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CDI Russia Weekly #214 Contents   Printer-Friendly Version

#10
Izvestia
July 10, 2002
IGOR IVANOV: FOREIGN POLICY SHOULDN'T CAUSE DIVISIONS AT HOME
An interview with Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov
Author: Svetlana Babayeva
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

IGOR IVANOV DISCUSSES THE OUTLOOK AT THE CLOSE OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL SEASON. HE SAYS THE ESSENCE OF FOREIGN POLICY IS TO ENSURE THAT THE NATION'S LIMITED RESOURCES ARE USED AS EFFICIENTLY AS POSSIBLE FOR DOMESTIC REFORMS. HOWEVER, RUSSIA CAN EXPECT PRESSURE FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD.

A summit of ambassadors is about to open at the Russian Foreign Ministry. It will continue for two days, and on Friday President Vladimir Putin will address the diplomats.

Last time a meeting on such a scale was held was almost 20 years ago. Together with the president's speech, the summit of ambassadors is supposed to put an end to the political season which started on September 11. In his interview, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov sums up that season and reflects on the tasks for the future.

Question: Around 90% of the so-called elite considers the current foreign policy to be ruinous for Russia. Supposedly, we have lost everything and gained nothing in exchange. Do you also think foreign policy should be approached from the point of bargaining?

Igor Ivanov: The foreign policy cannot be based on the principles that you favor me, I favor you. As a result, it should provide for some dividends, but not because one is bargaining, but because it is shaped correctly. Using the country's limited resources with maximal efficiency for the domestic reforms makes the essence of this policy. Consequently, it is necessary to do so that no domestic resources, no matter human, political, financial or military were withdrawn from the settlement of foreign conflicts. To make the reforms correctly understandable abroad is the second component. Just recall: the concept of the foreign policy was adopted under the accompaniment of the scandal surrounding the Bank of New York. It was an attempt to represent our businessmen as criminals, our country as a cradle of mafia, etc. Nowadays, Russia is perceived quite differently, and the fact that it has become a full-fledged member of the G8 proves that.

What do we have today? Firstly, protection of national security. Secondly, the world has been acquainting the processes which are underway in our country. Thirdly, our opportunities are expanding. In the settlement of economic issues the business community begins to enjoy equal rights with their colleagues from other states. I want to stress that the rights are equal. The thing doesn't concern privileges, but the absence of discrimination just because one s from Russia. At the same time, it is indispensable to perceive: the more active we are at integrating in the worldwide economic and financial structures, the stiffer the competition will be, the same as between Europe and the US, the US and Japan.

You are mentioning the elite. I don't' know who do you consider among the critically inclined elite, but in my opinion over the past few years uniting various political forces around the president's line in foreign policy has been a success. Criticism will exist forever. Most importantly is that the foreign policy shouldn't cause a split inside the country.

Question: What is the difference of the current foreign policy from the Kozyrev's course of the early 1990s?

Ivanov: After the disintegration of the Soviet Union Russia was searching for its way. We encountered with the problem that nobody wants to take us anywhere and resolve our problems. Instead, they want to occupy our niches, use our economic resources, etc. The difference is that in the early 1990s we were searching and hesitating: either to follow Europe of Asia, either jointly with someone, or follow someone. Nowadays, we perceive clearly what meets our interests.

To restore the bipolar world, claim to the role of a mighty power, dictating its own rules of the game to someone. We do not want that, and wouldn't be able to do that even if we wanted. However, we can participate in the creation of the new world order.

Question: It is considered that the foreign policy is based on concessions and compromises. What was our price for the new quality of relations with Europe, for changing to the partnership with the US?

Ivanov: I wouldn't say we made any concessions. More likely, we demonstrated the change of our appearance. What was alerting in the relations with the USSR and at the first stage of relations with Russia? Unpredictability. Our partners were afraid that Russia might abuse the opinion of the majority and act at its own discretion. You might say: the US has been acting likewise. Unfortunately, it does in some specific cases. Nowadays, the prior significance in our principles and approaches is given to respect for the UN Charter and standards of the international law. In my opinion, this has changed the attitude toward us.

