#8
Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference
November 14-15, 2002
http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/2002conference/speeches3.htm
Panel Summary
Reshaping US-Russian Threat Reduction
Thursday, November 14

Chair: Jon B. Wolfsthal- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Kenneth Luongo- Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council
Mary Alice Hayward- Professional Staff, US Senate Armed Services Committee
Alexander Pakayev- Carnegie Moscow Center
Paul F. Walker- Global Green USA

Introduction

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in conjunction with the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC), released a ten-month intensive study examining the complexities of dismantling Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs in the Former Soviet Union (FSU). The primary focus of the study and the panel discussion, Reshaping U.S.-Russian Threat Reduction, is to review the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, created by Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar, and to recommend how better to implement the initiative as it enters its second decade of existence. The current problem the U.S. Government faces is a significant one. Though much work has been done under CTR, there is much more to do, and new approaches are needed to reduce proliferation threats arising from the FSU.

Kenneth Luongo

On the ten-year anniversary of the Nunn-Lugar initiative there are several important questions to ask: Why was this study undertaken? What are the findings of the report? What do we want to see come from this report? Much has already been accomplished: 6,000 nuclear warheads have been removed from deployment, 400 missile silos destroyed, and nearly 1,400 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, submarines, and strategic bombers eliminated. The report found many areas that need immediate attention, however.

For example, it is important to acknowledge that the U.S. does not fully know the scope of all Russian WMD programs, and that support for the CTR program is spotty in the United States. Furthermore, G-8 countries, which have formally pledged to support CTR projects financially, have yet to back up their promises with actual funds. The study also emphasized the fact that CTR implementation has been hindered by a lack of coordination within the U.S. interagency since the first Clinton Administration.

Additionally, there has been insufficient coordination between government agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and cooperation between the U.S. and Russian governments has proven sub-par. Luongo hoped that the report would create a stimulus for reform and draw more political attention to the CTR program-perhaps in the form of more congressional hearings to ascertain what the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State are doing to improve the CTR program.

Alexander Pikayev

The CTR discussion needs to be refocused to include more participation from the Russian Government. The dismantling of WMD programs in Russia is very desirable, since it frees up additional funds for other budgetary needs. For instance, Russia achieved a twelve-fold increase in freed funding by dismantling Chemical Weapon (CW)-related programs in 2001. Russia is becoming a true partner in weapons reduction, but the disarmament process is going to be expensive. CW destruction alone will require $3-8 billion over the next ten years. However, Russia is ready to downsize and will become even more ambitious in setting targets after the next presidential election.

The threats posed by scientists with special knowledge of WMD programs still need to be addressed, and the CTR program must ensure that technical experts are gainfully employed in order to prevent their knowledge from adding to the proliferation problem. Biodefense is another area that needs more work. Secrecy in the area of Biological Weapons (BW) programs prevents adequate cooperation between Russia and the U.S. Further, many Russian agencies, including Biopreperat, and the Ministries of Defense, Health, and Agriculture, have different priorities and levels of transparency. Biopreperat is prevented from competing in world markets as a result of U.S. policy, which prohibits it from receiving funding.

Paul F. Walker

25% of CW stockpiles in the U.S. have been destroyed, but no CWs have yet been disposed of in Russia. Unfortunately, there is no "silver bullet" for destroying CWs-a fact which will cause the CW elimination process to be extended beyond the 2007 deadline originally set by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This process is progressing slowly because CTR has found few champions in America, and because Europe has not assumed its share of the burden. However, the U.S. must continue to play a leadership role in CTR, and Congress should not block efforts to improve CTR. Urgent priorities include freeing up 2002 fiscal funds for CTR CW programs, developing a demilitarization plan for Russia, and providing technical cooperation in exchange for nerve agent destruction. Further, there needs to be more flexibility under international treaties for CTR development.

Mary Hayward

From a legislative perspective, the report tries to identify emerging threats. This corresponds to the aims of a hearing organized three years ago in the Senate Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, which illustrated that while its costs remain uncertain, CTR participation is in the U.S. national interest. What is needed now for CTR to be effective is transparency, a long-term plan, and agreed upon objectives, such as destroying specific programs and fostering a mutually beneficial working relationship with Russia.

The recently passed National Defense Authorization Bill that is now ready for the President's signature will give a three-year waiver authority to the president. This will allow flexibility in determining what projects in the FSU still need to be addressed through CTR, even if the Russians have not held up their side of the agreement. A working group should convene to create a follow-up report.

Closing Comments

A representative from Dyncorp asked what impact 9/11 had on CTR programs. The panelists agreed that the terror attacks helped convince Congress to allocate supplemental funding for CTR projects in light of new threats to U.S. security. Walker explained that the threat arising from CWs seems more imminent post-9/11, and he argued that the Homeland Security debate should begin to address what can be done to protect and ultimately destroy CWs. Jon Wolfsthal, the chair of the panel, closed with the comment that CTR implementation has often been marred by missed opportunities, and that the program's champions should work to take advantage of opportunities in the future more efficiently.

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