#10
Yezhenedelnyi Zhurnal
No. 36
September 2002
SOLDIERS DESERTING
Putin is displeased with his generals and the situation in the military
Author: Alexander Golts
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

EVERYTHING INDICATES THAT THE PRESIDENT (SUPREME COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF) IS DISSATISFIED WITH THE SITUATION IN THE ARMED FORCES. EVEN CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF ANATOLY KVASHNIN IS ALARMED. SOURCES AT THE KREMLIN SAY THAT PUTIN WILL LEAVE THE GENERALS ALONE UNTIL AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

Two truly extraordinary events occurred in the Russian army last week. Dozens of soldiers of the elite 20th Division, stationed in the Volgograd region, walked away from their base. The soldiers were scared half to death by how their commanding officers had investigated the circumstances of a nocturnal drinking session in the barracks, which ended when some drunk stole an armored personnel carrier. When questioned by the commanding officers, soldiers were repeatedly beaten with shovels. A similar mass exodus happened last year in the Ulianovsk region, when desperate soldiers marched to the headquarters. This time the servicemen went directly to the local branch of the Mother's Rights non-government organization, in the hope of finding protection there. The 20th Division command was completely unaware that anything was amiss, because the regimental commander did not even inform his superiors.

Meanwhile, some amazing things were happening in Chechnya. Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, on an inspection tour of Chechnya, commandeered a private Lada car and drove around the Oktyabrsky district of Grozny incognito. The information Kvashnin obtained in the course of his personal inspection had been reported repeatedly by media outlets not known for their unswerving loyalty to the Kremlin. Kvashnin saw with his own eyes federal soldiers at checkpoints extort money and goods from local residents. The fact that Kvashnin's "heroic action" here was trivial does not really matter. What matters is that the chief of the General Staff broke every security rule in existence. Had anything happened to him on the dangerous roads of Chechnya, the guerrillas would have gained a colossal propaganda victory; while Russia and its president would have become a laughingstock around the world. Even if Kvashnin's story about driving around in a civilian car isn't true, the question inevitably arises: what is the state of the military, when its top brass can boast of such achievements?

Such an escapade can only be the result of serious anger; something similar was felt by the soldiers who deserted. These soldiers were scared of their commanders. What could have instilled such fear into the omnipotent chief of the General Staff?

Everything indicates that the president (supreme commander-in- chief) is dissatisfied with the situation in the Armed Forces. Barely a month ago, some observers assumed that the generals successfully handled the previous outburst of presidential indignation last autumn. The president announced the necessity of a transition to service by contract then and the decision was made to withdraw from Cam Rahn in Vietnam and to close the ELINT center in Lourdes, Cuba, all this quite unexpectedly for the Defense Ministry. As soon as muttering in the upper echelons of the uniformed power began, Putin made a show of dismissing over a dozen admirals blamed for dereliction of duty in organization of the exercise that became the Kursk's last ever.

Initially dismayed and scared, Russian generals promptly came to and mounted a counterattack. It was a success. Putin was convinced that it would be better to start with an experiment with the 76th Pskov Airborne Division alone. Demanding a colossal sum for the experiment (over 2.6 billion), the Defense Ministry intends to torpedo the reforms and discredit the whole idea. Most of the sum is to be spent on capital construction - every serviceman by contract is supposed to get an apartment. The Pskov experiment began on September 1, but officers of the division say that money for construction has never been transacted from the treasury. in the meantime, the contest has taken place all the same, some work initiated. It means that credits were loaned from private banks. It is common knowledge that such operations increase the cost of the project enormously, even if nothing is embezzled, as it usually is. The division has not yet received any directive specifying the difference between service by conscription and by contract. In other words, everything possible is being done to enable generals to report to the president on August 30, 2003, that the experiment has failed and contract army in Russia is impossible.

Putin made a compromise with the Defense Ministry in the matter of alternative civilian service as well. Only a direct order from the Kremlin may explain the antic of Labor Minister Alexander Pochinok (author of the governmental draft) who right in the middle of the Duma meeting all of a sudden abandoned the draft already agreed upon in consultations with Duma committees and supported the military's draconian proposals. As a result, "alternative" servicemen will spend twice as long in the army as conscripts. Moreover, there are no guarantees that they will not be sent to do menial work in army units. In other words, alternative civilian service looks like punishment for disinclination to serve in the Russian army. The General Staff insists now that since the law "On alternative civilian service" has been adopted, it is necessary to cut down the number of deferments.