Question: I disagree about the targets and tasks. I still think that the Foreign Ministry hasn't clearly verbalized our position apropos of Central Asia. It would be nice to hear: how we see the medium-term prospects of relations with Central Asian states; what are we rejoiced and alarmed at, how we see cooperation with America?

Ivanov: We have mentioned already: the threat for Russia lies in the Caucasus and at the Asian border. A threat proceeding from Afghanistan, rather than a global nuclear catastrophe or an aggression on the part of the US or NATO was considered among the basic threats. Therefore, we supported the Northern Alliance, aiming at deviating the threat from our borders, rather than changing the system there - it is any country's domestic affair.

Following September 11, when the entire world community united against the Talibs and al Qaeda, active cooperation with the international coalition, primarily in the settlement of our own tasks, was Russia's natural reaction, and not because we wanted to favor anybody. Independently Russia wouldn't be able to achieve what the coalition had gained in the joint efforts.

Question: Does it mean that the term of the US military presence in the region gives us no terrible headache and we wouldn't be active in this issue?

Ivanov: America's military presence in Central Asia might be justified taking into account the term which the UN Security Council will set for the peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan. The Afghani administration proceeds from the fact that eighteen months will be enough for it to form its own army and security agencies. As for the bilateral relations, Central Asian states will be settling these issues basing on their own approaches. The US is not planning to stay the military contingent in the region for long, we were told at the US Department of State.

Question: Supported by the money, efficiency of the Americans wouldn't undoubtedly make the Asian leaders to neglect Russia and face the US. However, this might cause surrender of the economic positions by Russia: preferences will be given to American companies. Turkmenistan, for instance, is already negotiating construction of the Trans Afghani gas pipeline jointly with the US.

Ivanov: We cannot prohibit building a multi-vector policy to any state. It causes competition. These states must develop their economies since they cannot be in the sands, awaiting someone to descend from heaven. We are looking for markets, investments; so are they. Moreover, it is unnecessary to oust anybody from the region or not to admit anybody into it. Cooperation is possible. Together with Kazakhstan and the US we have constructed the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, and it has been making profits for everyone. The fact that we shouldn't allow being ousted or our interests being pinched is quite a different matter.

Question: Who became the author of changing the concept of relations with Ukraine? It has been altered sharply over the past six months.

Ivanov: The president.

Question: What was your role in the latest dispute between Russia and Belarus?

Ivanov: The problem of Belarus is simple, yet complicated at the same time. It is simple because both Moscow and Minsk understand the need for close cooperation. However, how should this alliance be structured? It is not the matter of Belarus' joining the structure of the Russian Federation. Two sovereign states are supposed to build new principles of their relations. In our opinion, most appropriate it would be to follow the principle of structures, which proved their viability, particularly the EU.

Question: We loved Lukashenko so tenderly in the election campaign, protected him from Europe and started to pinch him a few months later.

Ivanov: There's nothing strange in this policy. The discussion is underway, each party involved is upholding its point of view. Debating is underway in the EU, disputing are taking place between Russia and Ukraine, so why can't we arouse dispute here? Belarus is a nation friendly to us, we need to respect it and its citizens.

Question: Do you admit, for instance, that Ukraine and even Belarus might claim to NATO or the EU a few years later?

Ivanov: I doubt it immensely. I expect NATO be undergo deep transformation in the next few years, dependently of which the alliance is to become; possibly, its structure might look differently. It is quite evident that NATO with its current structure is unable to resolve the tasks set in connection with new threats and challenges.

Question: What about the EU?

Ivanov: I think after the first stage of expansion ends, a long period of adaptation will follow. It shouldn't be forgotten that the countries which now intend to join the EU are being subsidized. In order to "digest" the expansion the EU might spend over a decade. I also think this process will be rather painful.

Question: Regarding our relations with Europe. Why, instead of discussing expansion of contacts and therefore more liberal visa mechanisms, we are stubbornly upholding the point "not a step back" and appeal - in connection with Kaliningrad - to corridors of the times of the Cold War?

Ivanov: We are ready to introduce non-visa regime with any EU member state. We are not canceling non-visa regimes with the contenders to the EU at our initiative. On the contrary, we are trying to mollify the visa regime. These countries perceive that the visa regime is unfavorable for them - it reduces the flow of tourists sharply. Nevertheless, they are forced to fulfill Brussels' demand. We are negotiating Brussels, but, unfortunately, I don't think any real progress is possible in this issue within the next few years. Combating illegal migration was given priority at the latest EU summit, i.e. the EU member states will be strengthening their outer borders because for these states migration is turning into a serious problem. Unfortunately, we are at a complicated situation with visas. This also has to do with the US, which is toughening its policy.

