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Rossiiskaya Gazeta
No. 5
January 2003
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
THE FUTURE OF IRAQ: RUSSIA'S STAND
By Prof. Georgy MIRSKY

The question that interests everyone now is what Iraq will be like after the crisis is settled. Will the Baath Party remain in power? Will Iraq follow the Afghan scenario (the creation of a pro-Western regime based on former opposition) or the Kosovo variant (international protectorate)? And lastly, how should Russia, which has been regarded as Saddam's ally for years, behave?

Despite two wars and a decade of international isolation, the power of Saddam Hussein and his Baath party remains strong. The Baath Party came to power in 1968 as a stabilising force that put an end to a series of internal shocks and military coups. For the first time in many years Iraq got a chance to use its rich natural resources. It boasts up to 10% of the prospected world oil resources, the second largest after Saudi Arabia, and its two rivers, the Euphrates and Tigris, create marvellous farming conditions. In the 1980s, Iraq became one of the most developed Arab countries on a par with Egypt. The high revenues from oil exports were used to create a modern processing industry and a powerful army.

Saddam Hussein's prestige and authority has grown tremendously in the power structure since the establishment of the Baath regime. Generations of Iraqis were brought up in an atmosphere of Saddam's personality cult, with Saddam revered as the father of the Arab nation and national liberation hero.

There are quite a few contenders for Saddam's chair among the local opposition. Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the Iraqi National Congress, which is the most influential emigre organisation headquartered in London, seems strong and serious but can hardly have considerable support in Iraq. The internal opposition in the country most probably dislikes those who "are sitting it out abroad."

Kurds are the objective allies of the Shiite Arabs in the struggle against the Baghdad regime. But if Shiites are properly represented in the new regime, they may succumb to Arab nationalism with its traditional dislike of Kurds. The thing is that Kurds, feeling victorious, will most likely be the strongest elements in the hypothetical coalition that will replace the Baath regime.

But the picture will be completely different in the Arab society of Iraq. Saddam's dictatorship will leave behind it a scorched social zone with demoralised, frightened and befuddled people. It would be naive to expect healthy and viable political forces to emerge soon in that zone, forces that would have the experience and an action programme, that would be confident in their abilities and trusted by the people, except, perhaps, the Islamists. Anyway, the dominant role of Kurds in the victorious coalition will provoke the resistance of the Arab part of society.

What should Russia do in this situation? It usually plays a modest role in such situations, as the arsenal of instruments available to Moscow is not very large. But the outcome of the conflict is exceptionally significant for Russia in terms of its economic interests and for internal and external political reasons. What we must certainly do is prevent a military operation against the Baghdad regime without a UN Security Council sanction.

It should be said in this context that the stand of Russian diplomacy, which advocated changes in the British-American resolution on Iraq in the Security Council and which eventually accepted its adjusted version, was the only correct one. If we rejected the resolution, Washington could have used the pretext for striking at Iraq.

But we should be also ready for a negative turn of events. Here is what can happen. The inspectors' report will not dispel fears concerning the presence of mass destruction weapons in Iraq. Washington and London will decide that they can no longer rely on the UN, which will draw out the problem infinitely, because nobody will guarantee that there are no such weapons in Iraq, and the Security Council will not give the green light to the use of military force without such a guarantee. Using this as a pretext, the USA and Britain would launch a war whose genuine aim will be the toppling of the current Baghdad regime.

In this case the main thing will be to stay cool and not yield to the temptation to step down and wash one's hands of Iraq. Russia as a great power that has considerable political and economic interests in the Middle East cannot allow a situation where it would be excluded from the new system of government in Iraq that will be created after the toppling of Saddam. On the contrary, it will need to become part of this new system in order to protect the interests of Russia and of the Iraqi people, who would face a turbulent and unpredictable future.

Economically, Russia is an old, experienced and tested partner of Iraq that knows - much better than the Americans do - the local specifics, the troubles and requirements of the country. Moscow can be also traditionally regarded as a counterbalance to Washington's powerful influence. The new Iraqi government will hardly like to become fully dependent on the USA. The new authorities will need room for manoeuvre, an ability to pursue a policy in the interests of national dignity of the people who have a rich history and great potential. To do this, they will need partners who would help Baghdad to balance more or less safely on the international scene.

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