The Defense Ministry seems to have bested the Ministry of Economic Development and Commerce. Vladislav Putilin (ex-chief of the Main Directorate of Organization and Mobilization of the General Staff notorious for resolute protection of interests of military bureaucracy in discussion transition to service by contract and alternative civilian service) became Herman Gref's deputy minister. This appointment is apparently supposed to put an end to formation of prices and tariffs on military goods by market laws.

It is clear, however, that this bureaucratic victory had in it the seeds of its eventual defeat. It is possible to persuade the supreme commander-in-chief for a time that the army formed by Soviet standards and principles may be a success and only needs proper funding. All the same, the president cannot and apparently does not want to ignore hard facts of life anymore.

Putin gave vent to his wrath after the MI-26 catastrophe that killed almost 120 men. It should be noted here that it is usually very difficult for him to decide to chastise the military. It took him over six months to put an end to the shameful brawl between Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and Kvashnin. Eighteen months passed between the death of the Kursk and punishment of senior officers of the Navy.

This time the president reacted instantly. Clearly acting on Putin's orders, the defense minister criticized virtually all top generals responsible for the operation in Chechnya. The list includes Ground Forces Commander Nikolai Kormiltsev, his second-in-command Alexander Morozov, Caucasus Military District Commander Gennadi Troshev, Sergei Makarov who was acting commander of the group in Chechnya, and General Alexander Novikov, deputy chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff. Troshev's second-in- command Colonel General Vladimir Bulgakov, a prominent senior officer who was reputed to be the next Caucasus Military District commander once, was warned of potential inadequacy. By the way, the 20th Division mentioned here is a unit of the Caucasus Military District which means that the same generals should be criticized for the incident. The existing practice dictates that dismissal from service should be the next... According to what information is available at this point, Putin distrusts the military's reports so much that he even sent officials of his own administration to Chechnya last week.

Despite all errors and casualties, the president has never acted against the generals in Chechnya until now. It is reasonable to assume that it was Putin's action against the "generals in the Caucasus" that scared chief of the General Staff so badly. He probably needed this incognito tour of Grozny to be able to forestall the report civilian officials of the administration were bound to forward to the president.

It seems that Kvashnin succeeded in distracting the president from failures of the army. Putin opted against another punishment of senior generals. After all, this lamentable condition of the Armed Forces does not improve his own image. The president pretended to share the opinion of his generals that the counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya is in a blind ally because of unfriendly Georgia which provides shelter for terrorists on its territory. Some threats were made, and the General Staff was told to "report expediency and feasibility of striking at terrorist bases whose whereabouts are known."

The only problem is, if Putin goes ahead with these plans (God forbid), he will see soon enough and not for the first time either that the Russian army is not combat ready. When some mysterious aircraft bombed the territory of Georgia three weeks ago, Moscow stupidly and helplessly denied the fact itself of bombardment despite statements of the US Department of State. Heavy bombs killed peasants, not guerrillas. It is impossible to imagine Russian generals surrounding and destroying terrorists in Georgia, when they don't succeed in doing so in Chechnya very often.

The military pins the blame on Russian society - which it says is greedy and unpatriotic. Generals are confident that it is society as well that should be blamed for what conscripts they, generals, are forced to deal with. As a matter of fact, upper echelons of the Defense Ministry are correct in saying that the Russian society and army exist in different worlds. The country has changed dramatically. There are different ways of evaluating the changes, but it is clear that neither policy of the country nor economy are Soviet anymore. The army in the meantime is a copy of the Soviet Armed Forces. An army like that can operate only when the military budget equals the budget of the whole country: concept of this mass army stipulates mobilization of virtually all males.

The current military budget has been growing somewhat, but is not unlimited. Young Russians do not want to become slaves for two years. Aware of society's support, they openly admit it nowadays and do not fear the idea of dodging the draft. The men who have been drafted do not see much difference between the army and prison. Hence their behavior: they drink, they desert... Initiatives of the Defense Ministry that are allegedly necessary to alleviate the situation - restoration of political structures and adoption of the Officer Code of Honor - merely indicate the helplessness of Russian military strategists.

Sources at the Kremlin say that Putin will leave the generals alone until after the presidential election. However, given the situation, it may be that the election itself will never take place. What if those armed deserters should forget about approaching groups like Mother's Rights, and appeal for guidance to someone who would not balk at using force in political battles?

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