#14
Russian Foreign Policy Expert on Terrorism, Relations with US
Nepszabadsag (Hungary)
18 December 2002
[translation for personal use only]
Interview with Sergei Rogov, director of Russia's Institute of USA and Canada Studies by Zoltan Szalai; in Moscow, in December 2002:
"Russia Can No Longer Be Written Off"

"When George W. Bush became president, many felt that Russia was a third-rate power and that Moscow no longer needed to be taken into consideration. Despite this, the US President has met Putin for the seventh time the other day. Accordingly, it would be too early to write off Russia. I have the greatest respect for China, but Washington did not sign a Strategic Arms [Reduction] Treaty with Beijing.

The same way as it did not sign one with Hungary," Sergei M. Rogov, director of the Institute of USA and Canada Studies in Moscow said. This prestigious research institute is still the number one brain trust of Russian foreign policy, when it comes to decisions involving relations with America or the West. Here is the first question our Moscow reporter asked from this well-known professional: "What has happened in the aftermath of 11 September from the Russian standpoint?"

[Rogov] The United States and Russia, the Soviet Union, to be more accurate, have been implacable enemies for almost half a century. The Cold War has ended in 1991, and with that, the ideological conflict has disappeared together with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, no real partnership came about despite preliminary hopes. To use Yeltsin's words: the Cold War was replaced by cold peace. By late 1999, the Kosovo crisis has become the low point in this process. September 11 rewrote the agenda of international relations. One could venture to say that the fight against terrorism has become as important to the United States, as halting the spread of communism in earlier days. It is a well-known fact that even before 9/11, terrorism has been the chief enemy from Moscow's point of view. The term "terrorism" appears 18 times in the national security doctrine signed by Putin in 2000. Russia and the United States found a strong common interest this way, one that was missing in the 1990-s. This might sound cynical but it is true: common interests are strongest when a common enemy exists. Another important element is that improved Russian-American relations were not accompanied by deteriorating Russian-European, Russian-Chinese or Russian-Japanese relations.

[Szalai] What is going to be the future of the Russian-American "axis" if the al-Qa'ida is liquidated or Usama Bin Ladin is captured?

[Rogov] Indeed, Russian-American cooperation is sill fragile. The greatest concern is that no institutional form has been established for the partnership. Too much depends on the personal relationship between Bush and Putin. Why must even the smallest details be decided at the presidential level? Is it so because the staff is not really interested in cooperation, i.e., neither the Pentagon nor our military staff is enthusiastic about cooperation? Establishing and institutional framework takes time of course, but the process could be advanced if Moscow and Washington had genuine common interests in addition to the common enemy. On the one hand, neither of the two great powers is interested in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, neither wants to see a situation in which any third country has more nuclear weapons than they have. On the other hand, both Moscow and Washington want to prevent regional conflicts - such as the one in the Near East or in the case of India and Pakistan - to enter a phase when the two sides deploy nuclear weapons. The third and most important pillar of partnership should be common economic interests, since this field serves as the glue that holds the West together.

[Szalai] Although significant advances have been made during the past several years in economic cooperation, Russia is by far not an organic part of the European economic center as of now.

[Rogov] Indeed, there is no cause for bragging in the field of economic cooperation. The elder Bush had promised Yeltsin that the Jackson-Vanick Amendment would be repealed, but this legal provision is still in force. (The amendment adopted in 1974 penalized the Soviet Union with trade sanctions for preventing the emigration of Jews. - The editor.) Its existence is a symbol, a bad symbol. The US and the EU recently recognized Russia as a market economy. This is a good sign. Its impact, however, is limited for now, the volume of trade has not increased because of this recognition, and investments have not expanded. Russia's membership in the World Trade Organization continues to be unresolved. In this regard, the EU has established conditions that could not be complied with. It is ridiculous that of all the organizations, Brussels is the one that demands that Russia restricts to a minimum the granting of agricultural subsidies. The issue of external indebtedness also remains unsettled. Russia's debt amounts to $120 billion at present; almost one-third of next year's $62 billion budget will represent repayment of debts.

[Szalai] Unlike three years ago, Moscow calmly agreed to yet another eastward expansion of NATO. Is the Alliance no longer an enemy?

[Rogov] A NATO-Russia Council has been established a few months ago and this indicates the beginning of an institutional framework for relations between the West and Russia. Mainly in the military field, even though one would expect most points of resistance in this field. Establishment of the new American-Russian consulting group fits into the same vein; the defense and foreign ministers of the two countries will meet in this framework. A similar body exists only in the Australian-American relation. Reverting to the NATO-Russia Council, this organization made it possible not to have problems regarding the new eastward expansion of the Alliance. Today, Russia is far less "afraid" of NATO than it was a few years ago. I would say as an aside, that NATO could, conceivably become a paper tiger. Namely, if fighting terrorism is the main goal, the Alliance plays only a small role in that. Russia and the NATO-Russia Council could be more important than that.

[Szalai] Is Russian diplomacy not concerned about the possibility that after expanding with the Baltic countries, NATO could also be expanded with the former Soviet member republics?

[Rogov] I exaggerated, of course, when I said that NATO was a paper tiger. This military alliance, however, no longer has an enemy. NATO must find a new role for itself. One cannot tell yet what exactly that new role is going to be. As president, the elder Bush called for the establishment of a security system between Vancouver and Vladivostok. While the OSCE is gradually becoming secondary, one cannot rule out the possibility that NATO is going to become the foundation for such a collective security system. One could imagine several kinds of scenarios in this regard. The first variant would function based on the "winner-takes-all" logic. In other words, that NATO would "devour" not only the former East European socialist countries, but also the former Soviet republics, and would hold both Russia and China in check this way. According to the second variant, the West would not unilaterally move forward, but would integrate Russia, moreover possibly even China. By establishing the Shanghai Group, China has already moved out of isolation, and, who knows, there might be a NATO-China Council five years from now.

[Szalai] To what extent does the Iraq issue influence the new foreign policy line of Russia?

[Rogov] It seems that Russian and American interests do not coincide in the case of Iraq. Saddam Husayn is an enemy, according to Washington. The Iraqi dictator presents no threat, according to Moscow. Accordingly, when the Bush Administration announced that there would be war, many felt that this could lead to breaking up Russian-American relations. Things did not happen that way, however, in the end we succeeded in adopting a common Security Council resolution. We often hear that Russia has economic interests in Iraq. I suggest, however, that we should not confuse the interests of [the Russian oil company] Lukoil with national interests. What about Iraq's indebtedness? Iraq owes us indeed, but no one has paid this debt so far. It seems to me that the entire problem is fueled by large Russian oil firms with interests in Iraq. How should I say this.... the tail wags the dog. It would be far more important to Russia if the West wrote off at least part of its debt. [As published; it is unclear whose debt Rogov is talking about.]

[Szalai] Is Russian foreign policy clearly moving in the westerly direction?

[Rogov] We have known for a long time that foreign policy is always a continuation of domestic policy. By no coincidence, Putin is continually urging the reforming of Russian bureaucracy. Not much happens, however, beyond the staff members nodding their heads in a disciplined manner. Unfortunately, the executive power is too strong in Russia, while the administration of justice is too weak. The staff could still be made interested in the new course. Let us take the present expansion of NATO for instance. The fact that the Alliance has incorporated the former Warsaw Pact also means that in 2004 between 30 and 40 percent of the weapons used by NATO will have been manufactured in the former Soviet Union. Most of these are obsolete, but could be modernized. If there were a mechanism in the framework of which the Russian military industry could play a role in these renewals, the rather strong military industry lobby would be the chief supporter of the new kind of Russian-Western relations.

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