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#6 AT A MEETING WITH THE SENIOR MILITARY COMMAND, PRESIDENT PUTIN OUTLINED THE MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF THE ARMED FORCES AS "ESTABLISHING PERMANENT COMBAT READINESS UNITS IN ALL BRANCHES OF THE SERVICE". IN CONCEPTUAL TERMS, THE ARMY AND NAVY HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO ABOUT FACE AND MARCH IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. President demands further restructuring of the Armed Forces At a meeting with the senior military command three days ago, President Vladimir Putin outlined the major objective of the Armed Forces as "establishing permanent combat readiness units in all branches of the service". In conceptual terms, the Army and Navy have been ordered to about face and march in the opposite direction to the one they have been facing for the past decade. By the early 1990s, the Ground Forces alone included almost 80 formations (divisions), every one of them combat ready: i.e. fully staffed and properly equipped. Then cuts began - described as military reforms in the upper echelons. The nation's leaders demanded better quality and mobility of the troops, i.e. their preservation and higher combat readiness. Special attention was paid to the nuclear shield, especially its ground component; while the conventional forces were mercilessly cut. The Ground Forces, the major branch of the service, even had its main command disbanded and abolished as unnecessary. As a result, these days the Ground Forces have 20 formations, and 15 more exist in other branches of the service. The recently formed 42nd Division in Chechnya is the only one that is more or less combat ready. All other formations of the Ground Forces are in a different state. Reduction of permanent combat readiness divisions began in 1997 and 1999. It meant that only one of every four combat ready regiments was left intact and therefore relatively combat ready. And even these regiments did not last long. Their turn came fairly soon - leaving only one out of several battalions. Combat readiness of the division was thus reduced to the battalion level. The situation in the Navy and the Air Force was similar. Each Russian fleet (Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific) was essentially left with only one or two warships in full combat readiness. The command keeps repeating that all these endless cuts are forced on it by funding shortages. However, lawmakers and analysts say the military is too wasteful. These days, the president wants something absolutely different and promises "a substantial increase in funding for science, repair, acquisition, and research." All this is needed, of course; but not as desperately as the president seems to think. According to Colonel General Eduard Vorobiov, the troops and army depots have 22,000 tanks and 26,000 armored vehicles of other types, 20,000 artillery pieces, 2,000 anti-aircraft missile launchers, almost as many aircraft, 900 combat helicopters, 46 multipurpose nuclear submarines, and at least 140 surface warships of major classes. All problems of the Armed Forces are rooted elsewhere: in the lack of enthusiasm for military service. What kind of prestige can there be in military service when 160,000 families in garrisons and cantonments do not have apartments of their own? Vorobiov says that officers taking early retirement now account for three-quarters of all permanent departures from the Armed Forces. Almost 50% of them are officers aged under 30. Officers of the General Staff already say ruefully that Russia is short of battalion commanders between Moscow and the Urals, and short of regimental commanders beyond the Urals. The American idea is on the agenda - do away with small auxiliary units and transfer their personnel to the units which will be turned into permanent combat readiness formations. There are six military districts in Russia. Each should have one combat ready formation plus several army depots with skeleton crews. Whenever needed, they may be developed into fully-fledged units in a matter of weeks. There is nothing new about the idea. It has been discussed for the past decade; with nothing to show for all the discussions and debates. Who or what has prevented the General Staff from implementing this fairly simple idea until now? Perhaps it intends a rapid transition from conscription to a professional military now; but financial experts say such Armed Forces will be much more expensive. In that case, increased defense spending will be needed.
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