|
|

#15
Krasnaya Zvezda
No. 225
December 2002
POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR RUSSIA OF U.S. OPERATION
AGAINST IRAQ
Expert Forecast
By Sergei SUMBAYEV
The work being done by the UN inspectors in Iraq has not removed from the
agenda a military operation, which is much spoken of in Washington today. The
Iraqi issue in this context is in the focus of public interest in Russia as
well. To examine the situation from every aspect the Parlamentskaya Gazeta
jointly with the Krasnaya Zvezda held a round-table discussion devoted to
"Political and Military-Strategic Consequences for Russia in the Event of
U.S. Military Action against Iraq," in which leading Russian political
analysts and experts took part. The main items discussed were U.S. goals in
Iraq, the time and methods of conducting a military operation, and its likely
outcome and possible consequences for Russia.
In the opinion of Alexei Vasilyev, director of the Institute of Africa,
Russian Academy of Sciences, a war against Iraq is a decided matter, because
President Bush cannot back away without losing face. Besides, "hawks"
like Condoleezza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld are dominating in shaping the U.S.
foreign policy today, rather than moderate politicians like Colin Powell. And
the fact that the permanent bombings of the Iraqi air defense systems is done to
clear a zone of attack for U.S. troops shows that preparations for the war are
underway. President Bush claims that his goal in Iraq is to destroy nuclear
arms. However, during the inspectors' work that ended in 1998, two files on
Iraq, one on nuclear and the other on chemical arms, were closed. It is
unrealistic to develop these weapons anew within four years, Vasilyev explained.
As regards the accusations of complicity in terrorism and ties with Al Qaeda
leveled against Baghdad, Vasilyev said that Iraq is ruled by a nationalistic
regime, while Al Qaeda is a fundamentalist organization set up with the money of
Saudi Arabia and with the help of CIA. Vasilyev recommended also that attention
be paid to relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia in the context of an
obvious change of U.S. priorities in the region. The pro-Russian lobby that has
emerged in Saudi Arabia points to serious changes in the alignment of forces in
the Middle East.
As for the time and methods of conducting the operation, it will take the
Americans about a month, in the opinion of Vasilyev, to form a military group of
250 thousand servicemen. One of the variants of warfare may be a blitzkrieg
followed by the surrender of the Iraqi Republican Guards. But Vasilyev warned
against a wrong idea of the war developments in 1991 when Iraqi troops
reportedly were surrendering in large numbers. It was uniformed peasants that
surrendered, while the units of the Republican Guards were moved to the rear and
were getting ready for defense.
The second version may be the seizure of cities, but in that case the war
will be protracted. This version is better for Saddam, for it would cause
greater losses among the Americans. Therefore Baghdad would strive to make
events turn this way.
If a war breaks out, the U.S. will win anyway, Vasilyev said, but at what
cost? After their victory the Americans will try to form a pro-Western
government in the country. This will be hard to do, because the Iraqis are not
prepared for it. Five thousand years under totalitarian rule will not allow to
subjugate the Iraqi people the way Japan or Germany surrendered in 1945.
Therefore to maintain control over the Iraqi territory, it would be necessary to
establish either a military Sunnite regime or an occupation U.S. regime for a
term of one to ten years. Considering that the opposition in Iraq is weak and
will hardly take power into its hands, Iraq may be expected to split into three
parts - the Kurd north, the Sunnite center and the Shiite south, which will get
under Iran's influence.
The consequences of such development in Iraq for Russia may be either bad or
very bad, Vasilyev believes. First, in case of a war, Washington will go beyond
the bounds of international law, while Russia is striving to strengthen
international law. Second, Russia's economic interests will suffer. At present
Iraq's debt to Russia is estimated at 5 to 7 billion dollars. Will it be
returned after the war? Nobody knows that. And it is not clear whether Russia
will retain its right to develop Iraq's Western Kurna oil deposit. Russian
industrial facilities will also lose contracts for the delivery to Iraq of
machines and equipment, and oil prices will fall below the level acceptable for
Russia. Third, the rout of Iraq may push Iran towards the development of nuclear
weapons. In addition, the war against Iraq may bring Islamic fundamentalists to
power also in Egypt and Jordan.
