#12
Rossiya
No. 136
August 2002
2004: THE MANAGER PRESIDENT VERSUS THE PRESIDENT OF HOPE
President Putin actually suits everyone
Author: Alexander Tsipko
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

A ROUNDTABLE CONFERENCE TRYING TO ANSWER THE QUESTION: IS THE EARLY START OF PUTIN'S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AN INDICATION OF STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS? THE ANALYSTS DISCUSS WHAT THE CAMPAIGN ISSUES WILL BE, AND WHETHER THERE MIGHT BE ANY REAL CHALLENGERS TO PUTIN.

The roundtable conference was attended by:

Andrei Ryabov of the Research Council of the Moscow Carnegie Center;
Mikhail Malyutin, project leader with the Research and Charity Foundation at the Expert Institute;
Alexei Yelymanov, political scientist with the Gorbachev Foundation;
Vladimir Petukhov, head of the Sociopolitical Processes Analysis Department at the Complex Social Surveys Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences;
Shamil Sultanov, deputy head of the Ethnic and Regional Economic Issues Research Center;
Alexei Pushkov, director of the Postscriptum current affairs program;
Oleg Pavlov, Senior Vice President of the Novokom Information and Analysis Center
Mikhail Malyutin: Putin's future depends on the global situation

Public opinion, the opinion of the elites, and eventually Vladimir Putin's own opinion, generated and unquestioningly accepted the myth of "Putin the great and omnipotent". This situation could not last, however, because national humiliation syndrome demanded some specific ways of overcoming it, and some specific solutions - but the interests and demands of various social strata (oligarchs and the masses, for example) were diametrically opposed.

Alexei Yelymanov: No miracles

Vladimir Putin and his team have failed to initiate any special new modernization projects. They are no exception to the rule. Rather, they are a continuation of a genetic line, a clone of Russian "real politicians" in whose minds the interests of the state, personal and team interests of the establishment, and primarily their own interests are intertwined and integral. It is essentially as it was under Yeltsin, when everyone was fighting for a piece of the action. As for Putin's project - meaning establishing a strong hierarchy of governance in Russia - it should be noted here that this is impossible. It is a typical Utopian plan. The president idealizes the function of oversight; but this cannot be applied to a complex or ultra-complex system like a modern society.

It makes sense to attribute the early start of the election campaign to the dissatisfaction of various groups in society with the rearrangement and redistribution of power in 1999 and 2000. The artificial political realities which have been formed no longer suit the ruling elite or the citizenry.

What can Putin do about this growing discontent? Virtually nothing. He views rearrangement and redistribution as the major tool, and uses it as the basis of his social and even regional policy. The government is forced to be constantly on the lookout for money for all sorts of populist actions: like higher salaries for state-sector workers. The results of this are quite predictable. In the first place, they take the form of growing social dependence, as indicated by high inflation rates, poor tax collection, and the apparent failure of the rearrangement model (increase of state debts to state-sector workers generating wage arrears in the private sector as well). According to the State Statistics Committee, total wage arrears amounted to 32.887 billion rubles by June 1. Secondly, the number of donor regions has fallen from 18 to nine. Under Yeltsin, it grew, slowly but surely. The situation is such that it has been decided to use some of the gold and hard currency reserves of the Central Bank in the second half of the year.

Analysis of the president's political moves within the framework of his election campaign shows that he is paying particular attention to all kinds of charity functions, i.e. to the policy of the carrot rather than the stick. In other words, the president uses it to justify the theory of rearrangement and redistribution, a concept which is socialist in spirit. Because of this policy of his, at the very start of his campaign the president is already forced to bow to the demands of various lobby groups - military, agricultural, and regional.

This is a dead-end. The president's budget address and his latest news conference show that he is aware of the dead-ends his social and regional policy has led him into, but politicians never run for another term in office with a program of correcting their own mistakes. Moreover, objectives of the necessary corrections are clearly seen by the elite alone, and conflict with the growing apathy and dependence of the citizenry.

