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CDI Russia Weekly #232 Contents   Printer-Friendly Version

#2
www.kreml.org
November 21, 2002
The Bush-Putin Summit: Some Predictions and Observations
By Nikolai Zlobin
Director of Russian and Asian Programs, Center for Defense Information, Washington DC.

I'll begin by saying that this is an extremely important summit for the two presidents and, unfortunately, we must concede that they don't meet often enough, considering the situation of our two countries. Working meetings in particular must be the main mechanism for solving our problems, not merely an official visit such as the one in May, but visits like the upcoming one in Pushkin--these should be more frequent, and many problems can be solved there in an informal manner. That's first.

Second, it's absolutely clear that relations between the two presidents are on a much higher level than relations between the two states, between the two government structures, or between Russian and American societies. That's why present-day negotiation between them is far simpler than through traditional diplomatic mechanisms. And the third general observation is that, of course, US policy toward Russia is today based in large part on President Bush's personal relations toward Putin and Russia in general. This personal stance is closely tied to Bushs own perceptions and opinions, and Washington doesn't necessarily have a consensus on this matter. Therefore any show of support from Russia and from president Putin are important for Bush not only from the point of view of solving his most important international problems, but also from the point of view of Bush's cooperation between his foreign policy elite and the foreign policy experts in America, because not everyone shares the optimistic and friendly stance that he demonstrates toward Russia.

Regarding this summit, keep in mind that Bush's doctrine consists not of forging traditional, rigid unions and coalitions, but creating flexible coalitions to solve concrete problems. Today, the job is forming a potential coalition in case of military conflict with Iraq. And, undoubtedly, this summit will be one of the key meetings in Washingtons framework of creating such coalitions.

It is not a given that Moscow will agree to everything Washington proposes. But the Americans are behaving in a rather flexible manner. They have stated that countries may only partially support Washington or the idea of military action in Iraq. And Russia has a variety of options available to it. Bush hopes that Russia, with its authority and influence on Saddam's regime, will actively force Iraq to completely accept any resolution and obey any international demand - that is, help avoid military conflict.

Russia has more tools for applying diplomatic pressure on Saddam Hussein and his regime than any other country in the Western block, to which Russia belongs in this situation. In this plane Putin also has, I think, a variety of potential responses, and a variety of ways to support the resolution of the Iraqi problem. It is not necessary, after all, to offer Russia's military participation. There are other methods, for instance economic and diplomatic levers with which to pressure the regime toward total disarmament. These issues will undoubtedly be discussed.

There will also be a discussion of Europe's situation in regards to NATO expansion and here, I think, Bush will be explaining to the Russian president the meaning of what goes on in Europe. NATO is going through a fairly difficult stage, and I think it will be important for Bush to find out in Prague how much NATO is prepared to support Americans from the point of view of aiming the alliance at a new enemy -- international terrorism.

This is a major problem which could, I believe, split up the organization, because the traditional NATO is a NATO that provides stability and security in Europe. Now this issue is shifting into the background, as we all know, and the problem of international global terrorism comes to the forefront. And if NATO can re-orient itself toward the new target, all the better. If not, then Russia's role grows even larger, because Russia, as Washington sees it, can act much more pragmatically then the Europeans, who exist in a world of their own and don't recognize the reality.

And in general its is believed in Washington that Russia and Putin are pragmatic enough to separate the necessity of solving the problem from various ideological doctrines that Europeans stuff their heads with. That, I believe, is one of the reasons behind Bush's sympathy toward Russia and Putin -- a healthy pragmatism, possibly bordering on cynicism. But the problem must be solved, for it cannot be avoided.

Neither Russia nor America can any longer hide behind someone else's back. The Europeans, I think, have not recognized that, believing to this day that they may be able to hide somehow. The post-summit discussion will be about where NATO is headed and what role Russia will play in that transformation. Plus, we all realize that the union of Russia and NATO or Russia and America brings problems to the Russian-Chinese border, which has never been the case before. This issue will undoubtedly be discussed.

There will also surely be some discussion of the Chechnya question and the issue of terrorism within Russia, the hostage situation etc. Bush was exceptionally positive about Putin's role in the situation, while the American political elite, as you know, judged his role and his methods in a much less positive way, with much greater skepticism. The main focus seems to have been on what lesson the Russian administration will learn from this. The public opinion of the American political elite is that the Chechnya problem is in large part not a terrorist problem, but a Russian problem. Chechen fighters have roots in Russia, in Moscow, in Russian official structures, banks and businesses. Someone, of course, profits from this. Until we clarify these issues, Chechnya by itself appears a consequence of some deeper processes within the country. But Bush personally, as I said, has expressed only positive assessments of both Putin's role and the toughness with which he solved the problem. The hostage situation showed that political will does exist in the Kremlin after all. This issue will undoubtedly be discussed at the summit, and Bush will probably once again be talking about the necessity for political regulation. After all, practically the entire American political elite believes that there must be a political solution, but definitely not a military one, and that the parallels between Al-Qaeda and Chechna are not fully justified.

I think there will also be a discussion of the Middle East and Georgia, if there is time, but this is a separate set of problems which I dont want to go into. It's not a very extensive summit, I'm afraid.

I think Russia should try to extract the maximum benefit possible from this meeting. And Russia's options are greater than they may appear. The coalition's flexibility, the many varieties of Russian support -- direct, indirect, unseen, open, secret, diplomatic, military, intelligence-based, ideological, etc. -- allows Russia, with the correct formulation of the issues, to extract very significant benefits from the current situation.

Translated by Seva Gunitskiy.

*******

#3
SERGEI ROGOV, DIRECTOR OF THE USA AND CANADA INSTITUTE, RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, TALKS TO RIA NOVOSTI ANALYST MARIANNA BELENKAYA
RIA Novosti
November 21, 2002

QUESTION: US and Russian presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin are meeting on Friday. What "sharp angles", if any, now exist in relations between the two countries?

