#11
The Russia Journal
May 31-June 6, 2002
Moving to a new U.S. Russia-Eurasia policy
By Gordon M. Hahn
Dr. Gordon M. Hahn is The Russia Journal’s political analyst and a visiting research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

To win the war against terrorism and incorporate Russia and Eurasia into the West’s zone of peace and prosperity, the United States needs a revolution in its foreign-policy thinking. It needs to turn the "heartland thesis" inside out.

From heartland thesis

In 1919, Sir Halford MacKinder outlined a strategy for expanding British imperial power and containing Russia’s reach. It was influenced by imperial competition between the great sea power and Eurasia’s great land power of the 19th century. The "seaman," England, and the "landman," Russia – as MacKinder called them – probed and warred to expand their empires along Eurasia’s periphery from Afghanistan to the Crimea. MacKinder concluded that to expand British power it was imperative to control the "world island," the Eurasian super-continent, and its heartland, Russia.

This preceded the West’s policy of containing communism after World War II. As the Soviet Union took hold of Eastern Europe after Nazism’s demise, George Kennan, a U.S. Embassy official in Moscow, proposed a second policy of containment: a system of alliances along the Soviet perimeter from Asia to Europe that would deter communist expansion until the system reformed or failed. Containment II preserved a cold peace in a potentially very hot Cold War.

Containment III

Containment was abandoned briefly after the Cold War. Former Presidents George Bush Sr. and Bill Clinton tried to build bridges, however lackadaisically and ineffectively, to a partially democratizing heartland.

Then, for reasons of the NATO bureaucracy’s "organizational maintenance" and domestic American politics influenced by electoral support from the U.S. Polish community and defense industry, Clinton moved to expand NATO, alienating Russia’s elite.

Soon, noises emerged from Republicans in the U.S. Congress that America’s post-Soviet or Eurasia policy was too focused on the heartland – Russia. Ukraine, despite a climate even less democratic than that of Russia, suddenly became the darling of American strategists. Kiev moved up to third place on the list of U.S. foreign-aid recipients.

U.S. economic assistance to, and NATO cooperation with, other former Soviet republics were boosted as well. Containment III was emerging by default.

The August 1998 Russian financial collapse and the bombing of Belgrade alienated the Russian population and seemed to spell the end of the Russian-American partnership.

New-old containment

The current U.S. administration came into office unsure of its Russia policy. It rejected Clinton’s "permissive engagement" policy and appeared ready to deepen accidental containment. The new plan was to ignore Russia in practice, while at the same time declaring that it was a threat. This confused policy suggested that the incidental, almost accidental containment III would be ratcheted up, also by default. The Republican administration would not abandon NATO expansion, and early signs of repealing Clinton’s universal humanitarian interventionism evolved into policies of retaining the U.S. presence in Bosnia and Kosovo. But the events of Sept. 11 undercut Bush’s neo-isolationism and the inherited containment III.

Twisting MacKinder

Containment I and, most certainly, II were suitable strategies for their times. Containment III was not. Sept. 11 could do what Western policymakers could not: turn the heartland thesis inside out and seek to consolidate democracy, markets, and stability in Eurasia from Russia out. The United States should use its still-emerging partnership with Russia to advance Western security interests and expand democratic and market values to other post-Soviet states and beyond. To do this, the West will have to reconcile itself to an enhancement of Russian power on the "world island." The West should not be a priori adverse to this. It has repeatedly asserted to the Russians that the post-Cold War world is a post-zero-sum game.

Both Western and Russian influence can be enhanced in regions like Central Asia and the Transcaucasus simultaneously and even jointly, rather than in parallel and competition. In the new Afghan war against al Qaida and the Taliban, the risks of parallel efforts turning into competitive ones have become clear. U.S. efforts centered on the Pashtuns in the south, while Russia stepped up its backing of the Northern Alliance dominated by Tajiks, Uzbeks and Khazaris. Suspicions among policymakers on both sides grew over the appointment of the interim government, support for opposing factions in the government and building a new multi-ethnic Afghan military.

Stability and cooperation in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus are crucial. Any competition between the West and Russia can only destabilize these weak states. Growing instability in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia since the United States assumed more of a presence in the region is no accident. Russia and the West, therefore, must work jointly towards democracy, prosperity, and stability in the C.I.S. and along its rim in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and elsewhere.

Inside out

What specifically can Russia and the West do together? A good start has been made in building an infrastructure for cooperation on security issues relevant to the region. This includes the joint Russian-American working group on Afghanistan, to be upgraded to one on international terrorism; working groups on Iran and on proliferation of nuclear and rocket technology proposed by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov here at Stanford on May 6 and the new Russia-NATO Council of 20. Working groups on interethnic conflict and U.S.-Russian economic cooperation in the region are in order as well. In addition, the United States could seek funding for a joint U.S.-Russian-C.I.S. institute for the study of democratization and market development in the C.I.S.

Militarily, Russia and NATO should prepare some limited joint military operations for when and where they may be called into the war against terrorism. Cooperation between our intelligence services must be maintained and expanded, where possible.

Economically, the United States and Russia should cooperate as well as compete for markets and pipelines in the C.I.S. One way to ease President

Vladimir Putin’s shift westward would be to develop joint projects in the cleansed regions of the "axis of evil." Afghanistan would be a good place to start by arranging a joint American-Russian-Central Asian consortium to build gas- and oilexport pipelines to Karachi. This might also demonstrate to Iran the benefits of a potential regime transformation.

To wean Russia from its Cold War-era economic partners like Iraq, the United States should guarantee that any new Iraqi government honor the Ba’athist regime’s contracts with, and debts to, Moscow. In the event that this becomes impossible after Saddam, the West could provide compensation for any lost contracts or debt payments..

Only this kind of cooperation can ensure a U.S. victory in the twilight struggles against international terrorism and for global liberty and security.

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