
#8
Los Angeles Times
August 29, 2002
A Nuclear Weapon Just Waiting to Happen
Perilous materials at insecure sites around the world must be removed. By
MATTHEW BUNN Matthew Bunn, a former White House advisor on management of nuclear
materials, is a senior research associate in the Managing the Atom project at
Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government.
Terrorists with the makings of a nuclear bomb represent the worst homeland
security nightmare. So last week's removal of enough highly enriched uranium, or
HEU, for 2 1/2 bombs from the poorly guarded Vinca research facility in
Yugoslavia is a dramatic step toward making the world a safer place. But it is
only the first step.
Today, plutonium and HEU--the essential ingredients of nuclear bombs--are in
hundreds of facilities, in scores of countries. Because obtaining such materials
is the hardest part of making a nuclear bomb, vulnerable nuclear material
anywhere is a threat to everyone everywhere. Yet there are no binding global
nuclear security standards, and the security for these materials ranges from
excellent to appalling. Vinca was so impoverished it had dead rats floating in
its spent fuel pool.
There are more than 300 civilian research facilities like Vinca around the
world fueled with HEU, which is the easiest material for terrorists to make into
a nuclear bomb. Many of these sites do not have enough HEU to pose a serious
security threat. But there are others like Vinca: poorly secured and with enough
material for a nuclear bomb.
Rather than trying to beef up security everywhere, we need a focused
"global cleanout" program targeted on getting rid of bomb material
from as many sites as possible around the world and then effectively securing
the sites that remain. The surest form of prevention is to ensure there is no
bomb material to steal.
Such a global cleanout effort would be feasible and cost-effective. Like
Vinca, many of the facilities containing potential bomb material have no genuine
need for it anymore, recognize that they cannot afford to secure it effectively
for the long haul and can be persuaded to give it up if the right incentives are
offered.
The program should have the flexibility to tailor its work to the needs of
each site--from paying the cost of shipping the material away, to buying the
material outright, to helping to convert research reactors to use fuel that
cannot be used in bombs, to paying scientists to do research that no longer
requires a research reactor.
A program funded at perhaps $50 million per year would have the potential to
eliminate essentially all of the most serious threats--the facilities that are
both poorly secured and have a substantial amount of bomb material--within a few
years.
The Vinca operation vividly demonstrates why such a focused, flexible program
is needed. While ultimately successful, pulling it together required more than a
year of secret interagency and international negotiations. And when the U.S.
government found that it did not have the authority to spend money on one part
of the job crucial to sealing the deal with Yugoslavia, it had to reach out for
$5 million from the private Nuclear Threat Initiative, founded by Ted Turner and
Sam Nunn. It was a similar story when the United States airlifted nearly 600
kilograms of vulnerable HEU from Kazakhstan in 1994: more than a year of
interagency debate to pull the mission together while the material remained
insecure.
Post-Sept. 11, we no longer have time for that, and we cannot afford to force
the government to go to the private sector for handouts to get these vulnerable
bomb caches secured. We need to create one office with all the authority needed
to get the job done and to move as fast as we possibly can to reduce this urgent
risk to U.S. security.
When Congress returns from its August recess, the House and Senate will be
debating language in the Senate's defense bill that would authorize such an
effort (although the Senate failed to provide new money to carry it out).
In the interest of securing ourselves and our children from terrorist nuclear
attack, Congress and the Bush administration need to work together to launch a
fast-paced effort to clean out all of Vinca's vulnerable cousins, wherever they
may be.
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