The contradictions in the president's starting positions enable us to predict three possible scenarios for future developments

First: an agreement with the major elites in which Putin acknowledges the need for a dramatic change of course after the election, abandoning populist ideology, through stiff centralization, and reliance on "chekist" methods. Putin tells his people from St. Petersburg and the secret services to behave themselves. The elites then support him in the election and do not promote candidates of their own.

Second: If no agreement with the elites is reached, they may promote some alternatives to Putin. Political tension in the president's relations with the establishment will mount...

Third: In that case, Putin may try to restrict political freedoms, activate the secret services, mobilize the people's support, monopolize the media, etc. In short, he may use force - but this could have unpredictable consequences for the nation and for the president himself. Successful implementation of this option could fix the rearrangement model, and Russia will become "the seventh region of Belarus".

Vladimir Petukhov: No alternatives to the president today

Our institute recently completed another nationwide survey. Our specialists tried to gauge attitudes to the general situation in Russia, and to the president.

The latest opinion poll confirms that the attitude of most citizens take what could be described as a "calmly positive" view of the president. Of our respondents, 23% viewed his performance in office as definitely good, about 9% viewed it as poor, and 53% viewed it as fair. Asked about Putin's achievements, most respondents named restoring order in the payment of salaries, pensions, and welfare benefits; and improving Russia's image abroad. Some respondents also named a certain improvement in the overall state of the national economy, more effective state management, and better morale throughout the country in general. Living standards, the state of democracy and human rights, and the situation in Chechnya are assessed as before, without any noticeable shifts for better or worse. Some deterioration in the following areas was noted: personal security, the situation in the army and law enforcement agencies, and corruption.

What will the public be offered as the central idea in the next election? The "dispute" between Putin and Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov is evolving into pure economics, taking on a broader context of what is called "the philosophy of the reforms". We tried to determine whose side ordinary citizens are on. It turns out that they are ambivalent about the apparently attractive idea of economic growth acceleration and breakthrough, of bridging the gap between Russia and advanced European countries. Only 42% of respondents support the idea, while 30% say that the socioeconomic situation in Russia is developing positively and advocate gradual and slow evolution instead of radical reforms. And 27% of respondents were uncertain.

In other words, most Russian citizens do not care for never- ending reforms. They are apparently grateful to the president for the respite in the fifteen-year run of continual reforms. At the same time, however, many are worried about the state of stagnation they see as taking shape. They are active themselves, and they demand action from the government.

As for alternatives to the president, I do not see any at present. There was a period when Kasianov was viewed as a potential alternative - but this was clearly a result of some intrigues within the elites and had absolutely nothing to do with his actual vote- winning capacity. Most citizens view Kasianov as a good prime minister, but few if any see him as a public politician, much less a candidate for president. Certain other potential candidates (they are sometimes mentioned) would only play into Putin's hands. An alternative to the president may actually appear on the left again. These days, only 15% of respondents are prepared to vote for the Communist Party, and fewer than 10% would like to see Gennadi Zyuganov as president. It remains to be seen whether the left can come up with some other candidate to challenge Putin. It should also be noted that Putin himself will gather some communist votes. He does have supporters in the Communist Party, even though they are fewer than in other political parties...

Shamil Sultanov: Strategies are forgotten when everyone is busy with rearrangement

In my view, the early launch of the election campaign doesn't really matter. What matters is that two presidential campaigns were launched by Putin simultaneously. One of them initiated by the people from St. Petersburg, and the other by Yeltsin's Family and some oligarchs.

The Family doesn't have a serious rival to Putin nowadays - Kasianov, Anatoly Chubais, and Oleg Deripaska are not up to the task. At least, not right now; and provided Putin doesn't make any huge blunders. On the other hand, I do not rule out the possibility that radical nationalists will promote their own candidate in the 2004 election. Perhaps Putin will even indirectly help the project. The president may do so in order to gauge public response, to create another "scare" for the West, and of course to promote himself.

