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Ivanov Says US Relations Remain Russia's Priority
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
30 December 2002
Report by Vitaliy Dymarskiy on conversation with Russian Federation Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov during recent Washington-Moscow flight:
"Around the World with Igor Ivanov. Foreign Minister Sums up Results of 2002"

In the outgoing year I have had occasion to accompany the minister on several of his trips abroad. And on each occasion we journalists saw, as it were, two Ivanovs.

As befits a high-ranking diplomat, following official meetings on the ground he would give a short assessment of a particular event or the outcome of talks in fairly generalized terms. But once in the air, on board the aircraft, Ivanov would usually come into our cabin without a necktie, in a sports uniform or jeans. And then informal conversations would be held, during which the minister would exchange the language of diplomatic protocol for a more generally accessible style, discussing in detail (sometimes, of course, "off the record", i.e. not for publication) what he had not had time to say on the ground in the immediate aftermath of events.

Prologue, or Russian Diplomacy Over One Year and One Hour

In the past year Ivanov has spent 112 days on trips abroad, visiting 31 countries (some several times). His last journey of 2002 was a round-the-world tour following a route from Moscow to Manila to Tokyo to Washington and back to Moscow, with two intermediate refueling stops in Dubai and San Francisco (the not very modern Rossiya airlines Il-62 that carries the Russian political VIP cannot cover great distances without refueling). Each of these stopping places offered its own interest, its own subject for discussion. In Manila it was the Asia-Pacific direction in Russian foreign policy, which has been developing actively in recent years. In Tokyo it was bilateral relations with one of the main players in the international arena, with which Moscow is failing utterly to overcome the legacy of what happened back in World War II. In Washington it was a Near East settlement, and also the prospects for collaboration between Russia and the United States, which for more than a year now have been pursuing a dialogue with one another on better than confidential terms....

This, of course, does not describe the full range of core international issues with which Russian diplomacy is concerned. There are also Europe, the CIS, China, Iraq, the Korean peninsula, and other areas where the minister's aircraft did not touch down this time around but which Moscow is watching with the closest attention. The 40 hours spent in the air in the course of this December circumnavigation by Igor Ivanov gave sufficient time for an effort to look down from an altitude of 10,000 meters at a map of the world which has, in fact, been the "action zone" for Russian foreign policy in the outgoing year. The minister dedicated one of those 40 hours to answering Rossiyskaya Gazeta's questions.

Conversation

To "prime" the discussion I asked Igor Ivanov to name the three most important events of 2002, in his view.

[Ivanov] From the viewpoint of possible consequences for our foreign policy and for the situation in the world as a whole I would put Russia's relations with the United States in first place. This year we have managed to negotiate a very complex period connected with the Americans' unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty and not only to avoid sliding into confrontation, which for Russia would have entailed many unpleasant aspects, but even to maintain a constructive air of partnership. It was this that enabled us to move on within an extremely short period to the signing of a new treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive potentials, which provides real prospects for the next decade of reducing them by almost two-thirds, and to sign an important political declaration formulating the principles governing the relationship between our countries in the spheres that are the most important for Russia -- the political, military, and economic. All this has enabled us to continue joint efforts in the fight against international terrorism, and not only in Afghanistan.

[Dymarskiy] Despite the assurances given by politicians who talk a lot about rapprochement between Russia and the United States, the impression arises that, while talking loudly about an unprecedented level of partnership, at the same time the two sides have not abandoned the old logic of confrontation. It is as if we are outwardly friendly but inwardly still regard one another as enemies.

[Ivanov] Certainly, there are those in the United States, including some within the American administration, who still live according to Cold War notions and seek to secure one-sided advantages. This naturally affects the interests of not only Russia but also many other countries, including the closest of US allies. But the American administration also includes supporters of a multilateral approach. They understand that, even if it is objectively the strongest power in economic and military respects, the United States cannot live in isolation and expect -- especially since 11 September -- to resolve all problems autonomously.

I think that a confrontation is going on between these two trends in American society, including the political elite, but that they are not the only trends that are ever reflected in US foreign policy. Nevertheless, President Bush not only declaims but also pursues in practice a policy line based on the multilateral approach. Hence the results I was talking about. This does not mean that everything is going smoothly between us and America or that we have no differences. They do exist, and they are both objective and subjective in character. Because it is completely obvious and natural that interests should not always coincide and that assessments of and approaches to particular events should differ. But there is no need to dramatize the situation.