ANSWER: Russia and the US have some issues over which they disagree. We and the Americans do not exactly see eye to eye on the Iraqi issue, and on a number of other problems. Far from all in Russia rejoice at NATO's expansion, and problems also exist in the military and political field. But their existence does not alter the central feature -- that today we are witnessing the consolidation of a new model of Russian-American relations, a partner-like model, one that emerged following September 11, with Russia and the US recognising a common enemy -- international terrorism -- and acknowledging common interests in other fields as well.

Many believed that this is a passing phenomenon, that it is only a tactical coincidence, and in a few months' time, with the Taliban regime and Al-Qaeda network crushed, Russian-American relations would return to their former state, dominated by differences rather than coincidence of interests. But this did not happen. Today our relations are dominated by common interests.

At their meeting Bush and Putin will naturally discuss not only the issues on which the sides see partly eye to eye, but also unsolved problems, in particular in the economy, still plagued by the Jackson-Vanik amendment, still seeing no trade or investment growth, despite very enthusiastic statements. Here, however, I must make a correction.

This year Russia invested eight billion dollars in the US, and the US to Russia only 800 million. That is, we are now supplying capital to America. But all these questions can be described as normal problems which always exist between partners and are solved without crises or conflicts -- through routine business negotiations.

QUESTION: Can we say that Russia and US relations are much closer than those between NATO allies?

ANSWER: Indeed, the Europeans and the Americans have very serious disagreements, not only in the economy, where the European Union and the United States have always been main rivals, but also in the political area. And here I can state that on some issues Russia and the US are closer to each other. This concerns many aspects of the struggle against international terrorism and some other issues of global security, where the Europeans hold a position different from the US, or do not show a particular interest in these problems at all.

But on other major problems, such as the role of the UN, or the UN Security Council in the modern world, and the Iraqi issue, Russia and Europe are closer than the US and Europe or the US and Russia. We now have a kind of triangle -- Russia, the United States and Europe -- where on most issues the sides are agreed and understand each other, but on some there are discrepancies. A distinctive feature of the present-day situation is that our disagreements with America and the European Union are not greater than those between the US and the EU, and in some instances the differences among western allies are much more serious.

QUESTION: What option in Iraq will suit the US -- an obedient Baghdad or one resisting inspections? What is actually wanted by the US from Iraq?

ANSWER: So far we are seeing signs that the US is preparing to use military force to solve the problem. It is building up its military grouping in the region. Today the Americans do not have enough strength and weapons to pursue a major campaign. In a few months time such a grouping will be created, by the deadline set for inspections. A variety of options are possible. If the inspections reveal that Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction /WMD/ and Iraq discontinued their development programmes, this will dispense with the excuse for a military action. In the US there are people who are for toppling Saddam Hussein whatever the outcome, but I think they will find it difficult to gain the upper hand in debates inside Washington and launch a war if it were proved that Iraq has no WMD.

QUESTION: You mean to say, Washington does not need a military solution to the Iraqi problem?

ANSWER: Different groups in Washington give different assessments of the situation. And if the inspections show that Iraq does have WMD then the use of force will become very likely. If the inspections present convincing evidence that Iraq is violating the UN resolutions, then, as 10 years ago, the UN Security Council may mandate the use of force against Baghdad. But if the outcome of inspections is inarticulate and unpersuasive, then the Europeans, the Chinese and many others would not think that Iraq breached its commitments. And this is a case where the Americans may resort to unilateral action. That is, the party of war in Washington in the case of unclear reports from international inspectors would undertake an international forceful action without a new UN Security Council resolution.

QUESTION: Last week US Secretary of State Colin Powell said that the ultimate goal of US policy in Iraq continues to be a replacement of the regime. Is that really so?

ANSWER: American leaders make all sorts of statements. Looking at what is said by Bush and for that matter by Powell, the problem they put forward, at least in words, is WMD. The Pentagon and some high-ranking members of the administration, for example Vice-President Cheney, keep on saying that the Saddam Hussein regime should be overthrown whether or not it has WMD. Washington lacks a uniform position today, with infighting going on within the administration on this and other issues. And depending on the situation, now one line and now another gets the upper hand.

A few months ago, say, in August-September it seemed the party of war was gaining, but the administration's policy, under pressure from the State Department, under pressure from Powell, was adjusted, and the United States agreed to the UN Security Council adopting a compromise resolution. But the situation may in a few months' time undergo some drastic change.

QUESTION: This situation is changing because of domestic political problems in the US?

ANSWER: A dynamic behind American policy is a US desire to assert its role in the world arena as the sole superpower. This is the official doctrine of the Bush administration. Some members of the administration put their emphasis on military instruments. More moderate quarters propose using diplomatic, economic and military levers. It is within these boundaries that we see fluctuations.

Bush does not need war to win the 2004 presidential elections. It may be recalled that his father -- George Bush Sr -- lost the 1992 president election, although he won the Cold War and the Persian Gulf war. Outcome of elections in the US is practically never decided by foreign policy issues.

QUESTION: Won't Bush's foreign policy doctrine clash in time with the Russian foreign policy line?

ANSWER: Bush's foreign policy doctrine, proclaiming the role of the US as the only superpower, is in contradiction with the positions taken by all other countries. No one wishes to concede as a norm the situation when one state decides for all. Neither we, nor the Europeans, nor the Chinese agree with that. Hence inevitable friction, inevitable differences in the positions of the sides. But any doctrine, I want to remind you, is a declarative document. Real politics never matches the doctrine, it is connected with circumstances or some or other factors associated both with domestic political issues and with an alignment of forces on the world stage.

 

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