of functions and
specification of powers of the key links of the foreign-policy mechanism - the
presidential administration (which should play the key role in determining the
strategic guidelines of foreign policy) and the foreign ministry itself.
One important change in foreign policy should be a wider use of economic
leverage. There are individual examples of its efficient use - in particular,
with regard to Belarus, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan. There are, however, notably more
examples to the contrary. The possibilities of the Russian military-industrial
complex are practically not used as an economic resource of Russian foreign
policy, which, ideally, makes it possible to achieve aims other than a trivial
growth of military exports. It goes without saying that arms trade is primarily
a buyer's market. However, as applied to relations with China and India, Russia
can, and must, dictate, within admissible limits, its political terms. Foreign
policy should also be used to create favourable conditions for the expansion of
Russian oil and gas producing companies. At the same time, the radical changes
ripening on the global market of energy resources make the question of how
Russia could use the opportunities opening in this field in its foreign policy
interests extremely topical.
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