In the opinion of Lieutenant-General Leonid Shebarshin, president of the
Russian National Economic Security Service and former head of the First Main
Department of the KGB, Iraq should be regarded in the context of the general oil
situation in the world. After the U.S. troops entered Afghanistan and the
Central Asian countries, the United States received a possibility to control the
flow of energy sources from Kazakhstan and the Caspian area. In the Caucasus,
the U.S. pursue a policy, according to which it is not in the U.S. interests to
allow Russia's control of the Caucasus.
When Iraq is occupied (Shebarshin does not doubt either that the Americans
will win the war), Washington will be aiming at other targets - Iran or Saudi
Arabia. In this connection Russia should defend its interests without
quarrelling with the U.S. Colonel-General Valery Manilov, a member of the upper
house of the Russian parliament, who also took part in the round-table
discussion, considers that the U.S. wants to conquer Iraq not only for improving
its own economy but also for establishing its domination in the world. Iraq is a
necessary element in arranging a uni-polar world order centered around the U.S.
In Manilov's view, Washington seeks to complete the establishment of a new world
order, as other centers of power, such as Europe and China, are developing
rapidly. Manilov stressed also that the occupation of Iraq will enable U.S.
troops stationed in Afghanistan, Turkey and Iraq to encircle Iran, and then to
isolate Russia in the southern direction.
Fyodor Burlatsky, chairman of the Learned Council for Political Science at
that Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences and president of the
Foundation for Eurasian State Cooperation, doubts that the war is inevitable and
that the motives for starting the war boil down to Washington's desire to bring
Iraqi oil resources under its control. Burlatsky also cautioned against a view
that a war against Iraq would be tantamount to a war against the Islamic world.
In his opinion, the chief motive behind the U.S. stand with regard to Iraq is
fear of terrorism.
Political analyst Alexei Kiva disagreed with the view expressed by Burlatsky.
He compared the present situation in the U.S. with that in Germany before World
War II. In his view, oil is not the ultimate goal but an instrument. Besides,
George Bush is not sure that he will win the war. Nonetheless, Kiva stressed, it
is 80 percent certain that a war with a subsequent occupation of Iraq may take
place. The remaining 20 percent depend on the positions assumed by other
countries, which may come out resolutely against a military operation.
Speaking about possible consequences of the war and occupation of Iraq,
Major-General Anatoly Gusher, director of the Centre of Strategic Development,
pointed out that the character of U.S. military actions would be determined by
the forces and the goals set by the White House. As regards consequences for
Russia, it is clear that in the event of the war the debts will not be paid
back.
Vice-President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems Vladimir Anokhin, in
addition to what the speakers before him said, began by relating brief
information about Iraq's debt. The total sum is estimated at 6.8 billion
dollars. Of that sum, $6.4 billion account for arms deliveries. As for a
possible development of the situation, Anokhin said that, since Kuwait would be
unable to let a 250,000-strong army through its territory, the Americans will
have to form a provisional occupation government in the south of Iraq, for
instance, in Basra. Anokhin believes that if a revolution breaks out in Iraq,
the country may be headed by pro-British clans, which want a change of the
regime in the country and its orientation. But, keeping to a tradition, they
will have to declare themselves the successors of Saddam, while rejecting the
main role of the Ba'th party, which is in power today. But the Ba'th party or a
similar group will come to power anyway in four or five years. Then a new
revolution will follow and Russia will again become Iraq's main partner. Anokhin
did not rule out that during a military operation, if the Americans incur losses
unacceptable for themselves, they may use tactical nuclear arms.
Washington's chief goal, in Anokhin's view, is not so much the occupation of
Iraq as control over Iran and the Caspian energy resources. It may be supposed,
therefore, that in future actions will be taken to establish an independent
Daghestan, and thus to tear a 300 km area of the Caspian shelf away from Russia.
Another speaker at the discussion, Alexei Yevdokov, general director of the
Committee for International Scientific and Business Cooperation with Iraq,
called for abandoning a position of impending doom and stopping to compare the
present situation with that in 1991. In 1991, he recalled, George Bush Sr. was
supported by a few dozen countries, while at present the U.S. acts
single-handed, so far. This makes one wonder whether George Bush Jr. ventures to
launch a new campaign.
On the whole, all the speakers agreed that Russia's present position on Iraq,
in which flexibility and firmness are combined, is fairly reasonable. Moreover,
the adoption of Resolution 1441 by the UN Security Council should be regarded as
a success of Russian diplomacy.
BACK TO THE TOP #235 CONTENTS NEXT ARTICLE
|
|