#5
Asia Times
October 17, 2002
Missing: A modern-day Silk Road
By Stephen Blank
Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks

We have long known that the development of long-range transportation projects, including energy pipelines, brings together markets and peoples and provides a major impetus to long-term economic growth. Similarly we have also long known that a fundamental cause of Central Asia's backwardness was its remoteness from major shipping and transportation lanes.

Therefore a basic precondition of Central Asia's economic growth is its linkage to such lanes and the completion of major infrastructural projects in energy, rail, air, sea and land transport that connect it to foreign markets.

This consideration, after all, is what the struggle over energy pipelines is all about. Finally we have also known that such major projects also bring governments together, often against third parties whose interests may be at odds with those states who are linked together by such projects. All three developments seem to be prominent in Russia's evolving foreign policies in Central and East Asia and in India's connection to Iran.

Recently Moscow has also been able to move forward on at least two of three major railway plans that are intended to buttress its economic position, exploit its geography and increase its presence in East Asia and Central Asia. The latter railway and transport network also includes India and Iran. The East Asian system is found in the support expressed by both Koreas for Russian assistance in opening the railway between them and linking it to the Trans-Siberian railroad and the resumption of construction toward completion of that linkup.

This project not only is a step towards reconciliation of the two Koreas and their economic integration, it also enhances Russia's standing in he overall Korean peace process and ability to play a greater role in East Asia. If the projected Sakhalin-Hokkaido and Sakhalin-Russia systems open, they too would facilitate the growth of Sakhalin and bring Russia closer to Japan's and Asia's overall economy.

Russia's geographical position enables its policymakers and planners to think of it as a hub, if not the hub of a revived Asiatic transportation network that links together all the different parts of Asia through Russia and connects Europe to Asia as well. Ultimately, all these projected lines, if they materialize, could form part of a giant network of transportation lines linking together all of Asia and Russia. Russia's ambition is that this and other similar projects will facilitate a general recovery of the economy in Russian Asia which is essential if Russia can maintain its hold on the region and sustain a lasting economic-political influence there. In this sense these railway projects are symbols of a much greater process that is now underway to connect not just producers and buyers but also energy suppliers and consumers.

The two railways in question, apart from what they symbolize, also fulfill the three conditions listed above of bringing together markets, bringing together governments, and revitalizing regions now excluded from major trading lanes.

Similar considerations undoubtedly animate the Russo-Iranian-Indian transport corridor that is now coming into being. Both India and Iran, not to mention Pakistan, are increasingly interested in overland trade and transport with Central Asia; meanwhile, Central Asia, too, desperately needs secure outlets to its South. As long as Afghanistan and its borders remain unsettled, none of the interested states, including Russia, all Central Asian governments, India, Pakistan and Iran, can maximize opportunities for economic development that might emerge from Central Asia's potential. However, with the prospective end of the Taliban regime and the advent of a new regime that will be under much greater international scrutiny and perhaps impelled by domestic pressures to begin reconstruction in earnest, Afghanistan can play a role in the larger Central Asian economic picture.

The Russo-Irano-Indian corridor not only facilitates Russia's ability to trade with South Asia and exploit its geography as a "bridge" between Europe and Asia, it should materially contributes to the ability of all these and adjacent states - including those of Central Asia - to trade with more distant markets. At the same time, this project possesses important political implications. It brings together Russia, Iran, and India in a major project having substantial material interest and reinforces their joint interest against Central Asian insurgents, the Taliban, and their supporters in Pakistan.

Whereas in the past it would have strengthened foreign efforts to force Pakistan to stop supporting the Taliban, today it offers an inducement or incentive, even if only a relatively small one, for Pakistan to move towards a reorientation of its India policies. Otherwise this railway and the transportation networks that will grow up around it forces will add to Iranian support for India against Pakistan. Second, this route, to the extent it becomes successful, will also channel Central Asian economic development into directions more favorable to those three states who currently have a community of interest. These considerations might help Pakistan rethink its previous policies in Afghanistan and towards Iran and India.

This railway and the associated energy projects that Tehran and Delhi are discussing also mean energy, as India needs energy, and is improving its ties to Iran to get it as well as ties to Central Asia to forestall Pakistani adventures. Finally, if this becomes a major and successful project, it poses an alternative to the EU's Silk Road project that bypasses Russia and to American support for the Baku-Ceyhan energy pipeline and pipelines under the Caspian. That would redound to the benefit of Iran and Russia, who seek to exclude American and West European influence from Central Asia.

In Central Asia and Russia, as elsewhere, trade and the flag go together. Major transportation and infrastructure projects offer real possibilities for helping these areas recover from economic decline while contributing to major political objectives of all concerned. Recent evidence indicates these projects have become major aspects of Russia's overall Asian policy, but their consequences far transcend Russia's Asian policy to include the two Koreas, Iran, India, and possibly Japan. While these major initiatives thus have great potential significance for the future, only time will tell if they are successful in realizing Russia's ambitions. And the unintended consequences of these projects, possibly leading to other major programs, may yet have even more significant outcomes for CIS members, their neighbors and their partners. (The views expressed do not represent those of the US Army, Defense Department or the US Government.)

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