#11
eurasianet.org
November 12, 2002
TRANSITION TO AUTOCRACY IN CENTRAL EURASIA: THE US RESPONSE
A EurasiaNet Commentary by Tigran Martirosyan
Editor's Note: Tigran Martirosyan is director of programs at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. Prior to this, he was a senior Armenian diplomat specializing in the analysis of US foreign and national security policies toward south Caucasus.

A decade ago, Western policy-makers tended to view the collapse of the Soviet empire as part of a broader global shift toward democracy. By the late 1990s, however, those early assumptions had proven overly optimistic. Indeed, many of the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus are today taking swift steps backwards -- toward regimes that suppress democratization and civil liberties, toward a "transition to autocracy."

To be sure, regional leaders have implemented certain reforms -- they have created parliaments and multi-party systems and have introduced elements of pluralism, along with the embryonic attributes of a market economy. Nonetheless, virtually every state in Central Asia and the Caucasus features political system in which the executive branch is unduly strong and the legislature is comparatively weak. At the same time, judicial structures are arbitrary and are often utilized for political purposes. Corruption is prevalent, and electoral fraud is common. In the economic sphere, powerful interests -- including government officials, along with friends and relatives -- often control the most lucrative business sectors, including natural resources.

At their best, the governments of Central Asia and the Caucasus can be characterized as a hybrid of semi-authoritarianism and something less than democracy. At their worst, they approach totalitarianism.

How did this happen? First, in forging authoritarian regimes, the governing elites construed their own interests as the interests of the state and its general population. Accordingly, they cultivated an image of the region in terms of values, concerns, and inherited habits that gave preference to authoritarian elements, rather than stressing the potential basis for liberal politics. In addition, many regional governments embraced the view that rule-of-law in their underdeveloped countries was too abstract a concept, and that domestic stability required autocratic rule.

As a result, many regional governments, citing concerns about stability, have retreated from the pursuit of democratization. Instead, they have opted to deal harshly with political dissent, ethnic conflicts, and religious extremism in a chaotic geopolitical environment. However, the stability of these regimes is fragile precisely because it is based on suppression. Many regional leaders have been unable to grasp that they could better ensure lasting stability by encouraging democratization and sustainable economic growth.

Today, the governing elites in Central Asia and the Caucasus, with a few exceptions, are largely a reflection of each country's chief executive. Many of these same leaders ruled their countries as Communist Party bosses during the twilight of the Soviet era. When their countries gained independence these leaders went through a seamless metamorphosis, re-casting themselves as nationalist reformers.

Yet, 11-plus years after independence, most leaders have managed to accrue greater power, bending constitutions to suit their needs, while exerting increasing influence over economic development. Entrenched authority is now anxious to preserve its accumulated power. Leaders rationalize their role by claiming that a period of authoritarian rule is a necessary stage in the transition from totalitarianism to democracy. They also suggest that abundance of democracy can lead to anarchy in their developing nations.

The inability of the United States to develop a consistent strategy towards Central Eurasia has played a role in the region's retreat from democratization. The dual nature of Washington's policies have sent mixed signals to regional leaders. On one hand, Washington makes rhetorical affirmations of the importance of democratization, free market, and human rights as the key to establishing full relations with the West. On the other, US officials often are tepid in response to the specific rights abuses. Especially since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the top priorities for Washington appear to be maintaining domestic stability in the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as fostering good relations with the leaders of strategically important countries that possess vast reserves of oil and gas, or where America needs bases for its anti-terrorism campaign. Moreover, Washington encourages direct government assistance and credits from multilateral lending institutions that confer benefits on the regimes without regard for their democratic performance.

The conflict between Washington's messages and its actual practices has made American behavior unpredictable in the eyes of regional leaders and more conducive to instability, rather than to stability. It has created an impression that Washington tolerates autocratic governments.

Unless the United States reevaluates its policy, the authoritarian trend, and the associated increase in popular frustration over the lack of progress will continue. At present, Central Eurasian governments have few, if any, incentives to make policy changes that benefit the broader population. If it is truly interested in fostering democratization, the United States must make its economic and military assistance dependent upon a country's meeting certain political conditions, upon concrete, measurable improvements in meeting domestic and international obligations, and upon progress in the observance of civil rights.

Today, new factors are helping to sustain authoritarian rule in Central Eurasia, including military cooperation with the United States in the anti-terrorism campaign and the ongoing development of energy resources and transport routes. The rise of Islamic radicalism in the region makes it even easier to justify authoritarian practices. At the same time, these new conditions present fresh openings for open society development. Whether these new opportunities are utilized will depend in some measure on the United States. Washington faces difficult strategic decisions. The governments of Central Eurasia are fragile, as regional leaders remain unresponsive to popular complaints, and resort to force to contain political opposition. At the same time, regional governments confront immense challenges that will require deft political maneuvering to surmount. The present leaders in Central Eurasia may not be capable of accomplishing these daunting tasks. The United States ought to renew its commitment to democratization and the development of the entrepreneurial spirit in the region. Such a policy focus, accompanied by a methodical strategic framework, could help establish the foundations for genuine law-based pluralistic societies in Central Eurasia.

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