#15
eurasianet.org
December 17, 2002
NEW RUSSIAN DEPLOYMENT MARKS CHANGED STRATEGY
By Ariel Cohen
Editor's Note: Ariel Cohen is Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation.

The Bush Administration is reacting calmly to the Russian Air Force's deployment of planes at the Kant air base in Kyrgyzstan, which Russia announced in early December. The deployment is relatively small and temporary, but the muted American response to it indicates broader trends in American strategic policy toward Russia.

Scholars and observers say the placid American response to the December 5 announcement may indicate that China has emerged as a more important variable in Central Asia. Dmitri Gorenburg, Director of Russian and East European programs at a think tank called the Center for Naval Analyses, believes that Washington no longer views Russian military maneuvers through a competitive lens. (Gorenburg's group advises the Pentagon.) A National Security Council official who covers Central Asia supported this assessment. "We are beyond seeing Russian troop deployment in Central Asia through the prism of US-Russian rivalry," said this person, on condition of anonymity. "This is no longer a zero-sum game. We hope the Russians know this."

Washington and Moscow, Gorenburg says, are emerging as a twinned alternative to Chinese hegemony. Russia and Central Asian states, however, do not want China to deploy troops in the region. Concerns about China are dovetailing with longstanding interest among Russia and its Collective Security Treaty allies in the development of a rapid reaction force in the region.

"President Putin is doing what Moscow experts were recommending throughout the 1990s," says Irina Kobrinskaya, director of the international cooperation program at Moscow's National Project Institute-Social Contract. "It was obvious as early as 1995 that Russia has not economic capacity to deploy adequate forces in Central Asia and the Caucasus." Therefore, Russia had to "internationalize" the peacekeeping there. The force did not come together after a series of car bombs in Tashkent, Uzbekistan nearly killed President Islam Karimov on February 16, 1999. Nor did it develop after the United States struck alliances with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan prior to the forays Americans led into Afghanistan in autumn 2001. According to some analysts, though, it was these alliances that spurred Russia's deployment in Kyrgyzstan.

Moscow security sources believe that the military lobbied for Kant deployment to balance out US presence in Central Asia. President Putin agreed to these requests to placate generals and citizens who treat Western deployment in Central Asia as a long-term threat to Russia. If this analysis is correct, the deployment's modesty is telling. American officials contend that Putin knows Russia's limited budget reserves and military hardware cannot support adequate force structure along its periphery. That weakens Russian bases in Georgia, Armenia and Tajikistan and leaves soldiers at these bases poorly trained. If American troops pulled out of Central Asia, the thinking in the Pentagon goes, the Russians could not adequately protect the region on their own or within a CIS framework.

This traditional Russian military defensiveness, though, seems to coexist with a new emphasis on partnership with the United States. On the "old thinking," say sources from a Center for Naval Analyses seminar that convened in late November, Moscow tries to match Washington's military reach and spending. On the new thinking, Moscow recalls its alliance with Washington in Balkan peacekeeping efforts -- and welcomes the possibility of similar partnership in Central Asia.

Washington military analysts point out that the new Russian-led aircraft contingent in Kyrgyzstan seems weak in comparison with the American deployment at the Manas air base nearby. On December 16, according to Russian news agency Itar-Tass, US Ambassador John O'Keefe marked that base's first anniversary by praising its "high standard." Russiaâ' group, which includes Russian, Kazakh and Kyrgyz aircraft, would provide cover for 5,000 CIS rapid deployment soldiers. By December 16, however, only two SU-25 ground attack jets and two SU-27 fighters were deployed, and the SU-27 will be returning soon to their permanent bases. These planes do not seem combat-ready. Russian presidential and defense staff and accompanying journalists from the base made an emergency landing in Kazakhstan; some sources knowledgeable about the episode blamed poor Kyrgyz jet fuel.

The American-led force in Kyrgyzstan includes 20 F-16 fighters and over 2,000 troops, deployed primarily to support the peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. The Russian-CIS deployment can complement this force, and provide the basis for Russia-NATO cooperation envisaged in the NATO-Russian Treaty signed in May. As Russian and US military experts point out, conventional deployments do not necessarily harness the intelligence and special-forces capability that countries need to fight stateless foes such as al Qaeda. To truly battle terrorism, American and Russian leaders must support broad extra-military strategies designed to promote political participation, civil society and the rule of law. On this score, both the American-led deployment and the new Russian-CIS outpost in Kyrgyzstan seem unlikely to provide fresh answers any time soon.

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