#7
Newsday
November 21, 2002
In Backing Down to NATO, Russia Goes West
By James Klurfeld
James Klurfeld is a columnist and Newsday's editorial page editor.

Sometimes what does not happen is more important that what is happening. And that is exactly the case with the NATO summit meeting in Prague this week.

The headlines are all about the dramatic expansion of NATO to include another seven countries from Eastern Europe, especially three republics that were formerly part of the Soviet Union: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

But, as in the case of the Sherlock Holmes tale of the dog that did not bark, the real significant event this week is that the bear did not growl. That is, the Russians, under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, have decided not to make the expansion of NATO a cause celebre. Considering that for nearly half a century, NATO was viewed by Moscow as its intractable enemy, this is a remarkable development. It has to do, no doubt, with a cold-blooded calculation that the United States is so powerful and Russia so weak that it made no sense to oppose what was clearly going to happen no matter what Russia said or did.

But the decision is also another strong illustration of how determined Putin is to follow his post-Sept. 11 strategy of aligning Russia unequivocally with the West. This is potentially the most historic development not only since Sept. 11, 2001, but since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

I say potentially significant because it is far from clear that Putin will be successful, and because many of those who watch Russia closely say that he is far out in front of many of the most important institutional players in the Russian elite. The army and the security forces, for instance, remain wary of what Washington's true intentions are by moving the alliance into former Soviet territory. Many still fear that the West - which means the United States - will eventually wind up placing troops and nuclear weapons in the Baltics.

That is to say that the wisdom of expanding NATO is far from clear and that much depends on Putin's ability to implement his vision of a modern, free-market, Western-oriented Russia. As NATO celebrates its expansion, it is important to understand that one of the most critical aspects of world affairs in this new century will not be what happens to NATO, but what happens to Russia.

If Putin's vision can be fulfilled - if Russia becomes a normal state, a part of the new Europe and a strategic partner of the United States - the chances of maintaining a more stable, peaceful world are greatly enhanced. But at this moment, that is not a guaranteed outcome.

As for NATO itself, it is more a museum piece now than a mutual security organization. Maybe that was inevitable with the end of the Cold War. But what distinguished NATO, what made it one of the most successful alliances in world history, was the sanctity of its Article 5 commitment that an attack on one member was an attack on all. That is no longer true. NATO is now more a formerly exclusive club in which membership has a strong symbolic meaning but little practical application.

For the nations of Eastern Europe, membership means acceptance by the West. That is important to them. The prospect of joining did push many of those nations to accelerate reform of their political institutions.

But much more important in real terms is that many of these Eastern European nations are now on the cusp of being brought into the European Union. That has real meaning for their economies, their standard of living and, most importantly, their true integration into the West. Indeed, membership in NATO, which still carries military obligations, is counterproductive to their economic needs to meet EU economic standards.

The integration of Eastern European nations into the Atlantic Alliance this week is noteworthy. But what happens to the bear that is not growling is even more critical.

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