#12
Jamestown Foundation
www.jamestown.org
Russia and Eurasia Review
Volume 1, Issue 11
November 5, 2002
RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES POST SEPTEMBER 11: WHAT DO THE RUSSIANS THINK?
By Mikhail Kochkin
Mikhail Kochkin is a postgraduate in linguistic studies and a volunteer with the NGO "Eurocontact" in Volgograd.

The radical changes in Russia's foreign policy that followed the events of September 11 last year are often interpreted as the personal achievement of Vladimir Putin, who had challenged Russian public opinion. His line on supporting the United States in the fight against international terrorism and Russia's active participation in the antiterrorist coalition, as well as the impressive warming of Russia's relations with America and NATO--all this looks outwardly like an act of extraordinary courage by our president. In Russia it is often said that, in pursuing this policy, he runs the risk of losing public support. Many political and social analysts observe that deep-rooted anti-Americanism (for many a legacy of the Cold War period), and the hostility towards the United States as world leader that has developed in the last decade, are stronger than any feelings of sympathy for the victims of the terrorist attacks of September 11, or any sense that the Russian and American peoples are united in suffering from international terrorism, the common foe.

Of course, Putin really did achieve a huge and audacious turnaround in Russia's foreign policy in 2001. It is also true that this turnaround ran counter to the established positions of many members of the political elite and the inclinations of a significant part of society. Russians still, and consistently, take a dim view of the United States' role in the world, though, paradoxically, this does not stop half or more of them supporting, equally consistently, the development of partnerships or alliances with the United States and NATO. Perhaps it is because of the influence of Putin's pragmatism that ever more Russians now tend to regard Russian-American relations not from an emotional standpoint, with the wounded pride of a former superpower, but with an appreciation of the real pros and cons of cooperation. To understand the roots of this state of affairs, it is vital to look at the dynamics of the sympathy and antipathy felt for the United States in Russia over the last decade, and to try to identify just what provoked the various changes.

THE HONEYMOON AND AFTERWARDS

The beginning of the 1990s was a honeymoon period for Russian attitudes towards America. For the overwhelming majority (and this is especially true of the younger generation), America symbolized all the good things that Russia was striving for--civil liberties combined with material prosperity. This was a time of great hope, when many people thought that they needed only to rid themselves of Communist ideology for Russia to be able to take her rightful place among the world's powers. At that time, 70 percent of Russians were favorably disposed towards the United States and only 10 percent felt negatively. But when it turned out that freedom of speech and the multi-party system did not mean an automatic rise in living standards, and a huge number of people felt left out or cheated by the results of privatization and by hyperinflation, attitudes towards the West and to the United States in particular began to deteriorate rapidly. It was in this period too that the concept of democracy became discredited in the minds of Russians--the word 'democrat' became almost a swearword.

As a whole, from the second half of the 1990s onwards, Russian opinion on the United States was more rational and cautious. There were just two exceptions, when Russian sociologists identified sharp surges in anti-American feeling. These came in 1999 (with events in Yugoslavia and the NATO bombing of Serbia) and spring 2002 (with the American military presence in Georgia, scandals surrounding imports of Russian steel into the United States and of American chicken into Russia, and the Olympic scandals at Salt Lake City). These two 'peaks' of anti-Americanism were of a highly emotional nature. As a result, in the first case, of sympathy for the suffering Serbs--our 'Slavic brothers'--and in the second, of resentment at the unjust 'condemnation' of the Russian athletes, goodwill towards America fell to an all-time low. Fortunately, the emotion factor does not last long and the mutual animosity soon faded away; by summer 2002 few in either country could recall the heated emotions of the Olympics.

Amongst the rational factors that affect the perception of the United States in Russia, two stand out as carrying the most weight.

THE FACTORS

The first, which dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century, is the persistent perception of America as a powerful nation with a rapidly developing economy and cutting-edge technology, where people earn good money, where human rights are protected and so on. According to the Public Opinion Foundation, which asked Russians "Which society, in your opinion, is organized more justly, Russia or America?", approximately half (48 percent) of the respondents named America and only 17 percent Russia. For the vast majority of Russians, "going to America" is still like winning a lucky ticket to the land of their dreams and away from the problems of everyday life--to the glitter of Hollywood and the warm beaches of California or Florida. Interestingly, Western Europe has never inspired the same reverence.

