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CDI Russia Weekly #221 Contents   Printer-Friendly Version

#7
Moscow News
September 4-10, 2002
Russia's Trump in Middle East
Georgy Mirsky

Russia is mounting a diplomatic offensive on the Middle East front. Yasser Arafat will reportedly visit Moscow shortly. The $40 billion program of Russian-Iraqi economic cooperation announced by the Iraqi Ambassador to Moscow is surrounded by an aura of mystery. And the Russian Embassy in Washington is supposedly making contact with with Saddam Hussein's sworn enemies - representatives of the Iraqi opposition in exile, whom Washington wants to install as leaders of Iraq in the event of a successful U.S. military attack on the Baghdad regime.

Do the above points indicate a logical course of action on Moscow's part? To my mind, they do. They reveal Moscow's goals in the Middle East. Needless to say, Moscow should not try to become a dominant force in that region. There is no truth in Moscow's claim that "without Russia, no Middle East settlement is possible." For Russia has yet to win the right to be a mediator in the region.

Does Russia have a trump card in the Middle East? This country has long stopped being a major arms supplier to Arab nations, which it was in Soviet times. Russian economic influence is minimal there. Even the fact that Israel has more than a million immigrants from the former USSR does not help us exert any influence on Israeli politics: The political role of the "Russian" parties in Israel has always been negligible, and they never had a clear stand on a Middle East settlement.

Yet Russia, by virtue of its historical heritage, retains a degree of influence in the region. The local population has faith in us owing to our centuries-old relationships. This is our trump card. It is particularly invaluable in view of the Arab nations' total lack of confidence in both Israel and the United States. After all, it is good that apart from the United States and the European Union (which feels constrained in its policies), there is a potential mediator capable of negotiating with all the parties concerned.

The Americans are aware of that, and accordingly turn a blind eye to Russia's contacts with Arab leaders whom Washington finds disagreeable. Although President George W. Bush has publicly called for Arafat to be replaced by a younger and more pragmatic leader, Washington refrains from protesting against a possible meeting between Arafat and President Vladimir Putin. Moreover, Washington has not expressed dissatisfaction with Russia's program of cooperation with Iraq.

Washington knows that Putin makes such gestures to the Arab world mainly to prove to his people that he is no puppet in America's hands. As the Americans have famously quipped, "All politics is local." It's of little consequence what they think about you at the Earth Summit; what really counts is domestic reaction to your moves.

Meanwhile, the new foreign-policy course taken by Putin after September 11, 2001 has obviously infuriated a large segment of the Russian political elite. He has to sugar the pill for them somehow. Hence his overtures to North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, his support for economic cooperation with Iran, and his invitation to Arafat.

True, these gestures have a largely token value. Iraq obviously cannot afford to pay $40 billion for the services of Russian oil companies, but that does not disconcert anyone. It seems to be Russia's gesture of goodwill that counts.

As matters stand, Putin's diplomatic moves could play a positive role on the international scene too. In dealings with leaders like Yasser Arafat and Saddam Hussein, the international community would like to have a "cruel cop" (a role being played by the United States), as well as a "kind" one. In its "policing role," the U.S. is clearly experiencing increasing difficulties. Unlike the 1991 war against Iraq, in which the U.S. had the support of a coalition of European and Arab nations, today a military operation against Iraq is being opposed by France, Germany, and most Arab nations. Even Zbigniew Brzezinski (the national security adviser under President Jimmy Carter) wrote in a recent article that the United States must not go it alone on the Iraq issue. If American forces move into the Middle East, they will have in their rear an unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict, which is far more sensitive and severe today than in 1991.

Under the circumstances, Russia has put a choice before Saddam: Allow United Nations inspectors into Iraq (after which the post-sanction program of cooperation would be implemented), or watch the Americans destroy your regime and yourself. Having placed these options before Saddam, Russia moved to establish contacts with the Iraqi opposition. We are telling Saddam, as it were: Don't imagine that we intend to go under together with you; we will make oil contracts with the new regime that will replace yours.

When it comes to Iraq, the United States brandishes a stick, while Russia flourishes a carrot. But our aim is the same: To stave off a war and bring Iraq back into the fold.

 

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