#9
Asia Times
August 1, 2002
China, Russia and Pax Americana
By Ehsan Ahrari
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is a Norfolk, Virginia, US-based strategic analyst.

Viewed from the strategic perspectives of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the hyperactive phase of America's global war on terrorism has made Pax Americana a work in progress. As the militant phase of US foreign policy in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks shows no sign of letting up, Beijing remains uncertain about the future modalities of its own reactions to it. Russia's palpable willingness to please the United States on a number of strategic issues is also a source for its concerns.

In the pre-September 11 phase of the presidency of George W Bush, relations between Beijing and Washington were tense, with Bush insisting that China was a strategic competitor of the United States. In that duration, the PRC remained heavily engaged with Russia in pursuing their common strategic objectives of creating a multipolar global order, where China and Russia would be as significant in resolving heady global issues as the United States. As Beijing envisages it, an important tactic to attain multipolarity was Sino-Russian military cooperation, which would facilitate the transfer of state-of-the-art technology from the latter to the former.

In addition, the age-old Sino-Russian rivalry and mutual suspicions were to be set aside, as much as it is feasible. For the aging leaders of China, the youthful President Vladimir Putin represents a new generation of Russian leaders that is not carrying the Cold War-related baggage of their predecessors. He is also operating from a level-headed and realistic notion of Russia's place on the totem pole of global power. More important, he seems to have a better vision than Boris Yeltsin of Russia's strategic future and how it should get there. For China, the path to greatness for both countries might not have been too similar, but a central unifying objective was to become equals of the lone superpower.

Then came the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. The Bush administration declared war on global terrorism, succeeded in dismantling the Taliban-al-Qaeda nexus, and in the process, ousting the Taliban regime from Afghanistan, acquired military bases in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and appeared in no hurry to leave the area at the conclusion of its military operations in Afghanistan. What bothered China was the fact that the United States continued to ignore its role in the war against terrorism, despite the fact that Beijing readily supported it.

Bush adopted a policy of assigning significance to Russia in the pre- and post-September 11 phases of his presidency. Even when he abandoned the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, he took pains to assuage Russia's related concerns, and even invited Russia's participation in national missile defense (NMD)-related projects. Bush also singled out Putin for establishing personal bonding, along the same lines that Bill Clinton adopted vis-r-vis Yeltsin. In a stark contrast, during his second visit to China, Bush refused to be charmed by President Jiang Zemin.

Without overemphasizing the element of personal diplomacy in great power relations, suffice it to note that it does play a certain role. Personal ties notwithstanding, there is little doubt that in the Russo-American relationship, the latter enjoys a definite advantage in being the sole superpower. But even in unabashedly maximizing America's benefits, Bush has consistently attempted to minimize Putin's pain by remaining personable and warm toward him. The most significant benefit that Russia has accrued thus far was that it has formally become the eighth member of the Group of 8 (G-8) countries. As such, it is expected to host the G-8 meeting in 2006.

China knows that Putin's options are quite limited. He readily cooperated with the United States in Afghanistan and even when it was acquiring military bases in Central Asia, knowing the fait accompli aspects of those developments. Similarly, Putin refrained from strongly criticizing the United States when it abandoned the ABM Treaty. Even on the impending and rather ambitious round of North Atlantic Treaty Organization expansion, Putin has remained palpably sanguine. He decided to join the NATO-Russia Council last May, recognizing that its new status assigns Russia no special status, certainly no veto power on that alliance's major decisions.

China remained wary about the possibility of Russia's being co-opted into becoming a part of the NATO alliance system, especially when, at times, there seems to be no end to Putin's deal-making capacity with the United States. Putin's palpably endless pragmatism is potentially disastrous for China, for Russia plays a significant role in its calculations of becoming a great power. Russia's military technology is almost as significant as - or, arguably more significant than - its strategic partnership for China.

As Sino-US ties remain quite strained, China remains even more apprehensive about Bush's seemingly endless appetite for unilateralism, which, to China, means more than unilateral actions. The United States has an established record of ignoring or abiding by whatever aspects of international agreement or treaty at will. Washington also manifested that predilection during the Clinton presidency by waging a war against a sovereign Yugoslavia for violating the human rights of the Kosovar Albanians. Then, Washington was in the lead to bring Slobodan Milosevic and other war criminals to justice. But then it refused to join the International Criminal Court, fearing that its own civilian leaders and military personnel would be subjected to similar international scrutiny.

As long as the United States can come up with sui generis rationales for ignoring or following international law, there is nothing China or other great powers can do to discipline it. On this issue, China envisages the United States as following the law of the jungle, might makes right.

Obviously, such harsh perspectives only underscore the extant realities of global power. In the post-September 11 era, the continuing militant posture of US foreign policy is also emitting shrill slogans - "either you are with us or with the terrorists", "axis of evil", and "hot pre-emption" - thereby causing considerable dismay inside China at a time the aging Jiang Zemin is getting ready to hand over the baton of power to a younger Hu Jintao. In this phase, China is looking for certainty, assurance, and cooperative behavior from the Bush administration. But in Bush's calculations, China has to earn America's friendship and warmth. He has consistently refused to be understanding or sympathetic toward America's strategic competitor.

In the final analysis, China has to lower its own expectations and become more patient in dealing with Bush. A rapprochement with Taiwan would take US-China ties a long way. While Putin is making the best of not-so-good strategic realities for Russia by consistently cooperating with the United States, maybe, there is a lesson for China in that Russian modus operandi.

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