Something similar is also happening in Russian society. Some of our politicians believe that we have no substantial grounds for talking about partnership relations with United States, citing examples whereby American acts exclusively in its own interests, to the detriment of Russia's interests. Taken out of context, these examples can be interpreted in precisely that way. But the point is that in politics individual facts or events should not be viewed in isolation from their context. This was demonstrated most clearly in connection with the appearance of American military people in Central Asia. Some of our public figures were in a hurry to declare that the United States was taking advantage of the Afghan events to strengthen its positions in a strategically important region for Russia. That this was a kind of expansionism. But let us recall what was happening before that. We were constantly saying that there was a threat to our interests, and a real threat at that, coming from the south, primarily from the territory of Afghanistan. It is clear that Russia could hardly have resolved the task of eliminating the hotbed of terrorism in Afghanistan independently, in isolation. The task was successfully resolved by the efforts of an international coalition. Have our southern borders become more secure as a result? Undoubtedly. Although problems do remain -- in the shape of narcotics and emigration. But from the viewpoint of national security that flank has, in the final analysis, been significantly strengthened. Sure, we had to make compromises, and one of them is the appearance in the region of American, and not only American military service people, who are completing a mission connected with the international operation in Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the decisions to allow the Americans onto their territory were made by sovereign states. So-called bloc discipline has receded into the past along with the opposing blocs themselves. And nowadays it is both wrong and mistaken to expect that it is still possible to dictate decisions to particular states. What is realistic and feasible is to establish with our neighbors the kind of relations that take account of one another's interests. We should spend less time worrying about expansion by others, whoever they may be, and more taking the initiative ourselves. That way, we will not leave a vacuum in politics or in the military sphere to be filled by representatives of other states.

The ABM treaty is another example. We strove to preserve it. However, a treaty is only a treaty. If it provides for the possibility of withdrawal, then neither we nor anyone else has the levers of influence with which to prevent this from happening. We did not retreat from our principles and we fought hard to preserve the treaty, but the Americans acted in their own way. So now new approaches have emerged in our foreign policy. If such a thing had happened, let us say, ten or twenty years ago we would inevitably have come to a confrontation and started looking for an asymmetrical or some other kind of response, in other words everything would have followed the arms race pattern. Yet, in a difficult situation, we were able to persuade the United States to negotiate and to secure a treaty which meets our interests and the interests of international stability. Which means that we have still moved forward, and not back.

[Dymarskiy] You said that such a thing would have been impossible ten or twenty years ago. Did the critical point come after 11 September?

[Ivanov] It seems to me that 11 September was, rather, a milestone that influenced not so much the formation of Russia's foreign policy as the way of thinking and behavior of the United States and of the West in general. We had already been talking for many years about the threat emanating from Afghanistan because we felt its effects and we knew that it was a source of weapons and financial backing and that gunmen were trained there. But they did not pay much attention to us, thinking that Afghanistan was not their problem. If Russia was troubled by this, they said, if it was Russia's problem, then let Russia deal with it. The same kind of thing is still happening, only now the realization is gaining ground that greater solidarity is needed to confront new threats.

[Dymarskiy] What event are you going to name as the second in importance?

[Ivanov] In terms of significance for our foreign policy I would put the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in second place. It may be that the organization has not yet found its full voice, since it is only starting to get established. But in terms of its geographical embrace and its configurations the SCO has vast potential. The organization incorporates Russia and China and four Central Asian states, so we are creating conditions for secure development on our southern and Far Eastern borders. Moreover, the SCO has been created not just in interests of fighting terrorism -- although that is one of its priority tasks -- but also to implement large-scale economic projects. It goes without saying that this is very important for Siberia and the Far East. From the viewpoint of its operating mechanism the organization has yet to pick up speed, but it already has founding documents and its secretariat and other structures are being set up. And it is already the object of tremendous interest, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, where India has officially declared its wish to join the SCO either as an observer or as a full member. Negotiations are in progress about establishing contacts between the SCO and ASEAN and between the SCO and other regional structures. This is evidence of the organization's potential and of its future role in the Asia-Pacific area.

[Dymarskiy] What ranks third in the minister's ratings?

[Ivanov] The UN Security Council's adoption of Resolution 1441 on Iraq. It is no secret that there were many more skeptics than optimists with regard to the possibility of reaching consensus in the situation in which this document was adopted. A variety of speculative notions were constructed on the basis of the current Security Council membership, and it was claimed that the draft resolution was doomed, that it would not secure a majority, that it would be vetoed.... Nevertheless, literally the night before the session a consensus was found which ultimately removed some of the acuteness from the Iraq problem. This does not mean that it has been finally resolved, and it goes without saying that we are not insured against a new crisis. But the fact that the resolution was successfully passed is evidence of a fundamentally new situation taking shape in the world. The world community is coming to an understanding of the need to act in solidarity in resolving the most acute international problems. Until recently those who, for one reason or another, were unwilling to fulfill their international obligations honestly could make skillful play of the split in the Security Council. The unanimous adoption of the resolution, first, strengthens the positions of the international observers and, second, shows Iraq that it has no room for outflanking maneuvers -- it must either fulfill the resolution or take responsibility for violating it. Third, it is important for the United Nations itself and for the Security Council. I remember how, at the millennium summit in New York, many people were suggesting that for objective reasons (for example, the organization had effectively not amended its charter since the moment of its creation) the United Nations was starting to fall behind events and was losing its potential. In some respects I think that those people are right -- the United Nations does of course need reform and needs to adapt to modern realities -- but at the same time the organization remains a unique mechanism and instrument for resolving the most acute international problems. For this reason the resolution on Iraq provided moral and psychological support for the United Nations....

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