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#12
Question: Many Russian ministries, including the State Customs Committee, have celebrated their 200th anniversary this year. And when was the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) created? And who was the first Russian agent? Answer: Nobody knows his name now but the official birthday of the SVR is December 20, 1920, when a special department with intelligence functions was set up in Russia. Question: The taxpayer who is also the voter and reader wants to know how effective the work of state structures, including secret ones, is. Answer: Our successes cannot be evaluated in terms of money. Can you determine the cost of a correct political or economic decision based on promptly acquired and faithful information? Effective intelligence is an insurance policy of the state, which helps the national leadership to see the world as it is. And the revenues made possible by the work of the intelligence service are sufficiently large to maintain dozens of similar services. The SVR is regarded as an efficient service. Question: Do your partners abroad know this? Answer: They do. I think other intelligence services are working sufficiently effectively, too, or else they would have been liquidated long ago. Question: This year Russia's arms sales earned it a record high revenue of 4 billion dollars. Did your service contribute to this achievement? Answer: I can tell you openly that we work hand in glove with the Committee on Military-Technical Cooperation and Rosoboronexport, which coordinate all of their major deals with the SVR.
Question: In the past, the number one enemy was a state. Who is Russia's main enemy now? Against who are your efforts directed? Answer: We are not talking about any state as a number one enemy of Russia now. Instead, we are looking at the threat that is facing or can face Russia. If the threat comes from a country, we certainly do not see that country as friendly. The main threats today come from international terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is also a major threat because we cannot be sure that maniacs will never assume control of such weapons. Ecological security is another vital task. No country in the world, not even the powerful USA, can stand up against these threats single-handed. We need to join forces. Question: Maybe this will bring humankind together? Answer: Everybody is coming to hope so but the threats are growing much quicker than this positive transformation. Regrettably, old stereotypes hinder the operation of special services and an adequate political reply to the threats. Question: Terrorism lives not only on ideas but also on money. Do you know who pays to Chechen terrorists or who financed the terrorist act in the Dubrovka theatre centre? Answer: The Nord-Ost hostage standoff tragedy is being investigated by the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Interior Ministry. Our structures registered the telephone conversations between the terrorists and their interlocutors in Turkey and the Gulf countries. Regrettably, the terrorists have more than just a telephone connection; they also receive money, people and weapons. We are working jointly with our partners abroad on this problem, trying to cut short the delivery channels. Yet satisfaction with our work will come only when we safely block these channels.
Question: Do you have agents in extremist organisations abroad? Do you work in this "minefield"? Answer: No special service in the world will answer this question. But you can rest assured that we are energetically contributing to the anti-terrorist struggle. It is one of our priorities. We regularly supply related information to the national leadership. Question: The world is becoming apprehensive about attacks on diplomatic missions. Are Russian diplomats protected sufficiently well? Answer: One of SVR functions is to ensure the safety of Russian missions abroad. We cooperate with our foreign and defence ministries and maintain close ties with local special services. The states whose missions abroad have become terrorist targets are strengthening their embassies. We try to ensure the protection of the Russian staff from the terrorist threat already at the stage of designing embassies or acquiring buildings. Question: Is there any regularity in spy scandals? Answer: I remember quite a few cases when the counter-intelligence services of Western countries and the Russian counter-intelligence service exposed spies who were allowed to leave the country quietly, by the agreement of the sides. Nobody knew about this; the press did not report this and political campaigns were not inspired against the master country. When a scandal erupts, it is certainly a result of a political decision sanctioned at the top.
Question: The USA has just created a national security ministry with powers that the KGB could envy. Does this mean that each and everyone in the USA will grow a shadow? Maybe Russian special services should also be integrated into one organisation? Answer: I can judge the situation by the plans and designs associated with the creation of this ministry. If they come true, the ministry will indeed grow into a powerful - and, hopefully, effective - structure. Let's wait and see what comes of it. But we should remember that the creation of any powerful structure entails the threat of it breaking out of control. We have seen this in Russia before. And this is why Americans also express concern over the creation of the super-ministry. As for the situation in the sphere of security in Russia, I think that the services we have are sufficiently effective. Though they work separately, they keep in close touch with each other. Question: The SVR does not work in the CIS countries. Maybe the time has come to review not only the visa regime but also old agreements with some of them? Answer: Under the 1992 Alma Ata agreement, we do not work against each other. We have official missions in the CIS countries, which collect information and meet with politicians and special services staff. I would like to hope that our relations with the CIS countries will develop in a way that will not make spying on each other necessary. The SVR has an international staff, with quite a few former CIS citizens working well. Our common past and age-long traditions of friendship and neighbourly life in the union state are a good basis for developing close partner relations.
Question: Many of modern detective stories mention people called "cleaners," people who punish traitors. Indeed, treason is eventually punished, by God's wrath or penal law, or the law of the professional community. How do you punish traitors? Answer: We don't have such a profession now, I can assure you of this. There are no departments of this kind in the SVR or other Russian special services. We try to convince the defectors to return to the Motherland so as to try their case in accordance with law. I must tell you that we succeed only rarely because every special service protects its informers. It was good that you mentioned God's wrath. I believe that the bulk of traitors live in constant fear. I can tell you this on the example of several traitors who defected to the USA and Britain. They keep changing places of residence and their appearances without substantial reason. Theirs is not a tranquil life. Question: Do we have intelligence agents in prisons abroad now? Answer: No. Question: Can lie detectors expose traitors? Answer: No lie detector in Russia or any other country can reliably expose a traitor.
Question: Who comes to serve in the SVR now and what for? Idea? Money? Save the homeland? Earn a good living? Answer: There is no money in intelligence but there are other attractions. I want to say that the boys we choose for the Foreign Intelligence Academy - and choosing is a very long process, as we study people for years - are very good. We are satisfied with our choice. We had problems in the early and mid-1990s but things have changed after that and now we have no problems with choosing personnel. Question: Is there an entrance competition? Answer: Yes, and we are glad that we have many aspirants to choose from. Question: Has the fact that the President worked in the intelligence service improved your image? Answer: Frankly speaking, this helps the service and me as its director. The President understands how the service operates and we talk the same language, which greatly simplifies our job.
Question: It is said that there is no such thing as ex-intelligence officers. But professionals in your service retire rather early. How do they fare afterwards? Answer: Former intelligence officers are in demand everywhere. Reliability, knowledge of foreign languages, the ability to analyse the situation and draw correct conclusions, as well as experience in dealing with people are highly valued in all establishments. Many of our former staff hold important posts in state and commercial structures. * * * Colonel-General Sergei LEBEDEV joined the KGB in 1973 and was dispatched to the foreign intelligence department (the First Chief Directorate of the KGB) in 1975. He graduated (cum laude) from the Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Foreign Ministry in 1978 and speaks German and English. In 1998-2000 he was the official representative of the SVR in the USA. On May 20, 2000 he was appointed director of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service by President's decree.
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