#13
Russian Roundtable on Iraq Views Saddam's Prospects, Impact on Russia
Trud
January 4, 2003
Report by Andrey Stepanov:
"Will Saddam Hussein Be Gone By March?"

Will Saddam Hussein be gone by March? This is the topic of debate among Russian political scientists today.

A roundtable discussion was held in Moscow on the topic of "Iraq's Prospects and Russia's Interests," organized by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy in conjunction with the journal, Russia in Global Politics.

In anticipation of the American strike, Russian political scientists--among whom are Georgiy Mirskiy, Sergey Karaganov, Vyacheslav Nikonov, Aleksey Pushkov, Aleksey Malashenko, and others--tried to answer the following questions: What consequences will this have for Russia, and what should it do to protect its interests? Practically all those who spoke were unanimous in their opinion that a military operation against Iraq is inevitable, and that its result is predetermined: The fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein no later than March. After the events of 11 September, the USA has been in a state of war. President Bush promised a victory in [this war] and, since he does not have Bin Ladin's head, is prepared to get from the military and show the voters the head of the Iraqi president. A consensus was reached about the fact that it is unlikely that Iraq would be split into three formations, because no one is interested in this.

No serious discussion was evoked by the thesis to the effect that the military action would evoke chaos and even civil war in the country--and perhaps also destabilization in the entire region, especially if Hussein, in an act of desperation, tries to use weapons of mass destruction against Israel and US troops, and if nuclear weapons are used against him in return. Opinions clashed about what Russia could do to prevent such a development of events and to retain at least part of its oil interests.

One group of experts believes that it would be most expedient for Moscow to insist on continuation of the inspectors' mission, even after they present their report to the UN Security Council by 27 January. Another group believes that it would be more preferable to come to agreement with the Americans, and in exchange for our right of veto, to bargain for ourselves certain concessions in the sphere of oil. As one of the roundtable participants noted, when the first bomb falls on Baghdad, the price of our vote in the Security Council will be equal to exactly zero.

Part of the speakers reproached the Russian leadership for its lack of a clear-cut strategy and vision of the future. Another part insisted, paying no heed to the real arrangement of forces, that Russia cannot allow itself to be excluded from the system of managing Iraq after Saddam, even though it admitted that we could remain in that country only as partners of the USA and Britain. Among the specific proposals, there was the idea of creating an inter-departmental crisis committee headed by the president's personal representative, in order to react quickly to development of the situation in Iraq. This did not rule out the possibility of sending MChS [Ministry for Affairs of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations and Elimination of Natural Disasters] troops and peacekeeping units there. A number of participants painted an apocalyptic picture of how, after crushing the present-day Baghdad regime, the well-developed gigantic American military machine would inevitably be turned toward Iran, and perhaps also Saudi Arabia.

The oil topic also resounded clearly. There were no predictions of catastrophic surge in oil prices, followed by their no less catastrophic decline on world markets. However, no one doubted the prospect of establishing American control over Iraqi [oil] reserves, which are estimated at as much as $3 trillion.

Words to the effect that Russia can only minimize the rather negative consequences for itself from the impending American operation resounded as a sort of summary. The following idea was also expressed: The forceful removal of Saddam Hussein is only the simplest and easiest part of the entire operation. Serious problems will arise later, when it will be necessary to regulate management of the country in the post-Saddam period. Washington's hopes for democratization of the country are ephemeral. And evidently, it will have to restore an authoritarian regime there, which will be headed by a sort of double of Saddam, only with pro-American sentiments. Any other regime on American bayonets would obviously not be viable.

On the whole, it is recommended that the Russian leadership not oppose the aspirations of the current American administration (at the same time also certainly not approving them). The forceful action which is being prepared is fraught with unpredictable consequences, and will create so many difficulties for the USA in Iraq itself, as well as in the region and in the world, that [these difficulties] may ultimately outweigh all the anticipated dividends. But when the current administration is faced with the task of extracting itself from another (Afghanistan) quagmire, then its leadership will take up the task of finding those who can help it in this endeavor. In that case, Washington may perhaps remember Russia and its interests, and express readiness to reject the monopoly on resolution of conflict situations...

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