#2
Moscow News
September 25-October 1, 2002
WHY KEEP SECRET MILITARY BUDGET?
By Alexei Arbatov
[deputy chairman of the Duma's defense committee]
The draft of the federal budget, year in year out, gives the impression that the defense sector is not in the least important and discussing it is a waste of time for the State Duma

The defense budget of the United States is detailed in 3,000 to 4,000 open items. The expenditures of the Russian Defense Ministry are presented in just 128 items. And these items are so vaguely worded that one cannot possibly figure out how the ministry is going to spend its budgeted money, and what will be the priorities of the state's defense policy. What is more, only three of those 128 items are not classified. Those three items include aggregate spending on the buildup and maintenance of the army. But exactly how much will go into army buildup (rearmament, military infrastructure, research and development, without which a modern-day army is inconceivable), and into maintenance (food for the army)? A deputy who would like to find out these details must first gain access to the classified section of the defense budget.

It goes without saying, however, that the deputies are not equally good at sorting all the sections of the state budget. Independent experts may be asked to analyze the "civilian" expenditure items (say, those on social welfare needs). But experts who are knowledgeable about the defense section of the state budget are normally those who have access to state secrets; these people are not independent of the army generals.

Even if a dozen or two parliamentarians have managed to grasp the substance of the Defense Ministry's military-financial policy, they will not be allowed to voice their opinions on it at an open Duma session. Which means that the public is still in the dark about the matter. In short, the Russians are allowed to know about progress in reforming housing services and public utilities, but they are not allowed to find out in what sort of an army their children will serve.

By the way, the military spending structure dictates to Russia a foreign-policy course that is entirely different from the one proclaimed by the country's leadership. I cannot cite specific figures (they constitute a state secret!), but I can state the result of an analysis of the relevant statistics. As we know, President Putin has declared the principal goal of Russia's foreign policy to be integration with the West, primarily with the European nations. However, decisions taken behind closed doors suggest that even at this late date, 90% of our military budget goes into the training and maintenance of those forces that are intended for a big war with NATO. This appalling gap between our foreign policy and our defense policy is a secret only for the Russian parliament and the Russian public. It is not a secret for the West. To my mind, this is one of the main reasons why Russia is not allowed beyond the backyard of the European community.

We deputies have been trying hard since the mid-1990s to bring defense expenditures out into the open. In 1997, we succeeded in lifting the shroud of secrecy off 30 items of the military budget. The former leadership of the Defense Ministry and the General Staff were inclined to declassify defense expenditures. But the government objected to that: It did not want deputies armed with such information to respond to the military's complaints and put pressure on the executive branch.

The opposite is the case today: The Defense Ministry and the General Staff seek to keep their budget secret. We know why: Monopoly on information guarantees monopoly on decision making, including on strategic matters of reforming the army. Incidentally, the draft of the 2003 budget - for the first time in years - has decreased rather than increased spending on curtailment of the armed forces.

Moreover, the draft budget has altered the proportions in financing the armed forces, which signifies a policy change not immediately apparent to parliament and society. Besides, the veil of secrecy and lack of details on the military budget make it difficult to monitor the spending of its funds (the numerous scandals of the last few years are evidence that military budget funds are not infrequently misused).

If parliament wants, it can lift the lid off military spending. It can do so by adopting amendments to the existing Law on Budget Classification. Ironically, this law prescribes "declassifying" the military budget on 128 items; yet it does not prohibit applying the Law on State Secrets to all the figures pertaining to those 128 items!

A bill to amend the Law on Budget Classification has been brought before the State Duma on the initiative of the Yabloko faction. The bill lists 850 items of departmental expenditure in the military budget. And what is most important, it has drastically shortened the list of "particularly sensitive" secret items. If the deputies pass the bill, they will be able to participate professionally in the working out of the country's military policy and in monitoring its implementation. If they reject it, their message would be: All that military stuff is not our business.

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