Question: However, in respect for the US, we have managed if not liberalize then reduce the cost of visas.

Ivanov: It is true. But regarding liberalization... Unfortunately, thus far it is quite the other way round. This doesn't concern Russia alone. The US is toughening the requirements to all migrants, including those from the neighboring states. It is a paradoxical situation: we are telling that the Cold War has ended, it is necessary to extend contacts between people, create unified information space, etc. However, the situation with contacts is becoming harder...

As for Kaliningrad and the corridors: I would request to forget the word "corridor." No corridors are under discussion. The thing is about free communication for the Russians; this problem is solvable, with respect for sovereignty of any country via which the transit goes. In the case, this is Lithuania; no transit was planned via Poland, due to the problem of passing the border. As for the transit: there are definite routes of ensuring security if this alarms somebody. This is a technical issue. However, it was raised to the political level.

Question: What do you mean under transit?

Ivanov: Transit via Lithuania from one Russian border to another.

Question: By ground and without a visa?

Ivanov: Correct. We have asked our European partners: what are you alarmed at? If it is illegal migration, there's simple way to settle this: joint control bodies are created on both borders to suppress any danger. If it is unwillingness to make an exception from the Schengen, then this is a political issue. The situation is unique and requires an extraordinary approach.

Question: Many are saying that within a decade China, our Eastern neighbor, might be a great problem for us. However, we are supplying armaments and military hardware to China, together with production licences, and don't allow a single word of criticism. Are we afraid already, or perceive that if we do, our Chinese comrades will shut the door on us?

Ivanov: We are neighbors with China and will remain neighbors. There are two ways to avoid the apprehensions which are indeed expressed from time to time: to build a big cordon, mount military installations around it and think they will ensure safety for us - is what we did before. Secondly, we can lay solid legal basis, construct relations, meeting the requirements of both states, expand the sphere of cooperation.

Question: Why is the Foreign Ministry being criticized like that, and why does foreign policy seem to be the only sphere which is divided among so many departments? Many explain it with the Foreign Ministry's weakness and intend to bereave you of the powers further on.

Ivanov: Foreign policy is not the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry alone. All state structures are participating in foreign contacts. It is the issue of coordination. In my opinion, over the past few years coordination has been strengthened, primarily because the president himself, who determines the foreign policy in compliance with the Constitution is active. I notice neither hesitation, nor attempts to bereave us of anything. At least, I can declare with full responsibility: over the past few years, nobody has bereft the ministry of any powers. On the contrary, the ministry's coordinative role has been strengthened at various levels.

Question: You are said to be out of a narrow circle admitted to discussion of ideas in the foreign policy with the president.

Ivanov: It is hard for me to tell who says that... Over the past years, not a single fundamental decision regarding Russia's foreign policy has been made without my participation or without accounting for the Foreign Ministry's opinion.

Question: What other tasks do you set for the next political season?

Ivanov: We need to "fill in" the agreements we have reached. We have signed the agreement on offensive nuclear weapons and a declaration with the US, and they shouldn't remain on paper alone.

We are now preparing a series of activities; somewhere in the second half of September we will hold the first meeting of the commission of foreign and defense ministries in Washington. The second block concerns launching the mechanism of Russia-NATO Council. Even if slight, but specific results should be achieved in the next season, for instance, an agreement on using our military potentials in rescue operations at sea. Thirdly, it is necessary to launch the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, what requires drawing up some 20-30 legal acts. At the moment, about 10 countries are willing to join the organization. Regarding the EU, we aim at resolving a series of issues, primarily the Kaliningrad problem.

Question: Is it still interesting for you?

Ivanov: You know, everything was simple when the bipolar system existed: the Soviet Politburo made the decisions and your task was to see them carried out. Nowadays, diplomacy has a vast sphere of activity and many opportunities. Whether you manage to implement them or fail is quite a different matter...

(Translated by Andrei Ryabochkin)

 

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