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The U.S. National Security Strategy: A Russian Perception
September 26, 2002
Dr. Ivan Safranchuk
Director CDI Moscow
Isafranchuk@cdi.org

The following is an effort to review Russian perceptions of the new U.S. National Security Strategy unveiled by U.S. President George Bush, rather than an analysis of the strategy itself. How Moscow reads the new strategy will be important in determining Moscow's policy response.

That said, the strategy in and of itself is very unlikely to spark an active, coordinated Russian response. Indeed, as is likely in other countries, the response in Moscow is likely to split along political camps.

Still, through "Russian glasses," the most outstanding part of the new strategy is the preemption section (V) and numerous references to preemption scattered through most of the other sections of the document. Maybe because of this host of references, preemption is taken as the central or even integral, idea of the whole document. This is particularly true if one takes into account that in Russia, most political scientists and commentators take the document a priori as a declaration of unilateralism, thus interpreting all references to international cooperation as a polite U.S. attempt to wrap up unilateralism in a more internationally accepted form -- rather then following the formal logic of the document, which suggests that the United States intends to behave globally and cooperatively, but reserves the right for preemptive (not necessarily unilateral) action or unilateral action. This "unilateralism filter," commonly used in Moscow, leads to over-exaggeration of the preemption concept in the document. Consequently, the most popular interpretation is that preemption nearly fully substitutes for deterrence, the latter being excluded from U.S. political or military arsenals - despite the fact that this interpretation openly contradicts the text of the document.

Why is this "unilateralism filter" so decisive and powerful? Most likely, Russian officials and nongovernmental strategists are reading the new strategy with an ear to previous statements by Bush administration officials, and an eye to the fact that the document itself is a product of the White House and Defense Department, where the unilateral approach flourishes. While the document actually seems to be softer than earlier administration statements it is based on in its substance, in Moscow it is taken as a strong declaration by Washington of U.S. world leadership and unilateralism.

The other most visible reaction in Moscow is the positive perception of the strategy's "Russian section." The description of Russian reforms and U.S.-Russian cooperation are warmly taken in Moscow. This is despite the fact that the language seems to be harsher on Russian-U.S. disagreements than it is on U.S.-Indian or U.S.-Sino disputes (all three countries are put in the same category for the sake of U.S. policy). The strategy calls into doubt Russian progress in exactly the spheres Russian leaders themselves see as progressing toward Western standards the most quickly - citing "Russia's uneven commitment to the basic values of free-market democracy and dubious record in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remain matters of great concern." Nonetheless, the overall view in Moscow is that the strategy's language is positive for U.S-Russian relations.

However, Russian officials by and large are not approaching the new strategy in a critical way. To put it bluntly, the prevailing view is: "Okay, we've got it", rather than "let's discuss it" or "we disagree." As a result, the debate over the strategy is largely centered on what it means for Russia on the international stage, and how Moscow should live with the emerging U.S. policies.

Indeed, even those the unilateralist tone of the document is recognized, and even exaggerated, by Russian strategists, this is not leading to the sort of strident criticism of the strategy that followed in the wake of the U.S. decision to pull out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The fact is that preemption (mostly read in Russia as unilateralism) combined with prevalence of terrorism in the strategy's definition of the threat, turns out to be quite acceptable to Russia. Of course, the description and definition of the terrorist threat is widely favored in Moscow.

Russian interpretations of and reactions to the strategy can be summed up as fitting two prevailing models. The first one can be labeled as the jealousy (envy) model. Within it the strategy is taken as demonstration of U.S. "world gendarme" ambitions and U.S. hegemonism. However, two conclusions coexist within this model. The sober one states - "it is the reality, we have to live with it", the emotional one states - "The United States wants too much..."

The other model may be defined as the "green light" model. Under this view, Russia -- as a respected part of the international community -- has the right to do anything the United States has the right to do. This is regarded as the powerful engine for a so-called active Russian foreign policy -- first of all near its borders and within the scope of traditional geopolitical influence. This model of strategic thought is held by many as applicable to the current crisis in Russian-Georgian relations over the Pankisi Gorge, since it reflects Russian tactical interests in this dispute.

All in all, what is important to remember is that so far Russian officials and experts are not really conducting a substantive, detailed debate over the new strategy's text and underlying meaning, rather seeking to adapt the U.S. strategy to Russian foreign policy by juggling with interpretations. This should not be a surprise to U.S. leaders, as it is an approach generally fits into the prevailing understanding in Moscow, under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, of the need for a "pragmatic foreign policy."

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