These perceptions form the basis of the positive attitudes seen in Russia towards the United States and, significantly, not even the massive propaganda efforts of the Cold War period could stamp them out of Russia's collective consciousness. Hollywood and rock and roll proved stronger than the Communist Party's ideologues.

But then there is the second factor--the perception that the United States does not want to let Russia be a great power, and is endlessly striving to limit or undermine Russia's influence in the world. This is the basis of the negative opinion of America that is still doggedly held by approximately 25 percent of all Russians. The fact is that belonging to a "great nation" or a "great power" is one of the main elements of the Russian people's sense of national identity. Russian public opinion is therefore extremely sensitive to anything that affects Russia's position as a great world power, as a country involved in the decisionmaking process on key international issues.

POST 9/11 SENTIMENTS

So what have the tragic events of fall 2001 done to change the perception of America? In Russia, the September 11 terrorist attacks prompted a wave of fellow-feeling and sympathy for the people of the United States. It could not be otherwise: As Putin put it, "the Russian people have firsthand experience of the threat of terrorism." Less obviously, these events brought about a change in the image of America in Russia's collective consciousness. It was apparent that many of those who, in the primitive mythological scheme of things, had seen the United States as some sort of global 'evil force', began to form a more sophisticated and rounded view, in which the foreign policy and internal political ideology of the American state were no longer identical with the country and its people. Russians began to see America simply as people, real men and women--not the bloated, insolent and self-satisfied individuals they had often seemed before, but innocent victims, dying and suffering. Seen this way, the policies of the government were distinct from American society's "human dimension." The differences between the decidedly negative and the more rounded images of the United States were clearly distinguishable in the views expressed by the Public Opinion Foundation's respondents. "It's not America, but America's policies that need teaching a lesson," said one of them. "When a person is killed, you always feel sorry for him, whether he was good or bad--it's sad, whoever he was." Many see the sufferings of the Americans, who had 'never before experienced such a shock', as a spur towards a psychological rapprochement and improved mutual understanding with the Russians and their own endless shocks. ("After the tragedy they have been through, they have come to understand us better.")

In spite of all the sympathy for the victims of the terrorist attacks, however, many Russians think that the tragedy was to some extent America's fault. According to an Internet poll by the free mail service Mail.ru, 59 percent cited the "aggressive policies of the U.S. government everywhere" as the main cause. This view is shared by many Russians, regardless of age, education or social status. In the words of businessman Valery K, "the Americans need to understand that they're not alone in the world. If they keep on using force to solve all their problems, things will only get worse." According to policeman Dmitry A, "of course, America has upset a lot of people around the world and they should have expected something like this to happen, though you couldn't have imagined such an atrocity." Though collectively critical of the American government's policies, Russians were generally sympathetic about the tragedy experienced by the American people, and expressions of schadenfreude were the exception. "Anti-Americanism is stronger in Europe than in Russia," maintains Andrei Piontkovsky, director of the independent Center for Strategic Studies in Moscow. "I do not believe that there is consistent anti-American feeling in Russia."

THE CHOICE OF ALLIES

The legacy of the Cold War no longer plays a decisive role in relations between the United States and Russia, and has receded to a subconscious, emotional plane (not that this means that it has been totally eradicated). In the forefront now are economic and more mundane political issues, and they are being dealt with rationally. Meanwhile, the emotional confrontations that flare up periodically for various, often trivial reasons, do not prevent Russians from striving for cooperation with America. The clear preference for the strong, wealthy and developed West as a partner for Russia is graphically illustrated by Public Opinion Foundation data on who Russians consider to be their country's military and political allies. Twenty-seven percent of respondents named Western countries (including 14 percent for America), 15 percent cited the CIS and 11 percent opted for communist states (China, Cuba and North Korea).

One way or another, President Putin is unlikely in the near future to meet much resistance from Russian public opinion to an alliance with the United States and the West. The chief obstacle here is the older generation of generals and officials of the "old guard," who are genetically incapable of embracing such a course. However, further down the road, Russian society's support for an alliance with America will depend on the real economic and political dividends that it brings Russia. And the most important thing will be how the country's economy and the prosperity of its people develop. In the absence of any perceptible achievements in the socio-economic sphere, hopes for an alliance with the West may turn rapidly into disillusionment. Therefore, effective domestic policies (especially on economic and social issues) will remain the critical condition for the implementation of Russia's chosen foreign policy.

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