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CDI Russia Weekly #221 Contents   Printer-Friendly Version

#13
Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye
No. 29
August 2002
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
RUSSIAN STRATEGIC MISSILE FORCE TO BE MODERNISED
During an August visit to a formation of the Strategic Missile Force, headquartered in the settlement of Kartaly (Chelyabinsk Region), Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov said: "We plan to maintain the nuclear triad but the national leadership will spotlight the ground element of the strategic nuclear forces." The minister also mentioned "a plan of reforming the missile force by 2016." Colonel-General Nikolai SOLOVTSOV, commander of the Strategic Missile Force, talks with Salavat SULEIMANOV about the reform plans and ways of resolving the social problems of the force staff.

Question: Russia and the USA have signed a treaty on strategic offensive reductions. Has this changed the development plans of the Strategic Missile Force and the Russian strategic nuclear forces as a whole? What is the focus of the Russian nuclear triad?

Answer: Here is what I think about the development of the Russian strategic nuclear forces. I think all elements - the navy, aviation and the land group - should develop commensurately.

The Strategic Missile Force is being modernised by presidential decree and several reform plans for this year have been overhauled. In particular, the force will preserve a group of heavy missiles and a division of railway-based missile systems. We are also working on other issues of the force' reform depending on modern realities and the obtaining world situation.

But these plans are not connected with the US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM treaty.

This is what I mean. The possibility to prolong the life of heavy missiles through overhauling the missiles and their combat elements allows us to keep the R-36M Satan missiles of different modifications on combat duty. A decision has been recently made to keep two of the three available divisions [of these missiles] on combat duty until 2015. And we are discussing the possibility of keeping one more division armed with such missiles.

Allocations will be made within the state armaments programme for the preservation of the group of heavy missiles and we will search for additional funds, possibly by slashing the Topol group of missiles.

In had been earlier planned to transform the Kostroma, Krasnoyarsk and Perm missile divisions armed with railway-carried missiles into storage facilities. But it has since been decided to keep the Kostroma division on combat duty.

Question: The Americans have decided to store the warheads that are to be slashed under the new reduction treaty. Why cannot we do the same?

Answer: Every country has the right to its own choice. We should understand why this is done. In principle, the Americans and we think alike. Today Russia is using missiles produced 25-26 years ago, missiles with a warranty life of ten years. We can - and will - preserve part of this stock. For example, we do not destroy heavy missiles because they can be used to orbit spacecraft. But it would not be expedient to store missiles for no particular reason, "just in case." Stored nuclear warheads require the same temperature and moisture regime and maintenance control as the combat ones. This is why it would not be reasonable to store those missiles that are no longer suited for combat service.

 

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