Alexei Pushkov: Even the dissatisfied are fairly satisfied now

In my view, a certain team headed by Alexander Voloshin and Boris Berezovsky used the brilliant "Operation Putin" to stabilize the oligarchic nature of the system. This achievement has elevated this team to an entirely new level of awareness of problems. Two troubleshooters, Vladimir Gusinsky and Berezovsky, were removed from the arena. They wanted too much; especially the power to kick open doors in the Kremlin. Gusinsky and Berezovsky were successful once, but then something happened and they were deprived of this power. These people became jittery and were themselves kicked out. The rest, people like Roman Abramovich, are too smart to permit anything like that to happen to them.

We are living in a period of a stable, corrupt, oligarchic system with no way out in any foreseeable future. Such systems have existed in Italy, Greece, and some African and Asian countries. They are exceptionally stable, last for decades, and don't generate problems. If you ask me, such systems collapse only when economic mistakes exceed some critical mass; or when global markets plummet as they did in 1998. I do not think, however, that anyone will be caught that way again. Those people were playing all sorts of games then - short-term state bonds, vouchers, and so on. No more. Everyone has their own piece of the action nowadays; they are stealing less, but finding it sufficient.

Yes, all segments of the elite hate each other - but is it possible for any such segment to oust all the rest? I don't think it is. Look at how the bureaucrats around Putin are never replaced - we see the same familiar faces. They survive because they know how to survive. That is why Kasianov will be promoted as an alternative to Putin only if the president himself decides to restrict oligarchic powers and liberties, or to raise the issues which certain large companies prefer to be left unmentioned. If he doesn't do that, there will be no rivals. Therefore, I think all speculation about Kasianov are a tactical distraction, and that Putin understands this. Unless he raises some dangerous topics, everything will be all right - Putin himself will be the only candidate for president.

There may indeed be a candidate promoted by radical nationalists. What counts, however, is whether or not that candidate scales the 5% barrier. That's the question.

Oleg Pavlov: The West will not permit Putin to be replaced with anyone

I'll speak as a practical man rather than an analyst. The problem is rooted in the ratio between what we usually call the "elite" and the "electorate". They live on different planes, in different dimensions. These planes and dimensions do not overlap. Moreover, I don't even think attempts are made to make them meet, and this is what I view as the worst mistake so far. In other words, we lack the checks and balances which Yeltsin used so successfully. We lack a balance of interests. I'm talking about a balance of interests within elites, interests within society, and a balance between the interests of elites and society. This problem may eventually explode the situation despite all attempts to ensure stability.

I think the most important question is: "Who isn't satisfied with the president?" Consider it, and you will see that President Putin actually suits everyone. He suits the Family, suits Russia's remaining oligarchs, and suits the West - which is particularly important. The West is the primary force that will prevent Putin being replaced with someone else. He suits the West perfectly. In my view, even if the Family comes up with a candidate for president, the president will use the West and our American friends to bend the Family to his will and accept Putin's own candidacy. By the way, I know that all through these past six months we've been hearing about the potential replacement of Kasianov, Voloshin, Herman Gref, and others; but I'm almost sure that we will see Sergei Ivanov and Boris Gryzlov replaced first. These men will be dismissed before all the rest, because what is happening in the security structures - primarily the Defense Ministry and Interior Ministry - is unprecedented. The level of incompetence is appalling. I wish Ivanov had never gone on air at all.

The current campaign is such that we should rather discuss the people who compile the agenda. Believe me, I'm not talking about Sergei Markov. The president himself will compile the agenda, just as he decided what would go into the presidential address. Several teams of specialists worked on it, but it was still Putin - with a small group of confidants - who rewrote the document and probably finalized it. It was his product. That is why it is the president himself who will define the priorities of the campaign.

As for the priorities, they have already been mentioned here. I agree with Petukhov that they are crime, corruption, personal security, the situation in the security structures, Chechnya, and of course the economy and unemployment. These are the five or six major issues that are on the surface, and not to be denied or dismissed. Putin simply has to emphasize the correct points, and he can forget about alternative candidates for president.

As for the possibility of a radical nationalist candidate challenging Putin... I do not know. Why a radical nationalist in particular? Everything will depend on the situation. After all, the candidate may be promoted by the opposite political side. The candidate could be from the right or from the left, depending on the existing political and economic situation. I think it's impossible to answer this question right now.

(Translated by A. Ignatkin)

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